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Preface  
This is a thesis even more timely than I expected it to be. One year after I 
commenced my doctoral work, stunned TV audiences across the globe were 
shocked by live footage of the devastating attacks on lower Manhattan. 
The terrorist assaults of 11 September 2001 dramatically altered our per-
ceptions of security. But they did more. Under the rubric of “War on Terror-
ism”, a jagged political focus on international terrorism and a massive hunt 
for so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was soon instigated. Never be-
fore have more resources, political prestige, military power, and human los-
ses gone into the fight against terrorists.  
It is in this heated environment and action-packed context this thesis as-
pires to voice some suggestions on how to best deal with the threat of nu-
clear terrorism.  
The thesis came through during a four-year period starting August 2000. 
It builds naturally on my book Atomic Terrorism (1999). The research was 
made possible through a grant graciously provided by the Norwegian Re-
search Council. 
This assessment of nuclear terrorism has also been a journey on the per-
sonal level, where many of my interests and fields of professional expertise 
have converged in somewhat unexpected ways. My background in nuclear 
physics and previous work at the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 
to assist in securing and protecting fissile material in Northwest Russia, has 
helped me to understand the technical aspects of the new nuclear threat. 
Likewise, my experience in radiation protection and my studies in media 
science and risk communication have deepened my understanding of the po-
tential of “atoms” as strong tools of terrorist coercion. The efforts of domes-
tic and international NGO communities have showed me the importance of 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as essential means towards genu-
ine nuclear security.  
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) provided me 
with a unique chance to merge and further develop these issues into an inter-
disciplinary research portfolio, in a highly qualified and exciting environ-
ment. I am thankful for the opportunities given to me, and I would like to 
express my gratitude to all my friends and colleagues at NUPI.  
This thesis is my own work and views – and so is of course the responsi-
bility for any inaccuracies or errors of analysis of facts. I am, however, in-
debted to a great many people. Without wishing to leave anyone out, the fol-
lowing persons should particularly be mentioned: Sverre Lodgaard, for al-
ways being ready to explore the boundaries of nuclear security wisdom and 
the inherent opportunities of nuclear arms control. Sverre also served well as 
my principal advisor. Tore Bjørgo, for familiarising me with the intricacies 
of contemporary terrorism – and for introducing me to NUPI in the first 
place. Both of them joined in on the reference group for the doctoral work, 
where also Knut Gussgård, Steinar Høibraaten, Ole Reistad, Jon B. Reitan, 
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Terje Strand, and Arnfinn Tønnessen participated. I am very grateful to you 
all.  
I would also like to extend special thanks to my co-authors of some of the 
underlying research papers for the thesis: Annette Schaper, Frank Barnaby, 
and Roger G. Johnston. Thanks for your willingness to think creatively to 
further the nuclear terrorism debate and for making nuclear risk assessments 
and nuclear arms control exciting issues. 
Many others have provided useful inputs and comments along the way. 
Here let me single out Amund Solvi Bremer, as well as Gunnar Arbman, 
Nils Bøhmer, Ståle Eskeland, Charles Ferguson, Daniel Heradstveit, Alistair 
Millar, Inga-Britt Mærli, Pernille Rieker, Erik Riul, Andreas Selliaas, Jørn 
Siljeholm, Heidi Toft, Stein Tønnesson, Lars van Dassen, and Lars Weisæth.  
Great appreciation is due to Finn Ingebretsen, for helping to bring back 
my interdisciplinary research to the spheres of physics at the University of 
Oslo, where, I hope, it may promote further research and education on nu-
clear security.   
I am indebted to Susan Høivik for her highly professional and swift copy-
editing work. Vibeke L. Sand and Liv Høvik are to be thanked for kind lay-
out assistance. Ole Dahl-Gulliksen and Ivar Windheim assisted in getting 
some of the figures into shape. Jan Risvik has helped by providing useful 
semantic clarifications. The generous support shown by the librarians at 
NUPI has been invaluable: Dagfrid Hermansen, Hazel Henriksen, Tore Gus-
tavsson and a team of conscientious objectors were always ready to process 
my literature requests.   
A grant from the US–Norway Fulbright Foundation for Educational Ex-
change enabled me to experience new professional and political environ-
ments, and to explore the linkages of technology and security. This triggered 
a deep interest in the prospects of fissile material verification and allowed 
me a glimpse into US nuclear security thinking and priorities. Two years in 
the United States have not only shaped my thinking on international nuclear 
security relations, including issues related to the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
They have also given my professional career a boost – and a range of inter-
national friends and contacts.  
Let me take this opportunity to thank the Fulbright Foundation, as well as 
friends and colleagues at the Center for International Security and Coopera-
tion (CISAC), Stanford University, and Sandia National Laboratory, Cali-
fornia, for those exciting, inspiring and knowledge-packed years. My thanks 
to all of you for accommodating me and allowing me to talk, repeatedly, 
about the benefits of cooperative nuclear security and arms control.  
It is my hope that the thesis can contribute to diminishing the threat of 
nuclear terrorism, fuelling a discussion on the role we would like to give nu-
clear material and nuclear explosives in the 21st century. 
 
Oslo, 24 March 2004 
 
Morten Bremer Mærli 
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Executive Summary  
This thesis assesses the threat of nuclear terrorism and identifies strategies 
for diminishing the risk of such incidents. Never before have the material, 
the technology, the know-how, and, perhaps, the motivations needed to per-
form acts of nuclear terrorism been more exploitable.  
Building on eight research papers, the thesis sets out to answer three 
principal questions:  
 
 “Can terrorists possibly perform acts of terror by means of crude 
nuclear explosive devices based on highly enriched uranium? What 
are the main barriers to the production of crude nuclear explo-
sives?” 
 
 “Is there an optimum way of protecting fissile material from falling 
into terrorist hands? What role – if any – do transparency and non-
intrusive verification play in this regard?”   
 
 “Within legitimate security constraints, what kind of measures could 
be put in place to enhance the transparency and non-intrusive veri-
fication of stocks of sensitive fissile material?” 
 
Answers to these questions may be summarized as follows:  
 
To would-be nuclear terrorists, access to fissile material is the most formid-
able obstacle to their nuclear ambitions. If non-state actors have sufficient 
quantities of unirradiated, or “fresh”, highly enriched uranium (HEU), the 
production of crude nuclear explosives could be within their reach. Terrorists 
will have far less stringent requirements to their nuclear explosives in terms 
of reliability, safety, security and delivery, than states do.  
Once the needed quantities of fissile material have been obtained, it is 
easier to construct a nuclear explosive device using highly enriched uranium 
than using plutonium. Technical barriers to the construction of crude nuclear 
explosives based on HEU should not be regarded sufficient to avoid nuclear 
terrorism, because:  
 
 HEU allows for the easy and reliable manufacture of crude nuclear 
explosives;   
 
 perpetrators with access to sufficient quantities of HEU of high 
enough quality will have good chances of achieving an explosion in 
the lower kiloton-range, i.e. with a yield comparable to that of the 
Hiroshima bomb; 
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 HEU exists in large quantities, in part under unsatisfactory levels of 
protection, control and accounting; 
 
 HEU detection, e.g. at border-crossings and checkpoints, is demand-
ing due to the low levels of radiation that are emitted;  
 
 radiation levels from unirradiated uranium are low and the handling 
of HEU involves limited health hazards. 
  
Several implications for countermeasures against nuclear terrorism and pro-
tection and control of highly enriched uranium follow from these findings.  
There is scant protection against the pressure, heat, and radiation that 
would ensue from the detonation of even a crudely assembled nuclear de-
vice. There would be very few possibilities for meaningful mitigation after a 
nuclear terrorist attack. Reducing vulnerability by shielding particular or 
possible targets is neither prudent nor desirable. Accordingly, efforts to 
thwart nuclear terrorism should aim entirely at prevention. 
Detecting illicit fissile material at borders or in a busy urban environ-
ment, however, is challenging. The production of crude nuclear explosive 
devices could go undetected. To stem nuclear terrorism, comprehensive 
stockpile inventories and stringent norms should be developed to ensure that 
all stocks of highly enriched uranium are secure and rendered unusable as 
nuclear explosives. Denying terrorists access to fissile material through satis-
factory security at possible sources of supply could be the be-all and end-all 
of nuclear terrorism countermeasures. 
Hence, a key issue for nuclear terrorism prevention becomes how to en-
sure optimum nuclear husbandry. The past decade has shown some remark-
able achievements in the field of practical, cooperative nuclear arms control. 
Scientists and others whom very few had believed would ever collaborate 
have worked jointly to secure the excessive stocks of fissile material that 
were produced during the Cold War arms race. But despite unprecedented 
efforts, the majority of the security challenges remain. Less than half of the 
estimated hundreds of tons of proliferation-attractive fissile material in Rus-
sia have been secured with international assistance.  
The highly enriched uranium, enough for tens of thousands of crude nu-
clear explosive devices, is managed with very little of the transparency nec-
essary to build confidence that it is safe and secure, or to provide the founda-
tion for deep, transparent and irreversible reductions. Optimal countermea-
sures against nuclear terrorism thus require significantly more openness on ex-
isting holdings of fissile material in the nuclear weapon states. Appropriate 
schemes for non-intrusive verification of sensitive stocks of HEU are avail-
able and ready for implementation.  
Keeping a massive shroud of secrecy on stocks of highly enriched ura-
nium can only maintain and exacerbate current uncertainties in fissile mate-
rial stockpiles and levels of protection and control. This could increase the 
risk of diversion and, accordingly, elevate the threat of nuclear terrorism. It 
is not beneficial to the security of any state. 
Chapter 1: Objectives and Scope of 
the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
 
No terrorist group is known to have developed or deployed a nuclear explo-
sive device, and the severity of the threat of nuclear terrorism remains dis-
puted. Never before, however, have the material, the technology, the know-
how, and, perhaps, the motivations needed to perform this specialized terror-
ist tactic been more exploitable. This thesis assesses the threat of nuclear 
terrorism and identifies strategies for diminishing the risk of such incidents. 
Nuclear terrorism is probably the least understood of all contemporary 
nuclear dangers. Countermeasures so far instigated may be less than optimal. 
Contemporary security policies and nuclear threat responses are often driven 
by worst-case scenarios and perceptions of vulnerability. Moreover, they 
tend to emphasize demand-driven proliferation, e.g. the possible quest for 
nuclear explosives by states and non-state actors. Consequently, the pros-
pects of deliberate state-to-terrorist nuclear proliferation have come to the 
fore of our collective attention, as well as of evolving military counter-
proliferation strategies.  
In parallel, a decisive push for reducing domestic susceptibility to terror-
ists is developing. “Homeland Security”, with its mix of border controls and 
enhanced emergency response capabilities and domestic surveillance, has 
preoccupied the US, and to a lesser extent the European, public debate, as 
well as budget-makers. However, detecting illicit fissile material, or nuclear 
terrorism plots in the making, could be daunting tasks.  
 1.1.1 Supply-Side Nuclear Security 
 
Rather than taking a demand-driven, vigilant approach to the challenge of 
nuclear terrorism, this thesis will look at ways to effectively prevent nuclear 
terrorism by emphasizing the supply side of the problem. To terrorists, diffi-
culty in access to highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is likely to 
constitute the single most important obstacle to their nuclear ambitions. Fis-
sile material is an essential component of any nuclear explosive device. De-
nying terrorists this material through supply-side security could be the be-all 
and end-all of all nuclear terrorism countermeasures.  
Yet, surprisingly little scholarly and political attention has been devoted 
to threat-reducing activities to secure and control the excessive stocks of 
Cold War fissile material that are vulnerable to diversion, theft or sale,1 as 
well as the effects of such measures in terms of a reduced nuclear terrorist 
                                                     
1  One important initiative is the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. See 
Section 4.2.1.1.1.  
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threat. When grappling with the threat of nuclear terrorism, a key question is 
how best to deny terrorists access to fissile material. An integral part of this 
thesis is therefore devoted to the issue of achieving adequate fissile material 
control and protection through optimum nuclear husbandry, transparency 
and non-intrusive verification.2  
Eight research articles create the scientific backbone of the study. In an 
interdisciplinary analysis, they create a totality that illuminates evolving nu-
clear terrorism threats, discusses various threat-reducing approaches, and 
assesses a range of practical efforts to deny terrorists fissile material. Hence, 
this thesis is both explorative and normative in character. 
1.1.2 The Line of Least Nuclear Terrorist Resistance  
 
To terrorists with access to highly enriched uranium (HEU), crude nuclear 
explosives of a gun-type design are likely to represent the line of least resis-
tance to their nuclear ambitions.3 For one thing, it is considerably simpler to 
make a bomb using enriched uranium than to make one using plutonium, 
although the critical mass is larger (Bodansky 1996, 271; Falkenrath et al. 
1998, 162; Hoenig 2001, 33; Cordesman 2001, 33; Narath 2002, 6).4 More-
over, highly enriched uranium is easier to handle than plutonium and may 
thus represent a special nuclear terrorist threat (Falkenrath 1998, 59; von 
Hippel 2001, 1; Boutwell et al. 2002, 4–7; Committee on Science and Tech-
nology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 40).  
In consequence, crude HEU weapons represent a particularly relevant 
item for baseline analysis, for assessing what nuclear terrorists may accom-
plish – i.e. the minimum requirements for the production of improvised nu-
clear explosive devices. In order to understand what terrorists might do and 
what kind of impediments potential perpetrators would encounter when us-
ing the most primitive methods available, this thesis has as its principal study 
objective:   
 
                                                     
2  Longman’s Dictionary of the English Language (1988, 715) defines “husbandry” as “the 
management of resources”, and the “scientific control and management of a branch (or 
farming)”. A “husband” is a manager or steward, especially one that is prudent and 
thrifty. Throughout this study, “nuclear husbandry” hence signifies the long-term respon-
sible, careful, and judicious handling, protection and control of fissile material. 
3  “Crude” is here used in the meaning of “rudimentary”, “rough”, and “simple”, i.e. techni-
cally unsophisticated nuclear explosive devices. The possible effects of a nuclear terrorist 
explosion in a densely populated area are discussed in Appendix II.    
4  If the neutrons from the fission of a nucleus cause the fission of at least one other nucleus, 
a fission chain reaction is produced. The minimum mass that can sustain a nuclear fission 
chain reaction is called the “critical mass”. A “sub-critical mass” is unable to sustain the 
chain reaction. If the fission of a nucleus leads to two or more fissions, which in turn lead 
to another doubling, etc., the process grows exponentially and results in an explosive 
chain reaction. This system is “super-critical”. The fission cross-section and the average 
number of neutrons per fission are somewhat smaller for U-235 than they are for Pu-239, 
making the critical mass larger. However, with uranium there is essentially no problem of 
premature detonation due to neutrons from spontaneous fission (see Appendix III). A 
number of actinide nuclei can support a chain reaction, but only U-235 and Pu-238 have 
proven practicable to date. One or more nuclear weapon states may, however, have tested 
a nuclear explosive using neptunium-237 (Albright and Barbour 1999, 85).  
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To assess the risk of nuclear terrorism associated with 
highly enriched uranium (HEU), and to identify optimum 
ways to reduce this terrorism risk.    
 
This in turn presupposes investigating the competence and the technological 
sophistication needed to manufacture crude HEU nuclear explosive devices. 
A first derived study objective is therefore: 
 
To assess terrorist pathways to nuclear explosive capabili-
ties, and assess the feasibility of and the barriers to the 
production of crude HEU nuclear explosive devices. 
 
To set off a nuclear explosive, terrorists will most likely use a device fabri-
cated from externally acquired fissile material (Arbman and Ringbom 2002, 
3; Barnaby 2003a, 2). A second derived study objective is therefore:  
 
To assess how the risk of nuclear terrorism may be reduced 
by introducing specific security measures on highly en-
riched uranium; further, to consider any limitations and 
obstacles to the implementation of such security measures. 
 
On the basis of these study objectives, three principal research questions 
have been formulated.  
1.2 Research Questions 
1.2.1 [Q1]: On “Nuclear Terrorism Feasibility”  
 
“Can terrorists possibly perform acts of terror by means of crude nuclear 
explosive devices based on highly enriched uranium? What are the main 
barriers to the production of crude nuclear explosives?” 
 
Principal research question number one [Q1] and related issues are explored 
in papers [P1], [P2], and [P3] (see below). Answers are offered in Section 
4.1. 
1.2.2 [Q2]: On “Optimum Nuclear Husbandry” 
 
“Is there an optimum way of protecting fissile material from falling into ter-
rorist hands? What role – if any – do transparency and non-intrusive verifi-
cation play in this regard?” 
 
Principal research question number two [Q2] and related issues are explored 
in papers [P4] and [P5] (see below), and answered in Section 4.2. 
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1.2.3 [Q3]: On “Nuclear Transparency and Verification” 
 
“Within legitimate security constraints, what kinds of measures could be put 
in place to enhance the transparency and non-intrusive verification of stocks 
of sensitive fissile material?” 
 
Principal research question number three [Q3] and related issues are ex-
plored in papers [P6], [P7], and [P8] (see below). Section 4.3 offers some 
answers. 
1.3 Structure 
 
The study encompasses six chapters and seven appendixes. This first chapter 
presents the rationale, objectives, structure and scope, terminology, and the 
limitations of the thesis, as well as the underlying research papers. The pri-
mary aim of Chapter 2 is to put the threat of nuclear terrorism and research 
on nuclear terrorism into context. Here, a brief historical outline of nuclear 
terrorism is presented, together with some observations on the current threat 
of nuclear terrorism, as well as on threat development. Chapter 3 provides 
the methodological framework for the analysis: Analytical approaches, tools, 
and limitations are described and discussed. The chapter starts out with a 
discussion of some of the dilemmas associated with nuclear terrorism re-
search. 
In Chapter 4, key findings of the eight research papers are presented in 
three principal sections: Understanding the Nuclear Terrorism Threat; Con-
ceptual Nuclear Husbandry; and Nuclear Husbandry in Practise. The latter 
section uses as a case study fresh naval Russian highly enriched uranium. 
Each section ends with summary answers to the principal research questions 
formulated in Section 1.2. The research findings are presented in light of the 
contextual and analytical framework presented in the two previous chapters, 
and measured against those of other scholars in the field. As such, Chapter 4 
represents more than a mere synopsis of the underlying research articles.  
Chapter 5 concludes the analysis and discusses the direct implications of 
the research findings. Emphasis is on the repercussions for nuclear terrorism 
countermeasures and practical measures for nuclear arms control. A set of 
specific policy recommendations on how to meet the threat of nuclear terror-
ism through optimum nuclear husbandry is presented. The chapter also of-
fers some general considerations on nuclear terrorism risk assessment and 
model development. Chapter 6 offers some reflections on the research find-
ings. The findings, as well as the implications of the findings, are put into the 
current political context, with a view to furthering the overall scientific and 
political discourse on nuclear terrorism risk assessments and nuclear terror-
ism threat reduction. A critique of the ongoing “War on Terrorism” forms an 
integral part of the chapter.     
Underlying technical issues are presented in the Appendices. A brief as-
sessment of the similarities and differences of “radiological” and “nuclear” 
terror, two commonly confused forms of terrorism, is presented in Appendix 
I. The possible effects of a crude nuclear device are described in Appendix 
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II. Particular challenges associated with the production of crude nuclear ex-
plosives are discussed in Appendix III. In Appendix IV, open-source infor-
mation on Russian naval fuel is presented as background for the case-study 
research, while Appendix V gives an overview of past thefts of fresh naval 
fuel in Northwest Russia. Appendix VI presents the status of US support 
activities to secure fresh Russian naval fuel. Possible spin-offs of the study 
that could be relevant to nuclear non-proliferation, emergency preparedness, 
risk communication and education are briefly discussed in Appendix VII.  
Key terms are presented in a glossary at the end of the thesis. All suppor-
tive research papers are reproduced in full in the Addendum.5  
1.4 Terminology   
 
The study distinguishes between “nuclear terrorism” and “radiological ter-
rorism” – two related yet distinct forms of terrorism. This is further discus-
sed in Section 1.5.2, as well as in Appendix I.  
Throughout the study, a clear distinction is also made between “nuclear 
weapons” and “nuclear explosive devices”. Where states may possess nu-
clear weapons, terrorist may only be able to produce crude nuclear explo-
sives (see Section 4.1.2.4.2).6 No attempt, however, is made to discriminate 
between terms like “crude nuclear explosives” and “improvised nuclear ex-
plosives”, or simply “nuclear devices”. All these terms should be considered 
as referring to simple nuclear explosives that are possibly within the techni-
cal reach of terrorists, as opposed to the more technologically advanced nu-
clear weapons possessed by states. 
For reasons of simplicity, the expressions “fissile material”, “direct-use 
material”, “weapons-grade material”, or “weapons-useable material” are all 
used interchangeably as well. Basically, they indicate material that may be 
applied to construct workable, crude nuclear devices.7  
Likewise, the study refers indiscriminately to “terrorists” and “non-state 
actors”, simply ignoring any semantic differences between the two, as well 
as the inherent problems associated with the term “terrorism”. Labelling op-
ponents or adversaries as “terrorists” is a common technique to de-legitimize 
and demonize them (United Nations 2002b, 6) (on these problems, see 
Bjørgo and Heradstveit 1993, 13–16; Garton Ash 2001, 3w). 
                                                     
5  References found on the Internet, or the “web”, are throughout the text marked with a “w” 
after the page in question. Page numbering may thus be somewhat arbitrary compared to 
those of book references (generally, the Internet page numbers should reflect the equiva-
lent page numbering for a Word-document). 
6  Generally, “nuclear explosives” can be part of a military weapon, terrorists may use it, it 
may be applied for peaceful purposes, or it can be constructed solely as a part of a re-
search and development project (Swahn 1992, 208).  
7  Obviously, this collective jargon is a simplification. According to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, “direct-use material”, that is nuclear material that could be used 
for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrich-
ment, includes plutonium containing less than 80% of Pu-238, highly enriched uranium 
and U-233. Another category is the so-called “special fissionable material”. This category 
contains “Pu-239, U-233, and uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 and U-235, or any 
material containing one or more of the foregoing; and other such fissionable material as 
the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine” (International Atomic Energy 
Agency 2002b, 30-31 and 33).     
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Neither does the study distinguish strictly between “threat” and “risk”. As 
seen in Section 3.4.1, “risk” may be given a fairly concise mathematical 
definition and is thus in many instances a highly quantifiable and “objective” 
parameter.8 “Threat” is not so much a statement of a probability as a (perso-
nally) felt or perceived concern about a looming peril. Accordingly, Tønnes-
sen (2002, 7) defines “threat” as “an indication of impending danger”.  
Moreover, whereas “threat” imports specific consequences, “risk” is 
based upon measurable losses. These losses can be from an attack, or they 
can be inadvertent. Hence, whereas a “threat” requires some level of inten-
tion, “risk” may not. As such, the two concepts represent quite different 
ways of describing and interpreting hazards. For a highly non-quantitative 
study like the present one, however, the somewhat inexact mixing of “risk” 
and “threat” should cause minimal confusion. 
Nor is a stark distinction is made between risk reduction and risk preven-
tion. The terms are interrelated, and may represent a sliding continuum of 
activities. For instance, time will be needed to complete the work of improv-
ing security for fissile material in Russia. Until then, the efforts will be of a 
risk-reducing character. Risk prevention will be accomplished only when all 
nuclear proliferation-attractive material is duly secured. As such, risk pre-
vention represents an ideal, and risk reduction a means towards that end.9 
A recurring phrase in the thesis is “practical arms control measures”. This 
is a general, and admittedly somewhat imprecise, term used for any meas-
ures implemented to protect and control nuclear material, e.g. to increase 
nuclear security. As such, the phrase is more explicit than the widely used 
“arms control”, a term that normally encompasses an entire range of politi-
cal/diplomatic and verification efforts, often in conjunction with formalized 
treaties (see e.g. Gallagher 1999).  
“Weapons of Mass Destruction” is arduous phrase (see Section 6.2) that 
is generally avoided. Throughout the text it has been substituted with 
“chemical”, “biological”, “radiological”, and “nuclear” (or simply “CBRN”), 
respectively. 
1.4.1 Definitions  
 
While the scholarly community in general agrees upon the core elements of 
a definition of “terrorism”, discussion continues on how to delimitate the 
term. No real consensus as to what should be denoted “terrorism” has yet 
been established.10 More than 200 different definitions of terrorism now may 
be found in the academic literature (Silke 2003, 2). There exists no clear and 
                                                     
8  Refer for instance to the fields of “Risk Analysis” and “Risk Management”. The latter is 
basically a quantifiable discipline for living with the possibility that future events may 
cause adverse effects. 
9  The author of this thesis owes this point of clarification to Richard Garwin, when he 
commented on my intervention on “Terrorist use of nuclear weapons and control of wea-
pons-useable materials”, at the XV Amaldi Conference on Problems of Global Security, 
Helsinki, 25 September 2003. 
10  This has for instance contributed to slowing down the work for an international conven-
tion for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism. For a summary of this and other internatio-
nal diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear terrorism, see Potter and Florquin 2002.  
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concise working or operative definition of “terrorism” – and certainly not of 
“nuclear terrorism”.  
For the purposes of this study, “nuclear terrorism” is defined as (based on 
Maerli 1999, 24): 
 
Acts of violence and destruction performed by non-state ac-
tors where the means applied are nuclear explosive devices 
– or threats of such actions – with the purpose of inflicting 
destruction, creating a condition of fear, getting attention, 
blackmailing, installing instability, and to affect an audi-
ence beyond the victim(s) directly targeted. 
 
In other words, this study focuses on non-state elements exploring the use or 
threat of use of nuclear explosives to inflict havoc, fear and a deep-felt sense 
of insecurity in the population at large, in order to achieve certain goals. This 
is a narrow definition of “nuclear terrorism” that carries with it several im-
plications.  
Firstly, by emphasizing “non-state actors”, the definition excludes nu-
clear terror in the inter-state domain. Terror has for long been adopted by 
various regimes as an instrument of control and suppression. For decades, 
nuclear weapons and their destructive powers have been used to constrain 
and deter opponent states through the logic of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD). This balance of nuclear terror has been installed despite the illegal-
ity of the weapons and the disarmament obligations of the nuclear-weapon 
states.11  
Secondly, the definition categorizes even credible threats as a form of 
terror, because of the destructive powers of nuclear explosives and hence the 
psychological strain that possible use involves. This is also why the study, 
and the definition, focus on “nuclear terrorism” and not on “nuclear sabo-
tage”, as suggested by others (see e.g. Schmid 2001, 16). Sabotage may have 
additional aims, such as inflicting economic, military or proprietary damage, 
rather than primarily to install fear and devastation.12 
1.5 Scope Limitations   
 
With its core foci, the study has inherent limitations. The following section 
explains what is in the study, and what is not. 
                                                     
11  Nuclear weapon states are obliged, through Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons are, in accordance 
with the NPT, temporarily legal in five countries, not illegal in three others, and forbidden 
everywhere else. Chemical and biological weapons, however, are both legally prohibited 
by treaty, so the challenge they pose is basically one of enforcement. (Perkovich 2003). In 
July 1996, the International Court of Justice ruled that the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons is generally illegal, and that states have an obligation to conclude negotiations on their 
elimination. See www.lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm (last accessed 30 October 2003).  
12  There are overlaps between acts of terrorism and sabotage. Where terrorism rests upon a 
fear of death or severe harm, sabotage involves additional elements of calculated destruc-
tion of properties or installations, with the primary intention to inflict personal or larger 
economic losses or physical damage. 
Morten Bremer Mærli 
objectives and scope of the thesis 
20 
1.5.1 What is In?  
 
The study focuses solely on the possible production of crude nuclear explo-
sive devices by non-state groups, especially the first-generation gun-type 
design – the simplest and probably the most reliable nuclear device ever pro-
duced. Only highly enriched uranium (HEU), and not plutonium, may be 
used in this design. HEU is hence the core object for analysis throughout the 
thesis.  
The critical mass of enriched uranium increases as the relative amount of 
U-235 decreases. It is generally considered possible to construct nuclear ex-
plosives with enrichment levels as low as 20% (Swahn 1992, 47). When di-
luted to an isotopic content less than 15–20% in uranium-235, the material 
cannot be used in a nuclear device, because sufficiently rapid super-critical 
assembly of the explosive becomes impractical and the critical mass too 
large (Moniz and Neff 1978, 42).13 
In consequence, natural uranium has to be enriched if it is to be applied in 
nuclear explosives. While a small-scale enrichment programme might be 
hidden through careful facility design and could, in principle, produce 
enough fissile material for a bomb after several years of operation (Commit-
tee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 41), terror-
ists are unlikely to enrich material themselves (Cordesman 2001, 30; 
Schaper 2002, 19; Arbman and Ringbom 2002, 3). Uranium enrichment is 
equipment-intensive, expensive and time-consuming. In order to manufac-
ture an improvised nuclear explosive device, terrorists would have to steal, 
buy, or receive sufficient amounts of high-quality uranium.  
Highly enriched uranium serves two primary purposes in nuclear-weapon 
states: As the essential ingredient of nuclear weapons, and as reactor fuel for 
naval nuclear propulsion.14 The high enrichment levels establish a natural 
connection between the stocks. The weapons material may be used as fuel 
and vice versa: Virtually all high-quality weapons-grade uranium surplus in 
the USA today is thus kept for naval reactor fuel (Bunn 2000b, 54). As such, 
increased HEU excess declarations and HEU destruction may call for clarifi-
cation of the HEU needs and future consumption of the navies. Today this 
information is classified and beyond the reach of the international commu-
nity (see Appendix IV). HEU is also used in research reactors and at various 
research institutions.15 Current global stocks of HEU are nearly seven times 
greater than the holdings of weapons-grade plutonium.  
                                                     
13  Theoretically, uranium enriched to any level above 6% may be used to make a nuclear 
explosive. For all practical purposes, however, the size of the critical mass required would 
make this impractical. Frank von Hippel, personal communication with Arbman et al. 
2004, 11 September 2003.  
14  HEU may be categorised by way of utilization. HEU stocks exist as (based on Schaper 
1997, 21–22): (1) military material in operational nuclear weapons and their logistics 
pipeline, (2) military material held in reserve for military purposes, in assembled weapons 
and in other forms (e.g. naval fuel), (3) military material in weapons slated for disman-
tling, (4) military material withdrawn from dismantled weapons, (5) military material de-
clared for transfer to the civilian sector, (6) material currently in reactors (including naval 
and research reactors, and power reactors) and their logistics pipelines and storages, and 
finally, as (7) irradiated HEU in spent fuel from reactors, or in vitrified form for final dis-
posal. The primary focus of this study is on unirradiated naval fuel under item (2). 
15  According to IAEA estimates, a total of more than 1,300 kg of highly enriched uranium 
exists in research reactors in 27 countries, sometimes in quantities large enough to make a 
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Both the material in the nuclear-weapon stockpile and the naval fuel 
stocks are kept under strict national surveillance, under a shroud of secre-
cy.16 So far, the use of HEU in the military sector has attracted little non-
proliferation attention. Most non-proliferation analyses of fissile material in 
recent years have focused on weapons-grade plutonium slated for disposal 
(Glaser 2003, 34 and 36). But as the international community tries to tighten 
the noose around stocks of weapons-useable nuclear material to lay the foun-
dation for deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals and optimum nuclear non-prolifer-
ation activities, it will, sooner or later, have to deal with the naval stocks of 
highly enriched uranium as well (von Hippel 1997, 6). Accordingly, stocks 
of Russian unirradiated naval fuel are here used as a case study for the intro-
duction of transparency and non-intrusive verification on sensitive fissile 
material.17  
1.5.2 What is Out?  
 
With an exclusive focus on the latter, the thesis distinguishes between pos-
sible acts of radiological terrorism, terrorist attacks against nuclear power 
plants, and nuclear terrorism (see Section 1.4.1). Too often, even radiologi-
cal terrorism is put under the rubric of “nuclear terrorism” (see e.g. Potter 
and Spector, 2002; Whittaker 2002, 162; Potter and Florquin 2002, 1; 
Snowden 2003, 699–713; Steinhausler 2003, 783).18 While related, these 
types of terrorism are quite distinct. Mixing them uncritically may add to the 
current confusion.  
Radiological terrorism could inflict damages of both physical and psy-
chological character. It rests upon (the threat of) direct radiation exposure for 
humans and surroundings. One method involves the mixing of highly radio-
active material with conventional explosives to create radiological dispersal 
devices (RRDs), or so-called “dirty bombs”, radioactive material wrapped 
around high explosives. A dirty bomb could have drastic economic and psy-
chological effects (Levi and Kelly 2002, 81), and its potential for societal 
disturbance may be considerable. It would not, however, involve the trigger-
ing of a nuclear chain reaction. The physical effects of radiological terrorism 
would be minuscule compared to those ensuing from a successful nuclear 
terrorist explosion. 
The potential terrorist vulnerability of nuclear power plants has also cap-
tured the imagination of the public and the media.19 The psychological im-
pacts of any attacks may be correspondingly strong. Some studies suggest 
that a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant could have potentially severe 
consequences, if the attack is large enough (Committee on Science and 
                                                     
bomb. The US has been criticized for failing to retrieve its highly enriched uranium dis-
persed over the last several decades for research purposes (Brinkley and Broad 2004). 
16  As nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the states are exempted 
from international safeguards and control on their nuclear activities. Some voluntary safe-
guards agreements do, however, exist between these states and the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency.  
17  See Section 4.3.1 for a further explanation of the case-study selection. 
18  These differences are further discussed in Appendix I. 
19  Not least after rumours that one of the planes hijacked on 11 September 2001 was des-
tined for the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. 
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Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 41). But if attacked, no com-
mercial nuclear power plant would produce devastating effects equivalent to 
those of a nuclear explosive.20 
Moreover, the strict study-focus on first-generation crude gun-type explo-
sive devices bars any assessments of nuclear explosives using plutonium. As 
such, the study will not be able to consider the security ramifications of ever-
increasing stocks of separated plutonium, the applicability of reactor-grade 
plutonium in crude nuclear devices, or the possible radiological dispersal-
device properties of a fizzling plutonium explosive device. Nor does the 
scope give an opportunity to assess the security concerns associated with 
MOX.21 
The narrow scope of the study also excludes, perhaps somewhat unex-
pectedly, the seemingly deadly mix of terrorists and intact nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear weapons may be stolen – for instance during transport, when they 
are particularly exposed (Valynkin 1996, 16). In the mid-1990s reports of 
stray nuclear weapons regularly hit the front pages of leading newspapers. 
Anecdotal reports suggest that nuclear weapons have been lost since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union (Lee 1999, 123–27).22  
An array of tactical nuclear weapons was developed and deployed during 
the Cold War, covering almost every type of military posture (Rogers 2000, 
22). There have been specific concerns regarding the security of Russian 
sub-strategic weapons due to their (often) forwarded positions, the lack of 
systems to prevent unauthorized use, their large numbers and limited size 
(Potter and Sokov 2001; Millar 2002; Alexander and Millar 2003).  
The need for securing and consolidating tactical nuclear weapons in a 
transparent manner should not be brushed aside.23 However, the barriers for 
terrorists desiring to acquire intact nuclear weapons could prove higher than 
anticipated. Nuclear weapons are generally subject to more rigorous stan-
dards of protection than fissile material (Orlov et al. 2002, 54; Committee on 
Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 40). As a result of 
unilateral (US and Russian) action,24 tactical nuclear weapons could now be 
                                                     
20  So far, moreover, no attacks against nuclear power plants have resulted in radioactive re-
leases to the surroundings (Bremer Maerli 1999, 57). 
21  Mixed Oxide fuel, i.e. a mix of uranium oxide and plutonium fuel that can be used in 
(modified) power reactors. Both the USA and Russia now insist that MOX-fuel should be 
the primary way to dispose of their excess stocks of weapons-grade plutonium, the alter-
native being immobilisation.  
22  According to (questionable) and recurrent media reports, Osama bin Laden possesses 
several Russian suitcase nuclear bombs (Rees-Moog 2001; Associated Press 2004). Dur-
ing the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime supposedly made contact with Pakistani 
nuclear weapon scientists and were offered small tactical Russian nuclear weapons (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2001). In autumn 1998, Arabic news sources claimed that bin 
Laden had obtained nuclear weapons through links with organized crime in Chechnya and 
the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, paying with opium in exchange for nuclear 
weapons (Pate 2003). The pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat claimed February 2004 that the 
al-Qaeda organization led by Osama bin Laden bought tactical suitcase nuclear weapons 
from Ukraine in 1998 and is storing them in safe places for possible use (Reuters 2004, 
1w). There has been no independent corroboration of the report, and none of the informa-
tion has later been confirmed by authoritative sources. For more on the problems of over-
reporting, see Section A.7.6. in Appendix VII. 
23  Smith (2003, 23) summarizes this concern vividly: “The Russians no longer need to dis-
perse their nuclear weapons as a means to reduce the effectiveness of an American nu-
clear attack; rather, they need to consolidate them to reduce the likelihood of theft by ter-
rorists”. 
24  The so-called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of George Bush (Sr.), Mikhail Gor-
bachev, and Boris Yeltsin in 1991 and 1992. 
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as secure as strategic ones (Handler 2003, 32). Most weapons are stored in 
centralized storage vaults.25  
The theft of the nuclear weapon itself might not entail sophisticated tech-
nology, but would probably necessitate heavy manpower and weaponry. An 
attack on a nuclear-weapon arsenal would require expeditiously overcoming 
both passive and active security measures (Mullen 1987, 237). Moreover, 
permissive action links (PALs) may render any unauthorized use difficult. 
Removing the fissile material from the weapons may prove hard, as well as 
highly dangerous. Even if would-be perpetrators manage to overcome all 
these obstacles, delivery may still pose significant hurdles. 
In consequence, without some kind of state cooperation, successful ter-
rorist acquisition and use of an intact nuclear device could be next to impos-
sible (Center for International Security and Cooperation 2003, 3). Hence, it 
may not be so that a small functioning, tactical nuclear weapon necessarily is 
“a terrorist’s dream come true”, as claimed by Couch (2003, 126).  
Excluding intact nuclear weapons from the study also precludes any in-
vestigation into the mysterious “suitcase bombs”. In June 1997, former Rus-
sian Security Council chief General Lebed announced that some 52 to 84 
Soviet suitcase-size nuclear bombs were missing (Lee 1999, 125).26 Some 
Russian officials have confirmed the story; others have refuted it. In terms of 
size and compactness, advanced nuclear-weapon states, like the former So-
viet Union, are probably capable of producing such bombs (Sublette 2002, 
1w; Sokov 2002, 10).27 However, it is questionable whether the nuclear ma-
terial (plutonium) contained in the explosive device is still suitable for use. 
The performance of these nuclear explosives, if they exist, may be corre-
spondingly low (Sokov 2002, 11w; Maerli et al. 2003, 703–731).28 
Situations where states share nuclear technology, and possibly nuclear 
weapons, with non-state actors cannot be excluded. Any “nuclear sponsor-
ing” could boost terrorists’ nuclear abilities. Indeed, this was initially the pri-
mary US rationale for attacking Iraq Spring 2003. According to President 
G.W. Bush, “terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an 
outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive 
scale” (Bolton 2003, 2w).29 Such scenarios, however, could be unlikely. 
Even according to Bush’s own intelligence assessments, the likelihood of a 
                                                     
25  US tactical nuclear-weapon aircraft bombs in Europe are an exception (Handler 2003, 32). 
The approximately 180 bombs are kept dispersed in weapons storage vaults at ten bases in 
seven European countries. 
26  Reportedly, the yield of the devices was approximately one kiloton. The suitcases would 
weigh between 27 and 45 kg and could be armed in 20 to 30 minutes without secret 
codes. 
27  A related feature is the atomic demolition munitions (ADMs). The munitions were to be 
buried under their wartime targets before any hostilities and, if necessary, be exploded to 
hinder advancing Soviet ground troops into Europe. Because of their characteristics, 
ADMs were denoted “defensive nuclear weapons” (Hutchinson 2003, 86). Other light-
weight nuclear weapons include the “David Crockett”, a recoil-less rifle or a bazooka in 
the possession of the US infantry. Its range was between 1,000 and 13,000 feet. Both 
sides in the Cold War also deployed nuclear artillery shells as short-range tactical weap-
ons, the so-called “atomic cannon” (Hutchinson 2003, 88). 
28  As a rule, nuclear weapon plutonium has to be replaced at given intervals, perhaps every 
five to ten years. The material in any lost Russian nuclear explosives has certainly not 
been replaced, rendering the significance of the missing suitcase bombs more doubtful.  
29  The United States has, unsuccessfully, sought to link Saddam Hussein with al-Qaeda 
(Millar 2002, 1w; Bremer Maerli, 2003b, 24). See for instance State of the Union Ad-
dress, 28 January, 2003, by President G.W. Bush, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2003/01/20030128-19.html last accessed 10 March 2004). 
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state sponsor providing such nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to a 
terrorist group is believed to be low (United States Department of Defense 
2001, 61).  
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, any state providing nuclear 
weapons may face severe retaliation if such a transfer ever becomes 
known.30 Secondly, any state leader willing to engage in sponsoring nuclear 
terrorists may run a particular risk of losing (hard-won) control, by providing 
the most fearsome power the state ever possessed to non-state actors (Center 
for Counterproliferation Research 2002, 8; Bunn et al. 2003a, 28–29). 
Thirdly, nuclear weapons are extremely hard to acquire, even for states. To 
states, the weapons are regarded not only as military instruments but also as 
symbols of power, legitimacy and status – demonstrating national capabili-
ties and thus creating the foundations for nationhood building (Bracken 
2003, 405). And finally, nuclear weapons are regarded as the ultimate deter-
rent, and a decisive guarantor for regime survival. States possessing nuclear 
explosive devices are likely to hold onto them.  
This, however, does not exclude state elements from supporting nuclear 
terrorists, directly or indirectly. Some Pakistani nuclear scientists feel that 
their country’s bomb should be shared with the entire Muslim community, 
including al-Qaeda (Albright and Higgins 2003, 49). These scientists admit 
to having met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and may have been able to 
make contributions to an al-Qaeda nuclear programme. Early in 2004, more-
over, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, confessed to hav-
ing leaked nuclear secrets to other states (BBC 2004, 1w). 
Involvement of key nuclear scientists in unlawful nuclear proliferation 
activities may add to the risk of nuclear terrorism, especially if, as suggested 
by some, weapons-grade material has been passed to al-Qaeda (see Kristof 
2004, 1w). Yet, issues of nuclear brain-drain or deliberate or unintended 
state-to-terrorist nuclear sponsoring will be beyond the primary scope of this 
study.31 While any transfers of know-how could boost nuclear ambitions, 
mere illicit trafficking in for instance nuclear enrichment technology may be 
of limited use to terrorists. Actors with nuclear ambitions – whether indi-
viduals, groups or nations – may well prefer to acquire weapons-useable ma-
terial externally rather than producing it, as there are significant cost and 
time expenses related to developing the necessary infrastructure to produce 
fissile material (Dreicer and Rutherford 1996, 30).  
Ultimately, the only effective and sustainable way to prevent the unau-
thorized use of weapons-useable uranium is to blend existing stocks down to 
low enriched uranium (LEU), which is not directly useable in weapons (Ca-
logero 2003, 4; Natural Resources Defense Council 2003, 3w). Important 
efforts have been launched to expedite HEU elimination activities (see e.g. 
                                                     
30  This problem could be less prominent if a state hires a misaligned group to anonymously 
deliver a nuclear device for the state in question – an argument sometimes used in the run-
up to the Iraq war. 
31  “Brain-drain” is a commonly used expression, normally in the context of the former So-
viet Union, to describe the possible flux of (nuclear) weapon scientists and know-how to 
new states.  
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Arbman et al. 2004). Considerations in this direction will, however, be out-
side the scope of the thesis.32 
The risk that HEU may be applied in crude nuclear weapons has also mo-
tivated renewed (and important) emphasis in arms control circles on elimi-
nating the use of HEU in both civilian (research) and military (naval) reac-
tors. Proposals have been made to convert reactors using HEU to reactors 
using LEU (low enriched uranium) (Bukharin et al. 2002; Bukharin 2002; 
Kang and von Hippel 2001; Miller 2003).33 The conversion of naval reactors 
would entail obvious security benefits. However, a range of factors may 
hamper its successful implementation and nor is possible reactor conversion 
assessed in this study.34  
1.6 Research Papers  
 
Eight research papers constitute the scientific backbone of the study:35  
1.6.1 [P1]: “Relearning the ABCs” 
 
Morten Bremer Maerli, “Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and “Weapons of 
Mass Destruction””, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 2, Summer 2000a, 
ww.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/72/maerli.pdf (last accessed 30 October 
2003).  
 
Abstract:  
Throughout the 1990s, the prospects of biological and chemical terrorism attracted 
increasing attention, especially in the USA. The article points out some distinct 
features of non-conventional terrorism and contrasts biological and chemical ter-
                                                     
32  For a range of reasons is simply assumed that nuclear-weapon states will continue to 
maintain their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and large (excessive) stocks of fissile mate-
rial in the foreseeable future. 
33  Research reactors may be particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and fuel diversion. 
While operating on limited capacities, many of these rectors are located on university 
campuses, locations with far less comprehensive security measures and control than tradi-
tional sites for nuclear power plants (Bunn and Braun 2003). High-density research reac-
tor fuel is under development, and the prospects for LEU-run research reactors could be 
good (Miller 2003, 2). Preliminary feasibility studies show that even naval reactor cores, 
currently fuelled with HEU, may be converted with minimal efficiency losses (Ma and 
von Hippel 2001).  
34  Not only is space tight in naval vessels, particularly in submarines. Naval reactors must 
operate reliably for long periods of time, under extremely harsh conditions. The use of 
high-density LEU fuel requires reactor modifications. Any modifications to fuel or reactor 
may compromise performance and, hence, security. Moreover, modifications would nega-
tively affect refuelling intervals. After half a century of research, the USA has now 
reached its goal of lifetime reactor cores, using HEU (Bremer Maerli 2001d, 24). In con-
sequence, there is particularly strong US reluctance to redesign the reactors. 
35  Research papers [P1], [P2], [P4], and [P7] have all undergone peer-review. [P3] was re-
viewed at the “New Faces Conference 2000: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st 
Century”, 12–15 October 2000, Puidoux-Chexbres, Switzerland, prior to book publication 
(see Bremer Maerli 2001e). An updated version of paper [P6], titled “US-Russian Naval 
Security Upgrades. Lessons learned and the way ahead”, appeared in Naval War College 
Review, Autumn 2003, vol. 56, no. 4. Throughout this study the original paper published 
in Yaderny Control will be used as a point of reference. For the Naval War College Re-
view article, please refer to www nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art2-a03.html 
(last accessed 30 October 2003).  
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rorism with nuclear terrorism. It discusses various forms of “super-terrorism”,36 
its likelihood, and steps and obstacles towards such acts of terror. The differing 
requirements that terrorists and states may have to nuclear explosive devices are 
discussed. It is concluded that practical, strategic and possibly even moral con-
straints will make conventional weaponry and bombs the most likely terrorist 
means also in the future. Acts of non-conventional terrorism cannot, however, be 
ruled out. In this regard, nuclear terrorism may prove to be a more feasible option 
than often perceived, due to the quite limited technical capabilities needed to pro-
duce crude uranium explosives.  
1.6.2 [P2]: “The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons” 
 
Morten Bremer Maerli, Annette Schaper, Frank Barnaby, “The Characteris-
tics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons”, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 46, 
no. 6, February 2003. 
 
Abstract:    
The risk of nuclear terrorism may be low, but the possible level of physical 
destruction, fatalities and injuries is so great in and of itself that the potential 
for terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear devices warrants serious consid-
eration. This article provides some observations on the likelihood of nuclear 
terrorism and on the technical feasibility of producing crude nuclear weap-
ons. Characteristics of potential nuclear terrorist weapons are discussed and 
compared with military nuclear-weapon requirements. It is shown that the 
obstacles to the production of crude nuclear explosives may be lower than an-
ticipated, and that technical barriers should not be regarded as sufficient to 
avoid future nuclear terrorism. Preventing extremist groups from achieving 
their goals of large-scale nuclear violence can best be done by denying them 
access to highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the essential ingredients of 
any nuclear device. Consequently, adequate protection and control of such 
material is vital. The gap, however, between the threat and the international 
response seems to be widening. 
1.6.3 [P3]: “Managing Excess Material In Russia” 
 
Morten Bremer Maerli “Managing Excess Material In Russia”, in Andreas 
Wenger and Joachim Krause, (eds.), Nuclear Weapons and International 
Security in the 21st Century, Studies in Contemporary History and Security 
Studies, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology, Bern et al. Peter Lang, 2001e, www.fsk.ethz.ch/ 
documents/Studies/volume_8/content.htm (last accessed 30 October 2003). 
 
Abstract:  
Proper management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the essential 
ingredients of any nuclear explosive device, is a vital part of non-prolifer-
                                                     
36  This is a term frequently used by former Senator Sam Nunn, encompassing nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical terrorism. 
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ation efforts and a prerequisite for deep, transparent and irreversible reducti-
ons in nuclear material and nuclear-weapon arsenals. Existing systems of 
Material Protection, Control and Accountability in Russia may not, however, 
be up to the task. This article reviews current security challenges associated 
with the protection and control of weapons-useable material. It is shown that 
physical security upgrades at Russian nuclear facilities are a comprehensive 
and complex task, requiring more than quick technical fixes. The article con-
cludes with a set of recommendations for the future management of fissile 
material. 
1.6.4 [P4]: “Safeguarding This and Verifying That” 
 
Morten Bremer Maerli and Roger G. Johnston, “Safeguarding This and Veri-
fying That: Fuzzy Concepts, Confusing Terminology, and their Detrimental 
Effects on Nuclear Husbandry”, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 
Spring 2002, www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/abs91.htm#maer (last 
accessed 30 October 2003). 
 
Abstract:  
Words and concepts may have remarkable power, not least in international 
matters where subtleties and ambiguities in meaning can have major implica-
tions for treaty interpretation and compliance. In the diplomatic and political 
sphere, ambiguity has its uses, such as for attaining consensus or strategic 
gain. In consequence, hazy concepts may be embraced deliberately by inter-
national players seeking to achieve policy goals. But the imprecise use of 
terms and concepts can also have significant detrimental effects, causing 
misunderstandings and lost opportunities for practical nuclear arms control. 
The article takes a critical look at some of the existing nomenclature and 
concepts in the field of nuclear material, protection, control and accounting. 
Many current arms control terms are imprecisely defined and often used in-
accurately. As an alternative to the current “fuzzy” terminology, Seven Nu-
clear Husbandry Functions are identified. These have less overlap and a 
clearer range of application, and may help to avoid technical and political pit-
falls. It is concluded that the use of more precise terminology can strengthen 
both domestic and international efforts to improve nuclear security, whereas 
continued confusion over basic terms may block further progress. 
1.6.5 [P5]: “International vs. Domestic Nuclear Safeguards” 
 
Roger G. Johnston and Morten Bremer Maerli, “International vs. Domestic 
Nuclear Safeguards: The Need for Clarity in the Debate over Effectiveness”, 
Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 69, February/March 2003.www.acronym.org. 
uk/dd/dd69/69op01. htm (last accessed 30 October 2003). 
 
Abstract:  
Several interpretations of the term “safeguards” exist. The international com-
munity uses “safeguards” in a different way than for instance the United Sta-
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tes, and a clear, concise definition of one of the most central concepts in prac-
tical nuclear arms control is still lacking. As a result, there may be a risk not 
only of mixing the meaning of the different safeguards terms, but also of con-
fusing the disparate goals of practical nuclear security measures. To avoid the 
far too common “one-size-fits-all” approach to nuclear security, the article 
explains how and why different forms of nuclear safeguards are quite dis-
similar activities. This is done by comparing a set of “real-life” (operational) 
differences between “international safeguards” and “domestic safeguards”. 
This assessment is followed by a set of concluding remarks on the specific 
dangers of confusing or mixing domestic safeguards with international safe-
guards. 
1.6.6 [P6]: “US–Russian Naval Security Upgrades” 
 
Morten Bremer Maerli, “US-Russian Naval Security Upgrades: Lessons 
Learned And Future Steps”, Yaderny Kontrol, no. 4, Fall, 2002b. 
 
Abstract: 
The US Department of Energy is working cooperatively with Russia on sev-
eral fronts to reduce the threats associated with the Cold War nuclear legacy. 
One of these activities is the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 
(MPC&A) Program.37 It aims at reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation 
and nuclear terrorism by improving the security of all weapons-useable nu-
clear material. The programme has substantially increased security for large 
amounts of vulnerable nuclear material. However, most security challenges 
involving Russian nuclear material remain, and programme implementation 
has been hampered by various practical and political obstacles. The naval 
MPC&A security upgrades for fresh, unirradiated naval fuel and nuclear 
weapons in Northwest Russia have clearly been able to deal with these obsta-
cles. This article examines the sources of the extraordinary progress of the 
naval security upgrades, and attempts to balance justified security concerns 
with the need for openness. The progress made suggests that valuable lessons 
can be learned from the US–Russian naval security upgrades, lessons that 
could contribute to other practical nuclear arms control activities as well, in-
cluding nuclear transparency and non-intrusive verification. 
                                                     
37  Broadly speaking, domestic “MPC&A” (Material Protection, Control, and Accounting) 
systems are intended to protect material against theft or diversion, and to detect such 
events if they occur. This is explained succinctly in National Research Council 1999, 12: 
“Physical protection systems should allow for the detection of any unauthorized penetra-
tion of barriers and portals, thereby triggering an immediate response. The system should 
delay intruders long enough to allow for an effective response.  Material control and con-
tainment systems should prevent unauthorized movement of material and allow for the 
prompt detection of the theft and diversion of material. Material accounting systems 
should ensure all material is accounted for, enable the measurement of losses, and provide 
information for follow-up investigations for irregularities”.   
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1.6.7 [P7]: “Transparency and Non-Intrusive Verification”  
Morten Bremer Maerli, “Timely Options for Increased Transparency and 
Non-Intrusive Verification on Highly Enriched Uranium Naval Fuel”, Jour-
nal of Nuclear Material Management, Vol. 31, no.4, Summer 2003c. 
 
Abstract: 
The article explores the technical options and potential pitfalls for increased 
transparency, and possibly, non-intrusive verification on sensitive fissile ma-
terial. Fresh Russian naval fuel is used as a case study. The prospects for in-
creased transparency in naval fuel and non-intrusive verification may be bet-
ter than anticipated and could build upon the progress and solid working rela-
tions established during the US–Russian naval MPC&A upgrades. Through-
out the article, the importance of openness on stocks of naval fuel is ex-
plored. The political and practical challenges associated with transparency in 
dealing with naval nuclear fuel are assessed, partly in light of ongoing tech-
nical work and R&D in related areas of practical arms control. Technical 
fixes are available for non-intrusive naval HEU verification, if the necessary 
political will can be established. The measures proposed would not involve 
the release of any classified or sensitive information. If implemented, they 
could help in establishing a norm of naval fuel transparency and boost confi-
dence in the non-diversion of fissile naval material for clandestine bomb pro-
duction, by terrorists and others.  
1.6.8 [P8]: “Deep Seas and Deep-Seated Secrets” 
 
Morten Bremer Maerli, “Deep Seas and Deep-Seated Secrets: Naval Nuclear 
Fuel Stockpiles and The Need for Transparency”, Disarmament Diplomacy, 
no. 49, August 2000b, www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd49/49fuel.htm (last acces-
sed 30 October 2003). 
 
Abstract:38  
All five declared nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
possess nuclear-propelled submarines. As nuclear-weapon states they are ex-
empted from international (IAEA) safeguards. Sensitivity concerns and the strate-
gic importance of nuclear submarines have led the nuclear-weapon states to main-
tain a high degree of secrecy on their nuclear naval operations and stocks of fissile 
material. The USA and Russia have extensive nuclear propulsion programmes, 
representing a significant part of the global HEU economy. Eventually, even these 
stocks may have to be accounted for. Civilian naval uses of highly enriched ura-
nium are, moreover, envisioned. As current safeguards do not meet the prolifera-
tion challenges associated with the unirradiated naval fuel cycles, voluntary trans-
parency in naval activities could be introduced as a confidence-building supple-
ment to international control. Promoting a norm for transparency on naval nuclear 
fuel could limit the risk of evasions of naval material and, hence, raise confidence 
                                                     
38  This (early) paper carries with it some inherent difficulties, as it mixes “transparency” and 
“verification”. As shown in [P5], these are indeed quite distinct concepts in nuclear secu-
rity. Still, the paper has been included among the background papers, as its contextual and 
conceptional considerations on the issue of naval transparency seem to have merits. 
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in non-diversion. It could, moreover, help to create the conditions needed for 
deeper cuts in nuclear stockpiles, as well as improved nuclear security. This is a 
sine qua non for reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
Chapter 2: Setting the Nuclear  
Terrorism Stage 
The Cold War was a time in history where large parts of the Northern Hemi-
sphere could have been obliterated in a swift nuclear exchange. Today the 
Cold War is a thing of the past – yet, paradoxically, the nuclear security pic-
ture is as unclear as ever. Well-established nuclear-weapon states still hold 
sizeable nuclear arsenals; juvenile nuclear-weapon possessors are boosting 
their stockpiles; and a new set of states have revealed disturbing ambitions 
and a definite nuclear appetite.  
Prospects of renewed horizontal, and possibly vertical, state nuclear-
weapon proliferation are real.39 This blurred contemporary nuclear security 
picture is crested by the interest shown in nuclear explosives by several non-
state actors.  
2.1 Conditions of Nuclear Terrorism 
 
No information in the public domain indicates that non-state actors ever have 
managed to develop actual nuclear explosive capabilities. The number of 
incidents, however, remains classified. Even hoaxes involving nuclear explo-
sive devises are kept secret, in order to avoid panic, fear and possible “copy-
cat” effects (see Section 6.2).  
Nevertheless, some general information has been made available on nu-
clear bomb threats. In the late 1990s, German authorities were responding to 
an average of some three or four (hoax) incidents a year (Maerli 1999, 62). 
In the USA, about 100 threats involving alleged nuclear devices or radioac-
tivity have come to the attention of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team 
(NEST). Since NEST’s creation, at least a dozen threats – possibly more 
than twice that number – have resulted in active deployment of NEST per-
sonnel (Richelson 2002, 2w). 
For a given mass of explosive material, a nuclear explosion is at least one 
million times more powerful than a chemical explosion (Harris 2003, 7). In 
the Second World War, the largest “block-buster” bombs produced an explo-
sive power of about one ton of high explosives.40 One of the largest conven-
tional terrorist bombings ever was the 1995 attack in Oklahoma City. That 
attack involved explosive power equivalent to less than three tons of TNT – 
4,000 times weaker than the Hiroshima bomb and 17 million times weaker 
                                                     
39  Vertical proliferation refers to qualitative and/or quantitative nuclear weapons develop-
ment within existing nuclear-weapon states. Horizontal proliferation means the spread of 
nuclear weapons to new, would-be-nuclear states, or to non-state actors.  
40  The bombs got their names by their capability to reducing one city block to rubble 
(Swahn 1992, 64) 
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than the largest nuclear device ever exploded.41 Hence, even the most devas-
tating conventional power may become minuscule compared to that of a nu-
clear terrorist explosion.42 
The detonation of even a single crude terrorist nuclear explosive could 
leave a disaster in its wake. The effects could be devastating, immense and 
sudden, and even more horrendous than the assaults of 9/11, immediately 
killing perhaps tens of thousands of people (International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War 1996, iv; Zycher 2003, 11). Others will suffer as 
first-responders grapple with the radiation, the breakdown in health services 
and general crisis management.43 Clean-up, decontamination, and rebuilding 
costs may be immense, yet easily dwarfed by the expenses of societal distur-
bance, evacuation and panic, and financial losses.44 
The power of nuclear explosives was early recognized. On 25 April 1945, 
US Secretary of War Henry T. Stimson informed President Truman about 
the existence of the atomic bomb (quoted by Hutchinson 2003, preambular 
pages):  
 
Within four months, we shall in all probability have com-
pleted the most terrible weapon ever known in human 
history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city. 
 
With nuclear explosive devices, non-state actors may hence suddenly pos-
sess powers superseding those of many states. Against the pressure, heat and 
radiation from a nuclear blast there is at best only very limited protection. 
Mitigation and post-exposure prophylaxis could be in vain. In consequence, 
the terror may move from acting primarily on the psychological level, where 
the targeted victims are instrumental and additional effects among the public 
at large are desired, to a definite mass-casualty threat. 
Terrorists themselves, however, operate outside the sphere of nuclear de-
terrence and the carefully crafted logic of mutually assured destruction 
                                                     
41  It is usual to compare the energy released in a nuclear explosion with the equivalent 
amount of energy released by a certain mass of the chemical explosive trinitrotoluene 
(TNT) (Swahn 1992, 47). One kiloton of TNT is a common unit for the yield of nuclear 
explosives. During the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union held 
between them a firepower equivalent of three tons of TNT per every man, woman, and child 
living on the planet (Harris 2003). Hence, each and one of us had, in a sense, an allocation of 
firepower in the nuclear arsenals equivalent to that of the Oklahoma terrorist bombing. The 
largest nuclear explosive device ever exploded was the Soviet “Tsar Bomba” (“King of 
Bombs”), detonated with a force of 50 megatons of TNT on 30 October 1961 at the test range 
on Novaya Zemlya in the Barents Sea (Hutchinson 2003, 119). 
42  Three sources of energy were released in conjunction with the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
against the World Trade Center: Kinetic energy due to the motion of the two aircrafts, ex-
ploded jet fuel and gravitational potential energy due to the falling building material. In 
total, the energy unleashed was equivalent to the detonation of some 0.2 kilotons of TNT 
(BBC 2001a, 1w). Due to the large mass and height of the towers, the falling material cre-
ated the major energy component. By comparison, the nuclear blast that devastated Hiro-
shima was approximately 13 kilotons – some 65 times stronger. 
43  The impact of any nuclear attack on the medical infrastructure would be severe, with a 
high percentage of beds, operating rooms, equipment destroyed and personnel incapaci-
tated (Helfand et al. 2001, 13). 
44  Beyond the unprecedented human tragedy of such an event, the sheer economic loss 
would be staggering.  Bunn et al. (2003, 22) estimate the overall costs of a nuclear terror-
ist bombing at lower Manhattan to possibly be over one trillion USD. Zycher (2003, 21) 
reckons the annual economic cost of a crude nuclear terrorist attack against a U.S. target 
to be some 465 billion 2001 dollars, due to a combination of deaths and injuries, property 
damage, and a reduced GDP. 
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(MAD) (ElBaradei 2003, 1w). Nuclear terrorism should therefore not be 
confused with the Cold War concept “balance of nuclear terror”, whereby if 
one side first launched a nuclear attack, the other side would retaliate in 
kind. As terrorists are elusive, avoiding confrontation and preferring asym-
metrical tactics, the role that the military can play in fighting terrorism may 
be limited (Schmid 2003b, 14).  
Nuclear terrorism, if ever carried out, will hence represent something pro-
foundly new. It would challenge our security, and our perceptions of secu-
rity, in unforeseen and unprecedented ways. The unexpectedness and the 
sheer magnitude of the destruction could create social and financial collapse. 
Attention would be widespread and immediate. The norms of nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear non-use could, moreover, be jeopardized (Allison 
et al.1995, 9). 
2.2 Roots of Nuclear Terrorism  
 
For many years, nuclear explosive devices have remained the privilege of a 
limited number of states. These weapons have been their ultimate security 
benefit and security provider. The scientists behind the nuclear explosives 
were the first to warn about their devastating powers (Ruyter 2003, 18) – 
powers that were to be horrifically demonstrated twice, first in Hiroshima 
and then in Nagasaki, in August 1945. 
It all started with the discovery of the fission of uranium in 1938.45 This 
scientific breakthrough led to the development of the atomic bomb under the 
US Manhattan Project (Rhodes 1986). At the dawn of the atomic era every-
thing regarding nuclear weapons was new. Contemporary cutting-edge tech-
nology and a set of highly skilled scientists were needed to explore the split-
ting and the forces of the atom. Vast efforts had to be put in place to develop 
the initial nuclear explosive designs and to produce the necessary fissile ma-
terial. These were efforts that clearly were beyond the reach of any non-state 
actor (Allison et al. 1995, 54). Thus, the destructive potential of the atom 
rested in the hands of icy rational state actors (Bracken 2003, 407), entan-
gled in the MAD web.  
Within three years after the end of World War II, the United States had an 
arsenal of 50 atom bombs (Rogers 2000, 13). Tensions were rising as the 
Cold War took root, and the Soviet Union soon invested vast resources into a 
crash program to counter the US nuclear monopoly. The Cold War arms race 
resulted in more than 128,000 nuclear warheads being built (Norris and Kris-
tensen 2002). The doctrine of mutually assured destruction contributed to 
making the Cold War among the longest periods in history without military 
confrontation between major states (Waltz 1981, 1).46 But the unconstrained, 
                                                     
45  This finding earned Otto Hahn the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1944.  
46  The perceived benefits of the MAD doctrine have led some scholars, most notably Ken-
neth Waltz, to become nuclear-weapon advocates, arguing that the fear and possibility of 
mutual nuclear elimination causes states to behave in a more responsible manner. The gra-
dual spread of nuclear weapons is thus seen as preferable, as it is held that this will pro-
mote peace and reinforce international stability. See Waltz 1981, or Waltz’ follow-up en-
counter with Scott Sagan  (Sagan and Waltz 1995). For similar views in contemporary 
nuclear policy discussions, see e.g. Payne 1999. 
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and largely unaccounted, production of fissile material also fashioned to-
day’s nuclear terrorist opportunities (see Section 4.1.2). 
The possible use of nuclear explosives outside the MAD-web remained 
largely a non-issue for most of the Cold War. A 1963 US intelligence esti-
mate concluded: “The Soviets almost certainly would not contemplate the 
use of clandestinely delivered nuclear weapons except as a supplement to 
other weapons in the context of general war” (Richelson 2002, 1w). Never-
theless, there must have been some simmering concern, or perhaps curiosity, 
about nuclear terrorism. In May 1964, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory47 
launched its “Nth Country Experiment”. The objective was to see if a few 
capable physicists, unfamiliar with nuclear weapons and with access only to 
unclassified information, could produce a credible weapon design (Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratory, 1967).48  
The researchers, armed with the advantage of knowing that a bomb could 
be built and having access to the large quantity of open literature on shock 
waves, explosives, nuclear physics and reactor technology published since 
1945, concluded their task successfully (Stober 2003). The final bomb de-
sign was deemed workable, without a test. The nuclear explosive was too big 
to fit on a missile, but small enough to be carried by airplane or truck. Some 
of the findings were subjected to limited distribution, whereas the full phys-
ics description of the Nth Country design was published separately in a clas-
sified report.  
Still, in subsequent official assessments throughout the 1970s, the issue 
of nuclear terrorism received only limited consideration and attention (see 
e.g. the one-page appraisal in United States Office of Technology Assess-
ment 1979, 45). Then in 1987, the pioneering book Preventing Nuclear Ter-
rorism spelled out the growing possibility that terrorists could acquire nu-
clear weapons or engage in other forms of nuclear violence, and presented 
important measures and initiatives for preventing this.49 However, these pre-
ventive measures were followed up only to a very limited extent. The find-
ings of the task force were, moreover, qualified in the sense that if nuclear 
terrorism were to occur it would require substantial efforts, expertise and 
competence on behalf of the perpetrators.50  
                                                     
47  Today better known as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California. 
48  The National Security Archive has made a censored version of the original report avail-
able at: www.gwu.edu/%7ensarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.html#usnhdp (last accessed 3 Novem-
ber 2003).  
49  Leventhal and Alexander 1987. The task force behind the book made several recommen-
dations to limit the risk of terrorists resorting to nuclear forms of violence. These recom-
mendations included fitting all tactical nuclear weapons with self-protective systems, pro-
tection and minimization of use of some proliferation attractive nuclear fuels, and better 
protection of nuclear installations. 
50  The report concluded, for instance, that “it is exceedingly unlikely that any single individ-
ual, even after years of assiduous preparation, could equip himself to proceed confidently 
in each part of this diverse range of necessary knowledge and skills, so that it may be as-
sumed that a team would have to be involved. The number of specialists required would 
depend on the background and experience of those enlisted, but their number would 
scarcely be fewer than three or four and might well have to be more. The members of the 
team would have to be chosen not only on the basis of their technical knowledge, experi-
ence and skills but also on their willingness to apply their talents to such a project, al-
though their susceptibility to coercion or consideration of personal gain could be factors. 
In any event, the necessary attributes would be quite distinct from the paramilitary capa-
bilities most often supposed to typify terrorists.” (Mark et al. 1987, 58–59). 
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2.3 Prospects of Nuclear Terrorism  
This conditional conclusion, and the fact that nuclear terrorism has not oc-
curred, may have led many of today’s analysts to conclude that while chemi-
cal, biological, or even radiological terrorism is likely, nuclear terrorism is 
improbable. Notions have it that nuclear terrorism is too difficult, requiring a 
huge infrastructure and vast investments (see e.g. Betts 1998, 32; Cameron 
2000; Orlov et al. 2002, 54).51 In combination with technical hurdles, the 
risk of large-scale nuclear terrorist violence in specific countries has also 
been dismissed on the grounds of internal factors such as geography and 
politics (Anet et al. 2000, 56). Some scholars dismiss nuclear terrorism as 
merely “an overrated nightmare” (Kamp 1996), claiming that even vaga-
bonding fissile material would only “slightly increase the likelihood of nu-
clear terrorism” (Kamp 1998–99, 170). 
Others, however, maintain that unless radical steps urgently are taken, it 
will not be a question of whether non-state actors will perform acts of nu-
clear terrorism, but when (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nu-
clear War 1996; Falkenrath et al. 1998; Curtis 2001; Potter 2003; Ferguson 
et al. 2004). Some Western intelligence analysts believe that it is plausible 
that a small nuclear device may be detonated in Europe or the United States 
within the next decade (Hutchinson 2003, 195). According to these views, 
the absence of shocking TV images in the wake of successful nuclear terror-
ist activities is merely due to the “lack of means, rather than a lack of moti-
vations” (Bunn et al. 2002, 1).  
Such perceptions seem to be founded upon the conviction that the scenes 
from lower Manhattan on 11 September 2001 are only the beginning. These 
spectacular live-catastrophe attacks were performed with conventional 
means, providing a dire reminder of the destructive powers of contemporary 
terrorism.52 The magnitude, crudeness and efficacy with which these actions 
were carried out could point in the direction of future large-scale terrorist 
uses of chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological (CBRN) weapons.53 
More people died in one day on 11 September than in 35 years of sub-state 
terrorism in Western Europe (Wilkinson 2001, 5). On 11 March 2004, 
Europe got its dreadful share of large-scale terrorist violence. The multiple 
assaults in Madrid killed more than 200 people. 
As terrorists are known to have already stockpiled and used chemical and 
biological weapons, nuclear explosive devices may be the next logical step 
on the ladder of terrorist violence.54 The inherent “need” for violence escala-
                                                     
51  The belief that chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists represents a 
greater threat than nuclear devices may emanate from the misperception that fresh fissile 
material is so radioactive that it would fatally harm anyone who stole and assembled it 
into nuclear explosives, in addition to the complexity of manufacturing military nuclear 
weapons. 
52  The term “live-catastrophe attacks” is borrowed from Beck (2003, 141). 
53  The multiple attacks that day spurred a tidal wave of rumours of imminent large-scale ter-
rorist attacks, including low-flying terrorists using crop-dusters filled with biological ma-
terial, and trucks full of nasty toxicants destined for city centres. And indeed, letters con-
taining anthrax were soon mailed to several US recipients, fortunately with a limited num-
ber of casualties, but with a psychological damage radius far exceeding that of the physi-
cal impact.  
54  A chronology of CBRN terrorist/hoax incidents identifies 175 incidents in 1999 (Cameron 
et al. 2000). Most of the incidents involved biological (95) or chemical (82) substances. 
Only 10 involved radiological or nuclear material. Nearly 100 of the incidents were 
hoaxes, planks or still at the plotting stage. Only 39 involved the actual use of an agent.  
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tion could in itself force terrorists along a route leading inescapably towards 
nuclear havoc (Harris, undated). 
Chapter 3: Analytical Approach 
The primary aim of this chapter is to create an analytical framework and a 
methodological foundation for the analysis. The point of departure is a sim-
ple risk-assessment model in which each of the steps towards acts of nuclear 
terrorism will be analysed. For each of these subsequent steps there is also 
an opportunity for intervention, and hence risk-reduction measures. Risk 
assessments, identifying and evaluating threats on the basis of such factors 
as capability and intentions, as well as the potential impact of an event, are 
essential to effort aimed at risk management.55 
Latour’s model for the rendering of science is then presented and dis-
cussed as a theoretical foundation for the introduction of nuclear transpar-
ency and non-intrusive verification on fissile material. Transparency and 
verification are two key elements of optimum nuclear husbandry (see Sec-
tion 4.2.1.1).  
The chapter starts out by discussing the inherent dilemmas of nuclear ter-
rorism research, and by explaining the explorative, normative, and interdisci-
plinary character of this study. The analytical limitations of the study, here-
under restrictions in empirical data, are presented at the end of the chapter. 
3.1 Dilemmas of Research on Nuclear Terrorism Risks  
 
The highly politicised and publicized setting surrounding the risk of nuclear 
terrorism poses particular challenges to scholars. On the one hand, the risk 
could indeed be growing. Falkenrath (1998, 45) maintains that, in view of 
their potential severity, future acts of nuclear, biological or chemical terror-
ism should be regarded as likely enough for them to be counted amongst the 
most serious challenges to national security faced by modern liberal democ-
racies.  
If so, our perceptions of the risk should then commensurate with the real 
probability of such acts of violence, and with a realistic common understand-
ing of its seriousness if nuclear terrorism should occur (Weisæth, undated). 
This in itself calls for qualified analysis as well as proper risk communica-
tion (see Section A.7.8 in Appendix VII). The development of a qualified 
public opinion requires an educated and informed citizenry, and a free flow 
of communication (Habermas 1991, 200).  
                                                     
55  Risk management is a systematic and analytical process for considering the likelihood 
that a threat will endanger an asset, and for identifying actions that can reduce the risk and 
mitigate the consequences of an attack (United States General Accounting Office 2002, 
3). Since 1996, the United States General Accounting Office has produced more than 60 
reports and testimonies on the US government’s efforts to combat terrorism. Several of 
these reports have recommended using a risk-management approach for understanding the 
threat and developing proper countermeasures. Other elements of risk management in-
clude vulnerability and criticality assessments, aimed at identifying and eliminating socie-
tal and structural weaknesses that may be exploited.  
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Here academia may have a special responsibility. As knowledge-provid-
ers, scholars should engage in dialogue and “contribute to the development 
of knowledge-based assets and should enthusiastically participate in the so-
cial, cultural, economical and technological developments of society” (Uni-
versity of Oslo 2000, 1w). Translated to the field of nuclear terrorism risk 
assessment: Educated, informed discussion should create the foundation for 
a common understanding of the nuclear terrorist threat and directions for 
sensible political action. Such scholarly activities are not merely academic; 
they could have direct policy implications (Busch 2002, 88). 
On the other hand, any embellishing of the risk may serve to exaggerate 
the threat, and could lead to over-reactions and inappropriate short-term 
fixes. Research findings and science may be misused, suppressed, or dis-
torted to suit political and ideological goals (United States House of Repre-
sentatives 2003, 33; Union of Concerned Scientists 2004, 29).56 Scientists, 
or their findings, may be handpicked, misappropriated and then used to give 
political decisions the appearance of objectivity.57 By controlling access to 
scientific studies, officials and others may dismiss any citizens’ objections as 
uninformed and irrelevant.  
Another problem relates to the fact that even restrained scholarly assess-
ments could inspire and assist perpetrators (Calogero 2003, 7; Putnam 2002, 
13). Potential nuclear terrorists could start off significantly higher on the 
learning curve after studying some of the available papers and reports on 
nuclear explosive devices (Albright 2000, 59).  
This leaves scholars working on nuclear terrorism threats with a dilem-
ma. Undertaking and publishing research on the phenomenon of nuclear ter-
rorism could exacerbate the risk; but not doing so could lead to under-esti-
mation of the threat and failure to identify optimum countermeasures. The 
call for analysis and assessments by Jayanatha Dhanapala, former UN Un-
der-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs (2001, 3), could give some 
encouraging guidance on how to deal with this research quandary:  
 
The danger of terrorism involving weapons of mass de-
struction needs to be assessed realistically so that appro-
priate precautions can be taken. Objective facts require 
that we be neither alarmist sowers of panic, nor compla-
cent do-nothings. No doubt, the consequences from the use 
of one weapon of mass destruction by terrorists would be 
devastating. We need, however, to examine whether and in 
what quantities materials are available; the technology 
needed to weaponize these materials and, finally, what de-
livery methods could be used. This analysis would help 
strengthen existing legal norms and to create new ones to 
block any loopholes. 
                                                     
56  After the G.W. Bush Administration came into office, the scientific committee that had 
advised the US State Department on technical matters related to arms control was for in-
stance dismissed (Union of Concerned Scientists 2004, 25). 
57  As a response, this has given rise to the field of “public interest science”, where qualified 
scientists and researchers provide independent technical analysis and present their find-
ings directly to the public, either through media or at public hearings. Frank von Hippel, 
who has emerged as the leading proponent and practitioner of public-interest science, de-
scribes himself as a “citizen-scientist” (von Hippel 1991).  
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Correspondingly, clear- and level-headed analysis and examination of the 
threat of nuclear terrorism seems essential as an important step towards risk 
reduction. 
3.2 Explorative and Normative Research  
 
Ultimately, all research is concerned with crafting information into new 
knowledge. The resulting level of knowledge will vary, as will the methods 
used to reach it. The methods applied may depend on the primarily goal of 
the analysis. Explanatory research aims at providing reliable insights into a 
given subject, explaining what has happened and what is happening and, 
importantly, providing an opportunity to predict what will happen in the fu-
ture (Silke 2001, 1). Prerequisites for this kind of research are exploratory 
and descriptive studies, working at initial levels to identify and describe the 
main forces and connections at work. Here, case studies are often applied, 
and the methods commonly used are not overly concerned with issues of val-
idity and reliability (Silke 2001, 1). 
The present study belongs to the category of exploratory research. It in-
vestigates the threat of nuclear terrorism and ways to optimise protection 
against such acts. The analysis identifies possible nuclear-security options 
more than it dissects them. Once the necessary political awareness and inter-
est have been established, further follow-up and in-depth studies in the field 
should be initiated. An important element of this explorative analysis is a 
case study on nuclear transparency and non-intrusive fissile material verifi-
cation (Section 4.3). Case-study research is particularly applicable for re-
search questions formulated as “how”, and “why”, with a focus on contem-
porary events (Yin 1994, 6).  
The study is, moreover, of a normative character. Normative research 
aims at improvements, and usually includes an evaluation of the present state 
of affairs, as well as of the direction of future development. Accordingly, 
normative research differs from purely descriptive studies because the aim is 
not only to gather facts, but also to point out in which respects the object of 
study may be improved.58 Normative studies are expected to help point out 
the optimal or the most acceptable strategy to be used for subsequent practi-
cal operations (Routio 2003, 1w).59  
3.3 Interdisciplinary Research  
 
Different branches of science may yield different concepts of reality, in ac-
cordance with the core premise(s), or rather how the science in question it-
self explores reality (Krogh, 2001,15). This means that we may have to live 
with differentiated senses of reality, leaving us, as Krogh puts it, as “happy 
squirrels on different boughs of the great Christmas tree of science”. Inter-
                                                     
58  A critique of normative theory as an underlying analytical tool will be beyond the scope 
of the study.  
59  Hence, a set of policy recommendations for optimum nuclear terrorism countermeasures 
through improved nuclear husbandry is formulated in Section 5.2. 
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disciplinary science may therefore have to be defined, and even developed, 
on the basis of the need for communication that develops between different 
sciences. As a tactic for innovative knowledge-gathering, however, this may 
not appear very fruitful. 
Another and somewhat more pro-active approach would be to regard in-
terdisciplinary science as a process of convergence in which new insights 
evolve through interaction (Liestøl and Morrison 2001, 2). A daily-life anal-
ogy may clarify this. We humans usually look at things by aiming both eyes 
at the same object(s) at the same time. This may seem like a wasteful use of 
busy sense organs: After all, one eye could suffice. However, from this ar-
rangement, two sorts of advantages occur (Bateson 1980, 78). Firstly, the 
viewer is able to improve resolution at the edges and contrast, making it, for 
example, easier to read when the print is small or the lighting is poor. Sec-
ondly, and perhaps of particular importance for this study, information about 
depth is created. In effect, this double perspective nurtures new qualities in 
our experience of our surroundings – and, it is to be hoped in our case, new 
knowledge about nuclear terrorism and appropriate countermeasures. 
On the basis of their knowledge of general patterns, social researchers 
can, at best, make broad projections concerning the possibilities of future 
events and developments (Ragin 1994, 39). Natural scientists may, on their 
side, provide in-depth technical analyses of specific phenomena. By combin-
ing these approaches, risk assessment may foster in-depth examination in 
new and unforeseen ways, creating by itself renewed sensitivity. This pheno-
menon, which Bateson denotes “double description”, forms the methodo-
logical basis for this assessment. What the study may risk losing in terms of 
quality from a one (eyed)-discipline assessment, it should gain by combining 
disciplines traditionally labelled as “social science” and “natural sciences”. 
The overarching framework for such an interdisciplinary approach is a sim-
ple risk-assessment model, as presented below. 
3.4 Analytical Tools 
 
As was seen in Chapter 2, the current literature is divided on the issue of 
whether terrorists may be able to develop and use viable nuclear explo-
sives.60 Not surprisingly, recommendations for government responses to the 
threat vary accordingly (Center for Counterproliferation Research 2002, 10).  
If, as one school of thought argues, the likelihood of CBRN attacks is 
high and probably increasing, it is urgent that governments should allocate 
all needed resources for a range of countermeasures, since there is near-cer-
tainty that catastrophic acts of terror will occur. In the aftermath of a mass-
destruction attack, elected leaders who were not interested in hedging against 
the threat, may, moreover, find themselves accountable for their nations’ 
failed preventive efforts (Falkenrath 1998, 61). 
                                                     
60  For a good overview of recent articles on CBRN-related topics, see the “Threat Reduction 
Literature Quarterly Bibliographic Review”, Spring 2003, of the Defense Threat Reduc-
tion Agency, available online at www.dtra.mil/news/nw_lit_review.html  (last accessed 
30 October 2003). 
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If, however, as argued by others, the terrorist scene will remain domi-
nated by low-level attacks resulting in limited casualties, injuries and dam-
ages comparable to conventional bombings, comprehensive countermeasures 
may be not only futile but also a waste of money. In this second camp, the 
limited effects of the chemical attack of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995 and 
of the US anthrax outbreaks in autumn 2001 are often taken as demonstrat-
ing that terrorists lack sufficient CBRN capabilities (Center for Counterproli-
feration Research 2002, 10). 
 A third – and for this analysis a preferred – viewpoint takes a middle-
ground approach, incorporating elements from the other two. Here, it is ac-
knowledged that the likelihood of large-scale terrorist attacks may be lim-
ited. The possible consequences of such attacks, however, are potentially so 
severe that serious consideration should be given to the threat. Thus, the 
threat of nuclear terrorism merits judicious risk assessments that allow for 
threat understanding and for proper countermeasures to be installed, without 
catering to hysterical doomsday fears or arguments that deny any validity to 
the prospects of CBRN terrorism (Center for Counterproliferation Research 
2002, 10). 
3.4.1 A Simple Risk Assessment Model 
 
There is no universal definition of “risk”. To describe a situation involving 
risk, we must refer to the probability that it will actually occur, and the pos-
sible consequences if it occurs (Lindell 1996, 157). Mathematically, risk (R) 
may be expressed as a function of probability (P) times possible outcome 
(Q), i.e. consequences: 
QPR ×=  
 
Hence, high-probability/high-consequence events represent the greatest risk. 
However, even low-probability events may represent a comparable risk to 
more frequently occurring incidents if the potential consequences are parti-
cularly severe. Low-probability/low-consequence effects, on the other hand, 
will always represent a limited risk to society.61  
The “probability”(P) of a terrorist act is directly proportional with the 
threat level. The threat of nuclear terrorism depends upon a combination of a 
group’s motivation (M) to perform such actions, and their capability (C) to 
actually do so (see e.g. Bjørgo 1990). The threat, and hence probability (P), 
is thus a function of both motivations (M) and capabilities (C):  
 
[ ]),( CMfPP =  
 
                                                     
61  A related concept is “vulnerability”. Operationally, vulnerability could be defined as “a 
function of the reciprocal multiplicative relationship between risk and preparedness” 
(Hedge 1987, 148–149). In more popular terms, vulnerability may be regarded as the (so-
cietal) ability to recover from damage. Society is most vulnerable when risk is high and 
preparedness is low; by the same token, it is least vulnerable when risk is low and prepar-
edness high. However, due to the potential scale of the consequences of nuclear terrorism, 
and, hence, the very limited room for post-attack mediation, these aspects are given lim-
ited consideration throughout the present study.   
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High motivation combined with high technical capability raises the likeli-
hood of successfully performed acts of nuclear terrorism. Equivalently, low 
motivation plus low capability would represent a low probability of nuclear 
terrorism (Maerli 2003d, 1). Obviously, without any intentions and/or capa-
bilities to perform acts of nuclear terrorism there would be no such violence. 
Similarly, even though a group may be (highly) motivated to perform nu-
clear terrorism, lack of capabilities may severely hamper their chances of 
carrying out such acts of terrorism. 
3.4.2 A Model of Nuclear Terrorism Pathways  
 
A model of the successive steps towards a successful act of nuclear terror-
ism, presented by Bunn et al. (2003a, 26) provides a useful framework for 
understanding both the motivational and the technical aspects of this possi-
ble form of terror (see Table 3.1).62  
 
Table 3.1: Successive steps towards acts of nuclear terrorism  
 
Step Action  Index 
S1 Form a highly capable group with extreme objectives M1 
S2 Decide to escalate to the nuclear level of violence M2 
S3 Steal nuclear weapons-usable material C1 
S4 Acquire nuclear weapons-usable material C2 
S5 Smuggle nuclear weapons-usable material to safe 
haven 
C3 
S6 Construct nuclear explosive C4 
S7 Smuggle nuclear explosive into target country C5 
S8 Transport nuclear explosive to target location C6 
S9 Detonate nuclear explosive C7 
 
(Based on Bunn et al. 2003a, 26) 
 
The steps towards nuclear terrorism are both of a motivational, or inten-
tional, character, and of a capability strengthening character. The total risk, 
RT, is: 
 
CMT RRR ×=  
 
where RM and RC are the motivationally-based and capability-based nuclear 
risks, respectively. The motivationally-based nuclear risk (RM) encompasses 
the first two steps, i.e. the formation of a highly motivated and capable group 
with extreme objectives and then the decision within the group to pursue a 
                                                     
62  The original Bunn-model covers nuclear terrorism steps involving both intact nuclear 
weapons and nuclear weapons-useable material. Here, however, focus will be on the latter 
with a scenario where non-state actors possibly produce their own improvised nuclear ex-
plosives. A critique of the model and proposals for further development are presented in 
Section 5.3.  
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nuclear option. The capability-based risk (RC) involves a series of subse-
quent technical steps that any aspiring nuclear terrorists have to go through.  
According to the model, each of these steps must be performed in the or-
der indicated, and each rests upon the previous one. Accordingly, derived 
from Table 3.1, the total probability of a nuclear terrorist attack, PT, may be 
expressed as the product of the probability of all the single steps S1, S2, …, 
S9:   
 
∏
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With reference to Section 3.4.1 and the indices from Table 3.1, the total risk, 
RT, of nuclear terrorism may be expressed:  
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Each of the steps S1–S9 is a prerequisite for nuclear terrorist havoc. In con-
sequence, the total probability PT may be severely limited, even reduced to 
zero, if one or more of the partial probabilities P(S i) becomes minuscule or 
zero. This is an essential point: The risk of nuclear terrorism could be drasti-
cally reduced, even eliminated, if terrorists are prevented from carrying out 
one or more of the steps. They are hence barred from advancing throughout 
the nuclear terrorism chain.  
The model shows, moreover, that different countermeasures could be tai-
lored for the specific terrorist step in question. This could allow for compara-
tive “cost–benefit” considerations to determine where investments are likely 
to yield the highest gains, in terms of reduced probability of nuclear terror-
ism. 
3.4.3 Latour’s Model for the Rendering of Science 
 
Any arms control measures are likely to encounter a mixture of technical, 
political, and bureaucratic problems (Gallagher 1999). The extent of opposi-
tion will usually depend on the amount of change, resources, and inherent 
risks involved. Resistance to new arms control measures can be strategic in 
nature, where the changes are opposed due to politics and/or security con-
cerns, or of a subtler organizational (structural), cultural, psychological, or 
personal nature (Maerli and Johnson 2002, 69).  
To members of the defence community in particular, increased openness 
may be viewed as a threat to sustained military strength.63 Releasing infor-
mation may increase vulnerability and lessen the (political) strength of the 
nation as well, as sensitive technical information could be revealed. Divulg-
ing such information has been seen as being on a par with the surrender of 
status, and has thus often been viewed as defeat (Schaper and Frank 1999, 
                                                     
63  Indeed, nuclear deterrence depends critically upon the ambiguity of retaliatory attacks. 
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59). Hence, secretiveness has traditionally been accorded a special status 
within nuclear-weapon complexes. 
Consequently, nuclear arms control practitioners may face numerous pit-
falls in their endeavours to improve nuclear security. In one bold attempt to 
understand and assess the problems of sensitivity and systemic inertia, and 
thus make headway in the jungle of obstacles to practical nuclear control 
measures, non-intrusive fissile material verification is viewed as a novel sci-
entific discipline about to be implemented in a state. As will be seen, this 
somewhat exotic coupling has various merits, with fewer methodological 
difficulties than might be anticipated.  
The introduction of the “science” of non-intrusive verification may be 
tracked using Latour’s models of how political questions are transformed 
into questions of technique, and vice versa, and how mixtures of humans and 
non-human agents are mobilised during controversies (Latour 1999, 98–98). 
This could make it possible to pinpoint relevant technical-political relation-
ships in practical nuclear arms control, and could assist in identifying how 
nuclear arms control practitioners and experts may better influence policy-
makers. It could also allow for deeper understanding of the role of key secu-
rity actors involved in the process. 
According to Latour, there are five types of interrelated activities that 
need to be considered simultaneously in the process of understanding what 
any scientific discipline is up to. These are: “Mobilization of the world”, 
“Autonomization”, “Alliances”, “Public representation”, and finally, “Links 
and knots”. In society, these work together in generating mutually dependent 
loops (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Latour’s five loops for the rendering of science 
 
(From Latour 1999, 100) 
 
Mobilization of the world refers to all the means by which non-humans are 
progressively loaded into public discourse, to lay the foundation for interac-
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tion and dialogue. The “non-humans” in question could be instruments or 
equipment developed or recently made available. In the field of non-intru-
sive verification, a prime example is emerging equipment with information 
barriers to protect sensitive information during nuclear arms control meas-
urements.64 Or, it could be information-gathering expeditions, or simply sur-
veys that make new data available. Studies like this one may serve as an ex-
ample. Ideally, this set of new science opportunities should be gathered at 
openly available sites to ensure its optimum use and mobilization of poten-
tial users and actors.  
As with other fledgling disciplines, the foundations for non-intrusive 
verification need to grow strong on their own. In Latour’s model, autonomi-
zation concerns “the way in which a discipline or a profession becomes in-
dependent and forms its own criteria of relevance” (Latour 1999, 102). All 
scientists (and arms control practitioners) are gradually becoming experts 
though a learning and educational process that makes them more and more 
specialized within their fields of work. Eventually, a separate, autonomous 
“discipline” may evolve – in our case, optimum nuclear husbandry, in which 
e.g. non-intrusive verification will be an essential element.  
Alliances. To ensure that the new discipline is able to exist and endure, 
arms controllers may have to place it within a large and secure context. This 
may mean that new groups of people with little or no contact in the past sud-
denly have to interact. In our case, both the military and members of the leg-
islative assembly may for instance have to become interested in the opportu-
nities (and physics) of nuclear verification. To many of them, this could be a 
new field. Depending on the circumstances, these alliances between the new 
set of actors can take a wide variety of forms. But this inclination has to be 
created. To put it bluntly, there is no natural connection between a politician, 
a military officer and the gamma rays emanating from highly enriched ura-
nium inside a container. Some level of persuasion and assistance is needed. 
As Latour (1999, 104) explains, the world has to be worked on to “make 
these alliances, in retrospect, inevitable”. 
To create a foundation for new types of practical arms control measures 
like non-intrusive verification, the potential opportunities and, not least, the 
possible benefits of such measures have to be known, to the public at large 
and to a range of audiences. The novel techniques and procedures of non-
intrusive verification have to be socialized into the collective through public 
presentation, as a fourth loop of the science rendering. According to Latour, 
it would be astonishing if this were not so: “For what is science if it is not to 
modify the associations of people and things?” (1999,105).  
Finally, the new system of science “bloodstreams” needs to be connected 
through a set of mutually supportive and necessary set of links and knots: “If 
one takes the content on one side and the context on the other, the flow of 
science becomes incomprehensive, and so does its source of the oxygen and 
                                                     
64  For this purpose, a range of different verification schemes have been developed that use 
so called “information barriers” to protect sensitive information. Generally, an informa-
tion barrier must both prevent the release (accidental or intentional) of any classified in-
formation, and at the same time provide confidence that the measured systems are func-
tioning correctly and that the unclassified display (output) reflects the true state of the 
measured item. This is often referred to as the “authentication problem”. For more on this, 
see Section 4.3.3.2.1 and research paper [P7].  
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nutriment, as well as their means to entering the bloodstream” (Latour 1999, 
107). This is both the unifying loop and the blood-pumping cycle. Without 
the fifth loop, it would be hard to mobilize the world, annoyed colleagues 
and new allies would soon lose interest, as would the general public – after 
expressing either disbelief or indifference to the opportunities and threat-
reducing potentials of non-intrusive nuclear verification in society. 
The Latour model is an interesting tool for understanding the many chal-
lenges of practical measures for nuclear arms control. However, an inevit-
able question is how valid the coupling between “science” and “non-intru-
sive verification” is. From a methodological perspective, equating the two 
may be an overly simplified approximation. Firstly, “verification” may seem 
more like a measure, procedure or approach than a defined science disci-
pline. Secondly, validity losses may occur, as the Latour model here is (pre-
sumably) used in a quite extended way, beyond Latour’s own case studies. 
Latour analysed the introduction of so-called “big science” in society, and 
specifically the instigation of atomic physics and civilian nuclear power in 
France after the Second World War. 
On the other hand, these problems may prove less substantial than antici-
pated. Post-war “big science”, like nuclear power, was indeed characterized 
by teams of researchers, all in new settings with latest experimental devices. 
Researchers would typically work in a multidisciplinary way, with an array 
of newly developed and specialised equipment, often with governmental 
funding (American Institute of Physics, undated). The similarities to post-
Cold War nuclear verification activities are striking. During non-intrusive 
verification of sensitive fissile material, a (new) set of tools will have to be 
introduced in a highly multidisciplinary approach by a new set of actors 
(technicians, military, policy-makers etc.), facing a range of obstacles on the 
individual, structural, political and technical levels (Maerli and Johnston 
2002, 67–69). 
Important similarities between “science” and “non-intrusive verification” 
may be found on the ideological level as well. Science has three important 
functions: An instrumental function, where the development of science 
brings development and benefits to society; a critical function, where science 
may act as a corrective and guidance in society; and finally, a cultural func-
tion, where science describes, analyses and changes our culture (Kaiser 
2000, 29–30). Equally, the successful implementation of non-intrusive veri-
fication into society may bring (instrumental) development and societal 
benefits in terms of increased security; it may correct government policies 
and attitudes, thereby lessening hostility, and it may change individual and 
organizational customs and habits. As such, non-intrusive verification con-
tains many of the features of a fully-fledged science discipline.  
As argued by Silke (Section 3.2), moreover, atypical methodological 
steps, with less concern with issues of validity, may be taken at the explor-
ative study level in order to illuminate both technical and political aspects of 
the case in question. Despite possible validity losses, the Latour model will 
therefore be used, with caution, as a structuring element for the analysis of 
the practical implementation of key concepts of nuclear husbandry like 
transparency and non-intrusive verification of fissile material.  
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3.5 Analytical Limitations  
 
As to the “who”, “why” and “how” of nuclear terrorism, the analytical focus 
of study will be primarily on the latter, with a focus largely on (technical) 
capabilities (i.e. steps S3-S9 in Section 3.4.2).  
However, as the majority of terrorist organizations world do not seem to 
have an interest in nuclear explosives (Rapoport 2001, xv), understanding 
motivational aspects become particularly important; excluding terrorist in-
tention from the assessments could result in a general over-appreciation of 
the threat. For this reason, general terrorist motivations, as well as the usabil-
ity of crude nuclear explosives for terrorists, will have to be briefly assessed. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this study to undertake in-depth analyses 
of the motives and capabilities of specific terrorist movements, to identify 
groups most likely to acquire nuclear explosive devices.65 
Nor has the impact of suicide bombings, a method increasingly adopted 
as the ultimate strategic weapon (Randstorp 2003a, 74), been taken into con-
sideration. Defence against such attacks is extremely difficult, as the timing, 
location and target ranges could be drastically increased, and any threat of 
nuclear terrorism might be correspondingly amplified. However, the asser-
tion that suicide bombings could fuel large-scale terrorism with chemical, 
biological or nuclear weapons could be based on an unfounded generaliza-
tion of the phenomenon of suicide bombing (Dolnik 2003, 32). The possible 
emergence of nuclear suicide bombers is probably best understood by asses-
sing psychological processes on the group and/or individual level, which in 
again turn calls for specialised studies.  
Terrorism today is increasingly moving away from the hierarchal struc-
tures, national contexts and traditional modes of state sponsorships and is 
characterised by a move towards ad hoc constellations and international net-
works (Randstorp 2003a, 74). However, within the analytical framework 
applied here, there has been no room for assessing the impact of communica-
tions technology on terrorist capabilities. Terrorist finances and economic 
resources will have to be left unattended as well.66 Neither does the analysis 
address in any depth the nexus of organized crime, arms trade, and terrorism. 
No apparent links to organized crime have been identified (Zaitseva and 
Steinhausler 2004, 6w), but nuclear smugglers could use drug trafficking 
routes.67 Some of these actors are highly skilled, well-organized and re-
sourceful, which would make any nuclear trafficking operations particularly 
hard to detect (Williams and Woessner 2001, 321).  
Nor does the analytical approach chosen allow for a thorough assessment 
of perceptions of the risk of nuclear terrorism, another sadly under-investi-
                                                     
65  The sheer complexity surrounding the range of root causes of terrorism calls for separate 
and specialized studies on these issues. There exist many preconditions and precipitants 
for the emergence of various forms of terrorism (see Bjørgo 2003, 2). 
66  The events of 9/11 have heightened concerns about the ability of terrorist organizations to 
use the global financial system to support their activities. In response, international initia-
tives to combat terrorism have focused on preventing and suppressing the collection and 
movement of terrorist funds. These issues are assessed by the project “Targeting Terrorist 
Finances”, at the Watson Institute at Brown University, Rhode Island: see www. watson-
institute.org/projectdetail.cfm?id=51 (last accessed 16 January 2004). 
67  In February 2002, 1.5 kg. of uranium smuggled from Tajikistan through Uzbekistan was 
seized in the southern region of Kazakhstan together with a large cache of heroin (Zait-
seva 2002, 9). 
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gated topic. The fear of radiation is deep-seated among the world’s popula-
tions (Slovic 1996; Maerli 1996), and nuclear worries about radiation do not 
necessarily parallel (objective) assessments of the risk in question (Reitan et 
al. 1996, 155; Tønnessen 2002, 7). Strong responses in the population to any 
(possible) exposure from radioactivity could result, making atoms and nu-
clear explosives a particularly powerful terrorist tool (Maerli 1999, 65).  
Finally, to natural scientists, the analysis could appear to have its techni-
cal limitations. For instance, promising schemes for non-intrusive verifica-
tion on sensitive fissile material (naval fuel) are presented (Section 4.3.3.2) 
without any calculations that would take into consideration such critical fac-
tors as shielding, gamma-ray attenuation, measurement set-up and measuring 
times. Possible approaches for verification and key parameters are discussed 
in general terms only.  
Readers should, however, bear in mind that this thesis is of a highly ex-
ploratory character (see Section 3.2.). Rather than providing fully-fledged 
solutions for practical nuclear arms control, one of the underlying aims has 
been to explore the highly interwoven political and technical aspects of spe-
cific nuclear security challenges. Many of the practical problems encoun-
tered will have to be further investigated, once the necessary political resolve 
and openings have been generated. 
3.5.1 Data Limitations  
 
Due to secrecy considerations, especially in Russia/the former USSR, this 
study has struggled with both direct data acquisition problems and access to 
primary information sources in conjunction with the case study for transpar-
ency and non-intrusive verification on classified stockpiles. Very little is 
officially known about Russian naval fuel, and the limited information avail-
able is mostly channelled through NGO sources.68 While studies of civilian–
military relations always encounter methodological challenges, this may be a 
particular problem in Northwest Russia, one of the most highly militarised 
regions of the world (Hoenneland and Joergensen 1999, 3).  
Mutual sensitivity concerns may also play a role. It took nearly four 
months of consideration by the US Department of Energy (DOE) before the 
author of this study was granted permission to interview one of the US team 
members in the joint US–Russian naval material protection, control and ac-
countability programme. As a precondition, anything written after the inter-
view was to be subjected for review, prior to publication. As such, this rep-
resented a form of potential censorship and was hardly the best way to en-
sure free and equitable research. In the end, however, the DOE abstained 
from providing any official comments on the text. The person interviewed 
was granted anonymity.  
There is a reluctance to talk about non-classified issues related to naval 
fuel. All this would seem to indicate a deep-felt concern on both the US and 
the Russian side that anything written about such a sensitive topic as fresh 
                                                     
68  The most prominent ones being the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Database on the 
Russian Navy, available at www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/overview.htm, and the 
Norwegian Bellona Foundation, www.bellona.no.  
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naval fuel could endanger cooperation and progress in security upgrades. 
The author’s past professional experiences of fresh and spent fuel handling 
practices and nuclear security in Northwest Russia have made this less of a 
problem compared to the barriers other scholars may have encountered.  
Not only has data input proven challenging. Even the output of research 
findings could be an act of balance. The analyses would not only assist gov-
ernments in meeting the threat and in identifying optimum countermeasures: 
Studies like this also risk increasing the threat by inspiring, and perhaps guid-
ing, potential terrorists in their pursuit of innovative, media-attracting and 
hard-hitting tactics. Accordingly, considerable care should be taken when pre-
senting and disseminating research findings. For this reason, in this study only 
general and limited technical calculations on crude nuclear explosive devices 
have for instance been presented (Appendix III). References to Internet sites 
with open but possibly sensitive information have generally been omitted.  
Yet, even the caution shown may apparently not be enough. Concerns 
about assisting potential nuclear terrorists were cited as the reason why the 
editor of Nonproliferation Review found it necessary to replace some refer-
ences in one of the research papers of this study, thusly: “[Editor’s note: In 
order not to make it easier for unwanted actors to find information about 
how to build a nuclear bomb, the individual’s name and specific references 
provided by the author have been removed from this endnote]”.69 
                                                     
69  The research paper in question was [P1] (Maerli 2000a). For more on this story, see Lar-
sen 2002 or Hanley 2002. 

Chapter 4: Research Findings  
This chapter presents key findings from the eight research papers [P1] to 
[P8] presented in the Addendum. The chapter encompasses three main sec-
tions: Understanding the Nuclear Terrorism Threat; Conceptual Nuclear 
Husbandry; and Nuclear Husbandry in Practice. Each section ends with sum-
mary answers to the principal research questions formulated in Section 1.2. 
The analytical approach presented in Chapter 3 serves a structuring element 
and an overall methodological framework for the presentation of the re-
search findings. 
Where appropriate, the research findings are presented in concert with 
those of other scholars in the field. This will help to put the findings of this 
thesis in context, and also add on to the cumulative knowledge in the field, 
furthering the general understanding of the nuclear terrorism threat and perti-
nent countermeasures. Accordingly, the chapter will be more than a mere 
synopsis of the underlying research papers. However, only highlights of the 
underlying research papers will be presented. Readers wishing more in-depth 
considerations should consult the research paper(s) in question.  
To make it clear when the findings of one of the research papers [P1]–
[P8] is applied throughout this text, specific reference (e.g. [P3]) to the rele-
vant paper is made.  
4.1 Understanding the Nuclear Terrorism Threat 
 
Using the model of Bunn et al. on nuclear terrorism pathways (Section 
3.4.2), a series of questions regarding the terrorist threat will be investigated 
in the following. In particular are the various technical barriers to the pro-
duction of crude nuclear explosives scrutinized, inter alia by looking at the 
potential availability and the possible use of highly enriched uranium, and 
the respective “standards” of military and terrorist nuclear explosive devices. 
The first principal research question, [Q1],70 is taken as the point of de-
parture for studying the feasibility of producing crude nuclear explosives and 
the utility of such devices as a terrorist tool. The findings of research papers 
[P1], [P2], and [P3] are of primary importance for this analysis.  
4.1.1 Terrorist Interest in Nuclear Explosives 
 
Nuclear explosives could be the ultimate terrorist weapons. With crude nu-
clear devices, terrorists may suddenly possess powers far exceeding those of 
many states. They could be used to destroy an enemy’s centres of power and 
                                                     
70  [Q1]:“Can terrorists possibly perform acts of terror by means of crude nuclear explosive 
devices based on highly enriched uranium? What are the main barriers to the production 
of crude nuclear explosives?” 
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finance in a spectacular way, and at the same time be more territorially con-
fined than the less predictable and less reliable biological or chemical weap-
ons ([P2], 114–115). Moreover, terrorists might possibly view nuclear weap-
ons as somehow “cleaner” and merely a more powerful extension of traditio-
nal explosives, whereas biological and chemical weapons might be seen as 
representing a new and more vicious kind of destruction (Laqueur 1999, 
255).  
Generally, the public has greater fear of events and consequences that are 
confirmed, catastrophic, and imperfectly understood – and these are all com-
mon features of a nuclear threat (Maerli 1995, 115; Tønnessen, 2002, 61). 
Past nuclear explosions and nuclear accidents, limited public understanding 
and knowledge of radiation, and the human inability to sense potential expo-
sure may have cultivated (disproportionately) negative perceptions of radia-
tion (Maerli 1999, 51–52). Nuclear detonations could therefore inflict a ra-
dius of psychological as well as economic damage far exceeding that of ac-
tual injury and death ([P2], 730).  
Terrorists who capitalize on the inherent fear of radiation amongst the 
population are likely to have a strong impact ([P2], 730). In contrast to the 
silent, invisible death of biological and chemical substances, a nuclear blast 
would create unexpected, immediate, and widespread attention ([P1], 116). 
According to Tønnessen (2002, 241), “nuclear threat inflicts upon the public 
a feeling of insecurity about possible adverse health effects, is closely related 
to dreaded Armageddon schemata, and is perceived as a threat from which 
one cannot protect oneself”.71 The psychological and political impact of any 
nuclear explosion would hence be vast, regardless of the actual damage it 
inflicted (Cordesman 2001, 40), adding on to the post-attack confusion, fear 
and panic ([P1], 116). The strong impacts may, however, also stand a risk of 
overshadowing the cause – if any – that terrorists are trying to make a case 
for (Maerli 1999, 7). 
Nuclear explosive devices may be particularly useful for maximizing 
damages, augmenting crisis, and destabilizing societies or economies ([P1], 
116). Actually detonating a nuclear device could set a terrorist organization 
apart from any other group, and could compel governments to take that or-
ganization seriously (Carmeron 2000). Proven nuclear capabilities may, 
moreover, serve as a strong tool for terrorist blackmailing. Even a credible 
hoax – for example, where terrorists provide workable designs of nuclear ex-
plosive devices together with samples of high-quality fissile material – could 
challenge proper governmental responses ([P2], 730).  
While the number of terrorist attacks has remained fairly constant or even 
declined, the terrorist mortality rate is on the rise, with more indiscriminate 
killings (Stern 1999). The death-toll from the World Trade Center attacks 
represented a quantum leap in terms of terrorist casualties, in itself suggest-
ing that there will be future acts of large-scale terrorism (Maerli 2001a, 214).  
                                                     
71  This is confirmed by surveys. August 2003, 32% of Russian respondents saw internatio-
nal terrorists as a nuclear threat (Agence France-Presse 2003). As many as 66% of the 
Russians believe that terrorists may obtain access to the Russian nuclear arsenal (Orlov 
and Khlopkov 2001, 8). In 1998, 67% of 1502 Canadian respondents put nuclear terror-
ism on top of all contemporary nuclear threats, regarding this as a “serious threat”, Bre-
mer Maerli 1999, 53. 
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Particularly in the USA, there has been unprecedented concern that the 
next terrorist attack could involve a nuclear explosive or a radiological bomb 
(Collina and Wolfsthal 2002, 1w). When Tom Ridge, the Bush Administra-
tion’s head of the Office of Homeland Security, was asked what he worried 
the most about, he simply said “nuclear”, with reference to nuclear terrorism 
(Keller 2002, 2w). 
However, there have always been enormous gaps between the potential 
of a weapon and the will to employ it by terrorists (Rapoport 1999, 51). In 
the past, non-state actors desiring so have managed to kill large numbers of 
people without employing exotic technologies like nuclear weapons. Con-
ventional means could still more than effectively serve their goals and are 
likely to remain the terrorist weapons of choice. Besides, inflicting massive 
human casualties does not serve the objectives of most non-state groups 
(Falkenrath et al. 1998, 45).  
New means and methods of violence with unknown outcomes and new 
technical requirements (and thus an increased risk of failure) could also be 
less appealing for non-state actors. Unsuccessful or failed actions may waste 
resources, kill members of the terrorist groups, increase the risk of revelation 
and retaliation, embarrass the terrorist organization, or reduce support 
amongst followers – all putting at stake the very existence of the group, and 
its cause.  
Terrorists, moreover, operate in contexts of enormous uncertainty and 
anxiety, and may prefer known means. If one target is regarded as too chal-
lenging, other targets may be chosen, while the tactics of the group remain 
the same. Alternatively, conventional tactics may be further developed, as 
horrifically evidenced in the events of 9/11. The use of nuclear, biological, 
or chemical weapons could, moreover, stigmatize the terrorist group, render-
ing it hard for them to accomplish any political aspirations. The constraints 
against the use of such weapons are particularly severe for terrorists who are 
concerned with their constituents, as in the case of social revolutionary and 
national separatist terrorists (Post 2001, 9).  
A less pronounced barrier, in addition to the practical and strategic con-
straints, might be moral considerations. For a terrorist group to be able to use 
biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, its members would have to be mor-
ally disengaged from the consequences of their actions (Stern 1999, 80). 
Typically, terrorists do not view themselves as psychic madmen and killers, 
but simply as political or military units (Hoffman 1998, 29). Killing many 
innocent people may not be consistent with terrorists’ own perceptions of 
themselves as respected liberators or “freedom-fighters”. Coupled with the 
fact that most conventional means will serve the terrorist purpose(s) well, 
these considerations could probably go far in explaining why there so far 
have not been any acts of nuclear terrorism. 
4.1.1.1 Forming a Highly Capable Group With Extreme Objectives 
Most terrorists are in a sense conservative. It may be hard to establish a so-
phisticated, capable, and well-financed terrorist group that also had the kinds 
of extreme objectives that would make it a candidate for pursuing nuclear 
explosives (step S1, Section 3.4.2). Groups may not simply take what may 
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be “available” in terms of weaponry. They are more likely to seek weapons 
or agents that best suit their needs. 
Examination of past mass-casualty attacks shows that the perpetrators did 
not opt for unconventional weapons, but preferred known means (Parachini 
2001, 402). If a group chooses unconventional weaponry instead of conven-
tional means, this choice will be influenced by many more factors than only 
the perceived potential for inflicting mass casualties. 
However, while most terrorist groups are likely to stick to traditional ter-
rorist means and known tactics, some groups may be ready to escalate up to 
a new level of violence. In the wake of the events of 9/11, the notion that 
“terrorists want a lot of people watching and listening, not a lot of people 
dead” (Jenkins 1975, 15) should be in for review. As seen in Section 3.4.1, 
the greatest danger of large-scale killing occurs when the group or individual 
is not only motivated, but also has technical capabilities, easily exploitable 
opportunities, and a minimum of restraints (Falkenrath et al. 1998, 169; 
Parachini 2003, 46). As Jessica Stern (1999, 8–10) points out, a mix of at 
least five interrelated developments may point in this direction.  
First of all, terrorist motivations are changing. Today’s new breed of ter-
rorists appears more inclined than terrorists of the past to commit acts of ex-
treme violence. The set of new terrorists may include everything from ad hoc 
groups motivated by religious conviction or revenge, to violent right-wing 
extremists, and apocalyptical cults. Secondly, chemical, biological and nu-
clear weapons could be especially valuable to terrorists who are not pursuing 
traditional political goals, but are seeking divine retribution, to display 
prowess, or just to perform large-scale killings.  
Thirdly, terrorists will generally choose their technology to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of a particular society. Modern and densely populated socie-
ties are particularly susceptible to weapons capable of killing many people at 
one time. Moreover, as governments implement sophisticated security meas-
ures against terrorist attacks, terrorists may find more powerful weapons ap-
pealing, as a way to overcome such countermeasures.  
Fourthly, with the brake-up of the Soviet Union and corrupt nuclear sci-
entists in states on the fringes of international law,72 black markets may now 
offer unprecedented access to weapons, components and know-how. Tech-
nological (weapons) development may add on to this. Fifthly, copycat ef-
forts, where new groups both find inspiration and ideas from previous large-
scale terrorist violence, may spur additional terrorist attacks.  
Moreover, international terrorism is becoming more lethal. Terrorists 
themselves may have become less dependent on state sponsorship, gradually 
turning more non-secular, and more suicidal. Increasingly, they tend to orga-
nize themselves in loosely affiliated groups (Schmid 2003a, 2). Failed states 
could serve well as terrorist breeding grounds. None of these developments 
means good news for nuclear terrorism prevention; the use of crude nuclear 
explosives could indeed increase terrorism lethality, and a lower dependence 
on state sponsorship could reflect more technically competent and independ-
ent terrorist groups. 
                                                     
72  Early in 2004, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, confessed to having 
leaked nuclear secrets to other states, see Section 1.5.2. 
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There are few reasons why extreme religious considerations should be a 
constraining factor for nuclear terrorism. Any linkages with organized crime 
can only improve access to black markets of technology and fissile material. 
Finally, more loosely organized networks should not be regarded as a real 
impediment to nuclear terrorism, particularly not if the individuals involved 
are firmly committed and capable.  
4.1.1.2 Deciding to Escalate to the Nuclear Level of Violence  
The formation of a highly capable group with extreme objectives is in itself 
not enough to create nuclear havoc. As Bunn et al. point out (Section 3.4.2), 
the group needs to be ready to step up to the level of nuclear violence (step 
S2). A range of factors determines whether a group or an individual will 
seek to acquire and use non-conventional weapons for terrorism. These fac-
tors could differ from group to group. Religion is an important factor, but 
only one of many (Parachini 2003, 46).73 Tucker (2000, 255–269) has identi-
fied a set of characteristics associated with terrorist groups that have used 
biological or chemical weapons. These groups are characterized by:74   
 
 paranoia and grandiosity; 
 
 lack of political constituency; 
 
 closed cult or splinter group; 
 
 charismatic, violence-prone leader; 
 
 apocalyptic ideology, cult of death; 
 
 escalatory pattern of violence; 
 
 technical and tactical innovation; 
 
 fascination with poisons, plagues. 
 
Groups marginalized and distanced from society may be particularly prone 
to violence escalation. Often in cults, in closed environments with limited 
interactions with the outside world, such groups are open to strong influ-
ences from a charismatic leadership. Extreme images of right and wrong, 
images that not only call for but also justify, the use of extreme violence, 
may be easily cultivated. Groups that place themselves outside society and 
outside societal mores may have scant moral difficulty deciding to employ 
                                                     
73  Calls from religious or political leaders for nuclear explosives regularly surface. For in-
stance, December 26th 2002, the moderator of the radical Islamic Internet forum www.al-
mojahedoon.net, Abu Shihab al-Qandahari, published a short article entitled “The Nuclear 
War is the Solution for the Destruction of the United States” (Paz 2003).  
74  One obvious limitation to this comparison is that while terrorists’ uses of nuclear weapons 
will result in a massive, abrupt disaster of catastrophic dimensions, chemical and biologi-
cal weapons are invisible, odourless, tasteless, silent, and insidious. There are in other 
words profound differences between the different means (Bremer Maerli 2000, Bremer 
Maerli 2003a). Terrorists attracted to the shock, drama and drastic effects of a explosion 
may be particularly drawn to bombings, conventional or unconventional.   
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chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological means. Groups that lack an 
“audience” among the public may be less constrained in CBNR use, and par-
ticularly difficult to deter. Without a political constituency, they will not 
have to justify their goals or means to any outsiders – other than perhaps 
their God.  
In sum, only the most extreme and least rational groups, or those motivat-
ed not only by distinct political aims but by apocalyptic visions or by pan-
destructive beliefs are likely to employ nuclear, biological or chemical wea-
pons (Laqueur 1999, 70). Among such groups, associations to nuclear Ar-
mageddon do occur, both by way of “cleansing” and as sheer retribution 
(Maerli 1995, 92). 
The views that terrorist could be on the nuclear path have, particularly in 
the USA, been strengthened by the sarin attacks in Tokyo in 1995, the Okla-
homa City bombing the same year, the 2001 anthrax outbreaks, and, obvi-
ously, the attacks of 11 September 2001. Some groups that have shown a 
proven interest in acquiring nuclear explosive capabilities have, moreover, 
been granted considerable media attention. Prime examples are the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult, and, of course, the near-mythical bin Laden ([P1], 110; Ber-
gen 2001b, 431; Resch and Osborne 2001, 4–7; Parrish 2002, 1w). 
The Aum Shinrikyo cult had indeed an apocalyptic worldview, in which 
the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons would catalyse a future 
world where they would rule. The cult’s pursuit of nuclear explosive capa-
bilities, however, proved fragmented and opportunistic, and, consequently, 
unsuccessful (Cameron 1999). The nuclear material and technology pur-
chased by the cult seem to reflect what was available on the market, rather 
than being the result of a carefully crafted strategy.  
The worldview of Osama bin Laden does not depend upon the use of 
non-conventional weapons, unlike Aum Shinrikyo’s apocalyptic vision of 
the future (Parachini 2003, 43). Questions have hence been raised about the 
likelihood of a sanctioned nuclear attack by the group (Raufer 2003, 397). 
Findings in Afghanistan have revealed neither a nuclear capability nor any 
nuclear material. In the raids against former al-Qaeda hideouts, only simple 
sketches of nuclear devices were found (CNN 2002, 2w).  
But bin Laden and al-Qaeda have shown an incontestable interest in nu-
clear explosives. Proven nuclear efforts included attempted uranium pur-
chases in Sudan in 1993/94 and then in Germany in 1998. The latter attempt 
resulted in the arrest of bin Laden’s aide Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (Resch 
and Osborne 2001, 4). bin Laden may have been a “patient shopper” (Kluger 
2001, 2w). His intentions in this regard may have come to the fore with the 
events of 9/11. In the first interview given by Osama bin Laden after the at-
tacks, the terrorist leader claimed to possess nuclear weapons (BBC 2001b, 
1w). He has further maintained that by acquiring nuclear explosives, he 
would be carrying out a religious duty (Frontline 1995, 2w).  
However, while al-Qaeda may have acquired rudimentary nuclear mate-
rial, it remains highly uncertain whether the group has been able to weapon-
ize any of this material (Bergen 2001a, 85 and 231). Despite extremely high 
media publicity, evidence of any of al-Qaeda’s non-unconventional weapons 
capabilities remains fragmentary (Albright et al. 2002, 23; Parachini 2003, 
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40). Their nuclear intentions may hence still be stronger than any nuclear 
capabilities.   
4.1.2 Technical Barriers to Nuclear Terrorism  
 
Countless non-state actors with hostile intent have arisen in the past decade, 
but only very few, most notably the Aum Shinrikyo cult, have combined the 
technological capability needed to mount a terrorist act involving real CBNR 
capabilities with intent of doing so. As illustrated by the Bunn model (Sec-
tion 3.4.2), the initial technical, or capability-building, steps on the nuclear 
terrorist ladder involve stealing fissile material (step S3) and then gaining 
access to the stolen material (step S4). The materials that make possible nu-
clear bombs are those few isotopes capable of sustaining an exponentially 
growing chain reaction. Two isotopes of uranium, U-233 and U-235, and all 
isotopes of plutonium (most importantly Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241 and Pu-
242) fit this description, and thus are denoted directly useable nuclear mate-
rial, or “direct-use material”.75  
Unirradiated fissile material, especially HEU, is only mildly radioactive, 
with a limited level of toxicity in solid form. The material is not radioactive 
enough to deter theft and handling of them ([P3], 49). Such material be-
comes hazardous only if finely divided, dispersed and ingested into the 
lungs. Only after the uranium has undergone fissions, will strong radiation 
(from the fission products) be present.76 Due to the extreme density of the 
material, a critical mass of weapons-grade uranium occupies only small vol-
umes – about the size of a grapefruit (Harris 1999, 82).  
The small volumes needed and the low toxicities and radiation levels 
could make stealing and smuggling of near-critical amounts of fissile mate-
rial relatively uncomplicated. 
4.1.2.1 Stealing Fissile Material 
There have been multiple documented cases of theft of kilogram-quantities 
of weapons-useable material, especially in countries of the former Soviet 
Union ([P3]; Bukarin and Potter 1995; Ewell 1998; Ewell Daughtry and 
Wehling 2000; Parrish and Robinson 2000; Stone 2001). In February 2002, 
US intelligence confirmed to Congress that weapons-grade and weapons-
useable nuclear material had been stolen from some institutes in Russia (Col-
lina and Wolfsthal 2002, 1w).  
                                                     
75  For fission explosives, nuclear weapon designers prefer a U-235 fraction of more than 
90%, normally denoted “weapons-grade uranium”. For plutonium, more than 90% Pu-
239, denoted “weapons-grade plutonium”, will normally be preferred in the designs, al-
though virtually all combinations of plutonium isotopes can be used to manufacture nu-
clear explosives. An exception is plutonium containing substantial quantities of Pu-238, 
which generates so much heat and gamma radiation that it is not practical to make nuclear 
explosives out of it. Even reactor-grade plutonium is considered by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency as direct-use, i.e. weapons-useable, material. Recently declassi-
fied US documents reveal that in 1962 a nuclear test explosion was carried out with reac-
tor plutonium, producing a significant, but still classified yield. For an assessment of nu-
clear explosive devices based on reactor-grade plutonium, see Swahn 1992, 59–65. 
76  Because of the long half-lives of the isotopes, the dose rates from fresh material are sev-
eral orders of magnitude below the dose rates from spent uranium fuel when it is unloaded 
from a reactor. 
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A serious incident occurred in December 1998 ([P3], 52), when the Rus-
sian Federal Security Services intercepted an attempt to divert 18.5 kg of 
“radioactive materials that might have been used in the production of nuclear 
weapons” (Bukharin et al. 2000, 5; Bunn 2000b, 17; Parrish and Tamara 
2000, 112). Russian officials confirmed this attempt in November 1999. Lat-
er it was acknowledged that the material was highly enriched uranium. This 
makes this case the largest documented attempt to steal weapons-useable 
material in the former Soviet Union (Bunn 2000b, 17). It is, moreover, the 
first confirmed case that apparently involved a conspiracy to steal enough 
material for a bomb at a single stroke. The then Russian president, Boris 
Yeltsin, ordered a radical overhaul of security at the site, where more than 30 
tons of highly enriched uranium were stored (Hutchinson 2003, 184). 
Naval fuel has been particularly exposed to theft in Russia (see Appendix 
V); especially prior to the installation of US-funded security upgrades (see 
Appendix VI). At least six cases of attempted thefts of highly enriched ura-
nium from the Northern Fleet took place in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk 
region in the period from 1993 to 1996, at storages and shipyards for con-
struction and maintenance of nuclear submarines. But even more recent 
cases have occurred. August 2003, Alexander Tyulyakov, Deputy Director at 
Atomflot, the naval base for Russian civilian icebreakers in Murmansk, was 
arrested on charges of smuggling nuclear material (Diggens 2003b).77 The 
material seized allegedly contained uranium-235, uranium-238 and radium 
(Bellona 2003). The case is particularly worrying, as it involved senior man-
agement of a facility handling such material (Badkhen and Sterngold 2003, 
2w).78 
A Murmansk newspaper claims Tyulyakov planed to sell fuel assemblies 
from a nuclear icebreaker for USD 50,000. The case may be indicative: Per-
petrators apparently steal the material without having a buyer at hand, rou-
tinely asking for sums that are hundreds or thousands of times higher than 
the market value of the fuel.79 Interpol’s Stockholm office reported a case in 
which the smugglers wanted USD 700,000 for one kg of natural uranium 
(Lee 1997, 3w). The asking price for some 5 kg of 20% enriched fresh naval 
fuel stolen in the Murmansk area in 1993 was USD 50,000 (Allison et al. 
1995, 25). 
The unclassified literature on weapons design could lead many to exag-
gerate the amount of fissile material needed for a nuclear explosive device. 
Outdated sources of information indicate that 50% to 200% more fissile ma-
terial is required than is really needed for a modern nuclear explosive of ad-
vanced design (Cordesman 2001, 33). For a technically advanced gun-type 
device (see Section 4.1.2.1.4), Cochran and Paine claim (1995, 9) that 2.5 kg 
of HEU may suffice to produce a one-kiloton yield. According to the same 
authors, a functioning, crudely assembled device with neutron reflectors 
could require as little as 8 kg.  
                                                     
77  According to the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Tyulyakov was arrested 
after a search of his home allegedly revealed “an arsenal” of guns, as well as unknown a 
“strategic substance that could be radioactive”. 
78  These are the kinds of thefts hardest for any security system to prevent. 
79  Current uranium fuel (LEU) prices are generally in the range of USD 25–35 per kg of 
material (Bunn et al. 2003b, 23). 
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If, so the “Significant Quantities” (SQ) of the IAEA may have to be re-
viewed.80 According to IAEA, “the approximate amount of nuclear material 
for which the probability of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot 
be excluded” is 25 kg of U-235 (International Atomic Energy Agency 
2002b, 23). This is ten times the quantity suggested by Cochran and Paine 
for sophisticated devices, and three times the amount possibly needed for 
crude nuclear explosives.  
To ensure a nuclear chain reaction, however, amounts in excess of the 
critical mass of uranium-235, e.g. above 50 kg, are ideally needed.81 This is 
partly due to the fact that barely a critical mass would not release much en-
ergy, and partly as material losses may occur during the production of the 
device ([P2], 736). The inevitable presence of impurities would further in-
crease the required amounts (Narath 2002, 4). The quantities needed to pro-
duce a crude nuclear explosive device are still minuscule compared with the 
total amounts of fissile material produced. 
4.1.2.1.1 HEU Production, Control and Accountability82  
As the quantity of weapons-useable material increases, so does the prolifera-
tion risk (Dreicer and Rutherford 1996, 30). The probability for losing con-
trol over nuclear material depends on the amount of material to be secured, 
the number of storage sites, and the level of physical protection provided by 
the facility operators (Zaitseva and Steinhausler 2004, 1w). While much of 
the fissile material worldwide is duly protected and accounted for, the huge 
amounts produced during the Cold War could make proper control challeng-
ing. The stockpile inventories are not static (Bukharin et al. 2000, 7),83 and 
clear information on all fissile material stockpiles is essential to ensure opti-
mum fissile material handling and control by states.  
On a global scale, more than 3,000 metric tonnes of highly enriched ura-
nium and plutonium are now stockpiled in various military and civilian pro-
grammes (Albright et al. 1997, 396; Albright 1999, 6). While production has 
ceased in well-established nuclear-weapon states, it continues in the juvenile 
ones.84 At least 1,750 tons of HEU have been produced for military purposes 
since the dawn of the atomic era, most of this by the United States and Rus-
sia (Albright et al.1997, 397).85 These two countries, in their capacity as de-
clared nuclear-weapon states, are exempted from international control. Ac-
                                                     
80  Significant Quantities are used in establishing the quantity component of the IAEA in-
spection goal. The Significant Quantities take into unavoidable losses due to conversion 
and manufacturing processes and should not be confused with critical masses.  
81  The critical mass of a bare solid sphere of U-235 is approximately 50 kg. 
82  The section is in part based on (Arbman et al. 2004), a text to which the author of this the-
sis contributed. 
83  Tens of tons of fissile material are recovered from nuclear weapon dismantlement annu-
ally, and tons of HEU are disposed of or used in (naval) reactors. As Russia dismantles 
some 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads each year, the stockpile, however insecure, will 
grow even greater (Hutchinson 2003, 185).   
84  Most notably India and Pakistan (Bremer Maerli 2001c).  
85  The United States and Russia have now declared 174 tons and 500 tons, respectively, of 
HEU in excess to their national security needs. These quantities will be down-blended for 
use as commercial reactor fuel or disposal. The ongoing HEU deal between the United 
States and the Russian Federation is covering the 500 tons of HEU currently declared ex-
cess by Russia. No further excess declarations are currently envisioned by either side. It 
should, however, be observed that the initial Russian excess declaration of 500 tons hap-
pened only after the USA offered economic incentives.   
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cordingly, only some 1% of all HEU globally is currently under International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  
Today more information about military nuclear stocks is available than 
only a few years ago, but still, with some noteworthy exceptions, no official 
figures exist on the military inventories of HEU in the nuclear-weapon states 
([P3], 55).86 Whereas Russia’s contribution to overall fissile material pro-
duction has been substantial, its total quantities are largely unknown ([P3], 
53). No official figures on Russian stocks exist. Estimates involve large un-
certainties, varying by several hundreds of tons (see Table 4.1). This makes 
it difficult to assess the ratios of prevented to non-barred thefts (Orlov 1999, 
170). The material is distributed at more than 300 buildings at more than 50 
civilian or military sites in Russia ([P3], 57). 
Much of the nuclear accountancy that in fact took place has proven to be 
deficient at several of the installations in the former Soviet Union ([P3], 55). 
The quantities of nuclear material were often given in tons, or even in rela-
tion to the value of the rouble (Kulik 1995). Inflation and devaluation make 
this type of “accountancy” untenable. Obviously, the practice complicates 
any detailed control of the material.87  
 
Table 4.1: Estimated quantities of highly enriched uranium in Russia ac-
cording to different sources  
 
Source Quantity of HEU 
outside weapons 
Total quantities of 
HEU, including in 
weapons 
Mikhailov (1993) 88  1,250 tons 
Albright et al. (1997, 399–400, 414)89 825 tons 1,050 ± 300 tons 
Bunn and Holdren (1997, 413)90 825 tons  
Bukharin (1996, 70)  1,300 tons 
US Department of Energy (1998) 600 tons  
Albright (1999, 11)91  1,010 tons 
CSIS Task Force (2000, 20)  1,040 tons 
Cirincone et al. (2002,115)  Up to 1,500 tons 
 
(Based on [P3], 54)   
 
These discrepancies signify the importance of an overall fissile material ac-
countancy exercise and the creation of a “baseline” of all stocks of fissile 
material. 1,500 tons of Russian HEU represents the upper limit of these esti-
                                                     
86  Inventories of all nuclear material on hand have not been declared by any nuclear weapon 
state, except the United Kingdom. 
87  This lack of accountability should, however, not be mistaken as sole Russian problem. A 
US historical account of its total plutonium production revealed 2.8 tons in “losses”, that 
is, material unaccounted for (United States Department of Energy 1996). An equivalent 
historical UK plutonium survey finalized in April 2000 found 300 kg Pu in excess, theo-
retically enough for some 50 to 60 bombs. A long-promised US HEU historical account is 
pending due to the difficulties of keeping track of the uranium production and production 
tails.  
88  Quoted in Albright et al. 1997, 94.   
89  Based on 10,000 operational warheads. HEU figures given in weapons-grade equivalents.  
90  Again assuming a stockpile of 10,000 warheads (see the preceding footnote). 
91  The HEU figure is given in weapons-grade equivalents. 
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mates, a quantity possibly enough for some 30,000 crude HEU nuclear ex-
plosives.92 Today these vast stocks are managed with very little of the trans-
parency needed to build confidence that they are safe and secure, or to pro-
vide the foundation for deep, transparent and irreversible nuclear arms re-
ductions ([P3], 57).93 
4.1.2.2 Getting Access to the Stolen Material 
To get hold of the required quantities and qualities of fissile material, non-
state actors would need to steal or buy the material (step S2). If they try to 
steal it themselves, the terrorists risk blowing not only their cover, but also 
their tactics and future plans. Moreover, stealing material could take terror-
ists into new fields of criminal activity, where they have less competence 
and thus a higher risk of failure ([P1], 110).  
Alternatively, they could get the material from a seller or a middleman. 
This involves other risks, as the group will have to explore the market and 
expose themselves to new people and environments – and possible sting ope-
rations. Moreover, sellers and buyers may have problems in connecting. No 
final buyer – only sellers and middlemen – has been identified in what seems 
to be a persistent black market for fissile material (Belyaninov 1994, 8w). 
This could be due to a lack of purchasers, or, possibly, more professionalized 
smuggling networks (see below).  
According to the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database,94 about 600 illicit 
trafficking incidents have taken place since January 1993. Of these, about 
400 incidents have been confirmed by states. Slightly less than half of the 
confirmed cases (175) involve nuclear material, including 18 cases with 
highly enriched uranium or plutonium (Anzelon 2001). By combining state-
confirmed information with unconfirmed open source data, the number of 
highly-credible trafficking incidents involving weapons-useable nuclear ma-
terial amounts to 25 since 1992 (Zaitseva and Steinhausler 2004, 2w).    
None of the quantities of seized nuclear material was in itself enough to 
produce a workable nuclear explosive. Intercepted plutonium accounts for 
less than one percent of the 39 kg of fissile material seized in the 25 inci-
dents known. HEU may hence have been subject to diversion and smuggling 
to a much higher degree than plutonium (Zaitseva and Steinhausler 2004, 
2w). However, the extent to which undetected smuggling has occurred is 
unknown. The dark figures could be high. One successful transfer of high-
quality nuclear material could be one too many, and the seizures produce a 
disturbing picture ([P1], 114).  
                                                     
92  This is a very rough estimation, assuming that slightly above 50 kg of HEU will suffice 
for a crude nuclear explosive device. The number depends on the kind of nuclear explo-
sive in question. Using the 8 kg figure given by Cohran and Paine (Section 4.1.2.1) as a 
point of departure for the nuclear explosive, gives for instance a stockpile figure enough 
for nearly 200,000 crude nuclear explosives.  
93  The considerable uncertainties in fissile material inventories have been deemed to be the 
major obstacle to meaningful reductions (Fetter 1996, 15; Zarimpas 2003, 10).  
94  This database is part of an information exchange programme among IAEA member states, 
with some 70 states participating. The member states report and confirm incidents of il-
licit trafficking on their territories, and provide background information to the cases. Ad-
ditional information from open sources is included when appropriate. 
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4.1.2.2.1 Russian HEU Security  
Reponses from Russian officials on the matter of physical security deficien-
cies and insufficient control of nuclear material vary – from denial (see e.g. 
Sinitsina 2003) to some concessions, acknowledging to a certain extent that 
there are security problems. In August 2003, the board of the Russian Fed-
eral Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), 
concluded that there have been deviations in the control and accounting of 
nuclear material (Nuclear.ru 2003, 1w; RIA Novosti 2003, 1).  
The conclusions were reached after a revision of the activities within the 
state system for nuclear material control and accounting of as well as results 
of regulatory control over the physical protection of nuclear and radiation 
hazardous facilities. According to the board, many violations have been reg-
istered (Aale 2003, 6). Russian officials now claim to have taken steps to 
correct these. However, establishing a state system of accounting and control 
for nuclear material in Russia is a slow process (Dmitriev et al. 2001). 
The primary threat against the security and the control of nuclear material 
in today’s Russia may be a knowledgeable and corrupt insider, possibly act-
ing in collaboration with external participants ([P1], 114; [P3], 56; Bukharin 
and Potter 1995, 49; Bukharin 1998, 320). Soviet-era physical security sys-
tems were built on a philosophy of “guards, guns and Gulag” (Bunn et al. 
2002, 35). Morale in the nuclear-weapon complex then was high, and insid-
ers were not really a threat, as personal surveillance was tight and potential 
buyers of stolen fissile material absent.95 Post-Soviet experiences have 
proven otherwise ([P3], 52).  
Recent developments in Russia, resulting in burdensome transformations 
of both military and civilian nuclear entities and cuts in wages and former 
privileges for the employees, seems to have lowered the thresholds for theft 
and diversion of material ([P3], 56). According to a study performed by 
GAN, personnel working within the nuclear industry were involved in all the 
thefts that were analysed in 1992–94 (Koupriyanova 1999). These perpetra-
tors were all without a previous criminal record.  
Hence, although fissile material security in the former Soviet Union has 
often been treated as a technical problem, it may actually be more of a “peo-
ple problem” (Daughtry and Wehling 2000, 108). Living conditions and po-
litical turmoil in Russia are factors of great importance to nuclear security 
(Allison et al. 1995, 28–29). Domestic upheavals can only increase the risk 
of “nuclear leakage” (Busch 2002, 46). The system of fissile-material secu-
rity at former Soviet nuclear facilities was severely weakened after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union (Busch 2002, 73). Sustainable nuclear security and 
safety cannot be developed in a vacuum.  
                                                     
95  In the past, insiders were never considered a major threat ([P3], 57). Close screening and 
surveillance of employees, strong penalties and closed borders and the absence of external 
buyers of any diverted material was considered sufficient. Hence, portal monitors for fis-
sile material at nuclear facilities would be a rare feature in Soviet designed systems of 
physical protection. Sometimes simple wax seals were used to indicate if doors or con-
tainers have been opened or tampered with. These seals do not meet international stan-
dards and also do not guarantee the quick discovery of thefts (Bunn 2000).  
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Stable political, societal and economic conditions are paramount, and 
these aspects need to be taken into consideration when discussing nuclear 
security.96  
4.1.2.2.2 Joint International Efforts to Secure Russian HEU 
During the past decade, unprecedented cooperative work between the USA 
and Russia has been carried out to secure fissile material ([P6], 38). Many of 
the challenges, however, remain. Hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material 
still lack improved security systems. As of March 2003, the USA, according 
to the United States General Accounting Office (2003, 25), had assisted Rus-
sia in protecting about 228 metric tons, or some 38%, of its weapons-useable 
nuclear material.97 Most of the buildings where the Americans have been 
granted access and where security systems have been installed are at Russian 
civilian sites and at naval sites, not at Russian nuclear complex (see Table 
4.2). 
The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to complete its work at naval 
fuel storage sites in 2006, at civilian sites in 2007, and at the nuclear weap-
ons complex in 2008 (General Accounting Office 2003a, 24–25 and 29).98 
As of January 2003, US teams had obtained or anticipated obtaining access 
to thirty-five of the estimated 133 buildings in Russia’s nuclear-weapons 
complex with nuclear material. At the remaining buildings (74% of the to-
tal), the US Department of Energy (DOE) had no access to design or confirm 
the installation of security systems. In reality, therefore, progress has been 
limited for much of the most proliferation-attractive material, located in the 
nuclear-weapons complex ([P6], 38). 
 
Table 4.2: Buildings to Which US Teams Lack Physical Access in Russia, 
percentage, as of January 2001 
 
Civilian 
Sites (%) 
Naval Fuel Sites 
(%) 
Nuclear Weapon Laboratories 
(%) 
Overall 
(%) 
12 0 73 41 
 
(From US General Accounting Office 2001, p. 8)   
 
In stark contrast to this, the US team working on security upgrades for the 
Russian Navy reports access to all sensitive facilities having fresh highly 
enriched uranium fuel (see Table 4.2). Building upon the fresh fuel security 
upgrades, the team is now engaged in securing the nuclear weapons of the 
Russian Navy and expects to finish security upgrades for four thousand na-
val nuclear warheads by 2005 (Abraham 2002, 3w).  
                                                     
96  The assessment by Hansen and Tønnessen (1998) may be useful point of departure for 
such an analysis.  
97  A key US official in part contrasted these figures September 2003. According to Energy 
Secretary Spencer Abraham (2003, 3), security has been improved “at over 70% of the 
original MPC&A (Material Protection, Control and Accounting) sites in Russia”. It is un-
clear, however, what is meant by “original sites”, and the figure presented says nothing 
about the amount of material actually covered, to what level of security.  
98  DOE has, however, scaled back its plans to assist operational naval sites, which support 
deployed nuclear weapons, to comply with January 2003 US interagency guidelines that 
preclude assistance to most operational sites (General Accounting Office 2003a, 32). 
Morten Bremer Mærli 
research findings  
64 
The US–Russian naval MPC&A Program has clearly been more success-
ful than other cooperative programmes in overcoming distrust and dealing 
with sensitivity issues ([P6], 46–47). As such, it could be a particularly inter-
esting candidate, or perhaps even a springboard, for increased transparency 
([P6], 48).99 Important lessons from this collaboration could, moreover, be 
applied to other cooperative nuclear security efforts.  
Other elements of the US–Russian MPC&A Program have run into sev-
eral fundamental problems. From the beginning, access to sensitive Russian 
nuclear sites has been a significant stumbling-block for cooperation on fis-
sile material security and nuclear weapons ([P3], 59). There has been a lack 
of clarity on both sides as to the kinds of access needed, when, for whom, 
and most importantly, for what purposes (Holgate 2001). As a result, all new 
security contracting at the most sensitive nuclear-weapon complex has been 
suspended since autumn 1999, pending decisions and agreements on access 
([P6], 38). Most assessments of joint US–Russian cooperative threat-
reduction programmes or fissile-material security upgrades have hence 
stressed that improved transparency is essential for continued success (Busch 
2002, 90). 
The scale of the security challenges has, moreover, proven far greater 
than anticipated ([P3], 58). New insights into the size and diversity of the 
Russian nuclear weapon complex have led US experts to revise their initial 
threat assessments and cost estimates. In 1999, the risk of theft or diversion 
of directly useable material was deemed “considerably greater” than just 
three years earlier, due to more extensive dispersion of the fissile material 
and more pervasive inadequacies in the physical protection system (National 
Research Council 1999, 1).  
There are also operational problems associated with the MP&A equip-
ment installed with US support. The equipment needs continuous supervi-
sion and maintenance, which in turn presupposes dedicated and well-trained 
(and paid) personnel. Sustainability is obviously an aspect requiring more 
attention ([P3], 63). The fact that the joint US–Russian nuclear material se-
curity upgrades may be effective against casual thefts, but less effective 
against the insider threats mentioned (Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy for Countering Terrorism 2002, 40), also merits close consideration. 
4.1.2.3 Smuggling the HEU to a Safe Haven  
If the country of origin of the fissile material is different from the planned 
country of destination for the nuclear explosive device, the material will 
have to be transferred across international borders (step S5). To customs and 
other law-enforcement officers, this represents an opportunity for intercept-
ing the material. Unfortunately, the low radiation signatures of HEU compli-
cate such seizures, as do the need for specialized customs training and 
equipment. Prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear material is further chal-
lenged by the large number of legitimate border crossings, and limited op-
portunities and resources to control all travellers and goods. 
Every day, more than 15 million cargo containers are moving around at 
sea or land, or await delivery. Inspectors examine only two per cent of these 
containers, and often only after these have travelled long distances (Econo-
                                                     
99  These are issues that will be thoroughly investigated in Section 4.3. 
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mist 2002). Experiences with the interdiction of drugs and other trafficking 
suggest that seizures represent as little as 10%, and a maximum of 40%, of 
the goods actually being smuggled (Williams and Woessner 1995, 2; Zait-
seva and Steinhausler 2004, 5w).   
Assuming, probably far too generously, that customs and others should 
be able to seize 60 to 70% of the nuclear goods, this would still leave one 
third of the illicit nuclear material outside the hands of law-enforcement of-
ficials. Experiences from drug trafficking, moreover, suggest that when law 
enforcement is increased along one route, this simply leads to a re-routing 
along new paths that involve fewer risks for the perpetrators (Williams and 
Woessner 1995, 3). Since 1994, reported illicit trafficking incidents in 
Europe have declined. Simultaneously, however, since 1999 there has been a 
revival in such incidents in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Turkey (Stone 
2001; Zaitseva 2002).  
Illicit trafficking in nuclear material hence remains an international prob-
lem. While tests show that border monitoring of nuclear and radioactive ma-
terial is possible with acceptable expenses, there is ample room for improv-
ing detection capabilities at border crossings in many states (Beck undated, 5 
and 15–16). Sweden, a state with nuclear-power activities, may serve well as 
an example. A 2001 survey concluded that the national technical ability of 
Sweden to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive sub-
stances is highly limited (Ringbom and Spjuth 2001, 18). Existing equip-
ment is not sensitive enough, and improved training for customs officers is 
needed. A figure of zero seizures of radioactive and nuclear material in Swe-
den could therefore stem from poor detection capabilities, rather than from a 
lack of incidents.  
4.1.2.4 Constructing a Crude Nuclear Explosive Device  
After having acquired the needed amounts of high-quality uranium and 
smuggled the material to a safe haven or into the target country, terrorists 
may be ready to construct the actual nuclear explosive by assembling the 
various weapons components (step S6). To construct a workable nuclear ex-
plosive device, any actor – a state or a non-state group – must follow a series 
of complex technical steps ([P2], 731).  
 
Aspiring actors must:  
 
1. develop a design for its nuclear device or obtain such a design from 
a weapon-holding state;  
 
2. produce the fissile material for the core of the device or obtain it 
from an external source and then machine the fissile material to fab-
ricate the nuclear parts of the explosive;  
 
3. fabricate, or obtain from outside, the non-nuclear parts of the device, 
including the high-explosive elements and triggering components 
that will detonate the nuclear core;  
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4. verify the reliability of these various elements individually and as a 
system; 
 
5. and, finally, assemble all of these elements into a deliverable nuclear 
explosive, commonly referred to as “weaponization” (Carnegie 
2001, 1w). 
  
Consequently, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruc-
tion may represent significant challenges for terrorists, as indeed even for 
states with well-funded and sophisticated programmes (Cordesman 2001, 
30). Such endeavours would have to include technical skills, specialized 
brain-power (e.g. metallurgical experts and specialists on explosives and 
electronics), money, facilities, equipment, and fissile material (Milhollin 
2002, 8w).100 Aspiring nuclear bomb-makers would, moreover, have to 
study how to optimize the design. Although the basic scientific and technical 
principles of making nuclear weapons are relatively well-known, details and 
“tricks” can be very hard to duplicate in practice (Albright 2000, 58).  
All demonstrably successful efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons 
have to date thus been major enterprises, involving several years of work, 
with large design teams and recourses devoted to the development of nuclear 
devices ([P2], 731). The South African nuclear-weapon programme spent 
significant resources to develop adequate knowledge to design and manufac-
ture crude, deliverable fissionable weapons. Success was measured in years 
rather than months.101 
These technical challenges could, coupled with unsuccessful large-scale 
state nuclear weapon programmes (e.g. that of Iraq), be why some scholars 
prematurely and uncritically also dismiss the risk of nuclear terrorism. For 
instance, it has been claimed that “significant technical hurdles stand in the 
way of practicing nuclear terrorism in any form” (Cameron 2000, 157). But 
all the well-documented efforts by states of nuclear weaponization since 
1945 seem to have been created as stepping- stones to increasingly sophisti-
cated arsenals. Most of the resources have been put on the production of fis-
sile material (MacKenzie and Sinardi 1995, 84).102 
The need for extensive know-how may be circumvented by a modest 
programme aimed simply at producing a limited number of crude nuclear 
explosives; terrorists would have lower technical weapons requirements than 
would states ([P2], 731–732). The technical difficulties are highly dependent 
on the complexity of the device a non-state group chooses to develop (Na-
rath 2002, 2). As the complexity of the nuclear design decreases, so do the 
technical challenges associated with the design of auxiliary components.   
4.1.2.4.1 Types of Terrorist Nuclear Explosive Devices 
Two basic designs of crude nuclear explosives are likely to be adequate for 
most purposes of a terrorist group intent on nuclear terrorism ([P2], 732). 
Both designs were used in the first generation of nuclear weapons produced, 
                                                     
100  Additional technical challenges include issues of material purity, uniformity, stability and 
compatibility (Narath 2002, 12).  
101  For more on the South African nuclear devices, see Appendix III. 
102  Even the Iraqi nuclear weapon programme was over-dimensioned in terms of simply pro-
ducing a crude nuclear device (MacKenzie and Sinardi 1995, 85).   
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and could almost certainly be fielded without a nuclear testing programme 
(Zimmerman 1993, 354). By contrast, it is unlikely that terrorists will have 
access to enough know-how and information to construct sophisticated wea-
pons like small boosted fission devices or small staged thermonuclear devi-
ces (Narath 2002, 15).  
One of the designs is a so-called gun-type nuclear explosive device, simi-
lar to the nuclear weapon that destroyed Hiroshima.103 This is the simplest 
crude device to design and construct, and it is quite reliable ([P1], 115).104 
As such, it is the most likely one to produce a powerful nuclear explosion by 
less qualified actors. The risk of pre-ignition, and hence an effect (signifi-
cantly) below the design yield, is limited due to the low neutron background 
in the HEU (see Appendix III). This design can use only highly enriched 
uranium as fissile material, not plutonium.105 
In the gun-type design, one piece of sub-critical HEU could be propelled 
into a larger mass of uranium – whether by means of conventional explo-
sives, prompt retardation or compression, or simply by gravity (Alvarez 
1987, 125). Terrorists could possibly do this by using a thick-walled cylin-
drical barrel to force two sub-critical masses of HEU together with the use of 
high explosives ([P2], 733). A sketch of a gun-type device is presented in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of the gun-type assembly principle  
 
(From Craig and Jungerman 1986, 182) 
 
Because of the required characteristics of the gun itself, as a large mass of 
high density must be accelerated to a high speed in short distances, the gun-
type design may be harder to master than it initially appears. Moreover, im-
purities in the fissile material would reduce the yield and should, ideally, be 
removed. This could further complicate the manufacturing of the crude nu-
clear explosive device (Falkenrath et al. 1998, 133). Potential perpetrators 
would face hazards such as those arising from the handling of the conven-
tional explosives, the possibility of inadvertently initiating a chain reaction, 
                                                     
103  The nuclear explosive were never stockpiled, and only five assemblies were completed 
with this design. They were retired by November 1950. 
104  The bomb dropped on Hiroshima, “Little Boy”, had a gun-type design. It was never tested 
before deployed. Appendix III offers some general considerations on the feasibility of 
producing a crude highly enriched uranium explosive device. 
105  The relatively long insertion time would allow for spontaneous neutron fissions in the 
plutonium. Accordingly, a chain reaction may be initiated prematurely, leading to early 
termination of the fission reaction and a (drastically) reduced yield.   
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and radio-chemical toxicity of the material used (Barnaby 1996, 10). How-
ever, these production challenges and hazards should not be exaggerated. 
While by no means straightforward, designing and fabricating a function-
ing nuclear gun-type explosive is unlikely to confront non-state actors with 
insurmountable difficulties (Narath 2002, 7). A gun-type design can be con-
siderably simpler both to design and to construct, if the length and weight of 
the design are not constrained by the traditional requirement that the nuclear 
device be deliverable by air (Falkenrath et al. 1998, 162). 
With the exception of the HEU, and possibly high-strength steel for the 
barrel, a gun-type device does not have to rely on exotic material. In fact, it 
could be quite easy to produce all the needed material (again with the excep-
tion of the HEU) and perform the fabrication and assembly operations with-
out attracting much attention (Narath 2002, 8). Most non-nuclear compo-
nents of nuclear explosive devices are available in international commerce 
(Goldblat 2002, 116). The machining operations to produce the device are 
not particularly complex.106 Besides, the use of uranium oxide may lessen 
many production challenges, though at the cost of a less efficient device and, 
hence, a reduced yield. 
Poorly assembled nuclear explosive devices would produce lower yields, 
as the chain reaction will abort as the system expands. The yield will vary 
accordingly, but a crude HEU device should explode with an explosive 
power equivalent to that of several hundred to a few thousand ton of TNT 
(Barnaby 1996, 7). Even a device in the lower kiloton range would wreck 
havoc vastly greater than that hitherto inflicted anywhere by a terrorist attack 
(Arbman et al. 2002; Narath 2002, 14). 
A sketch of an implosion-type device, the other first-generation nuclear 
design, is presented in Figure 4.2. In contrast to HEU devices, plutonium 
explosives need to have a fast compression due to the higher fraction of 
spontaneous neutrons. The need for a rapid and simultaneous compression of 
the fissile material requires a more challenging implosion design (Narath 
2002, 9), and preferably, but not necessarily, advanced computerized analy-
sis to optimize the yield ([P2], 734).  
The needed quantities of fissile material will be lower than for a gun-type 
design, and both plutonium and highly enriched uranium may be applied. 
But generally, in addition to lower design and performance confidence, the 
fabrication of an implosion-type device is more demanding than that of a 
gun-type one (Narath 2002, 10). 
 
                                                     
106  Possible hardening of the uranium may pose some production challenges, and the fact that 
the uranium is pyrophoric could cause additional problems (Zimmerman 1993, 348). 
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Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram of the implosion type assembly principle 
 
(From Craig and Jungerman 1986, 182) 
 
The gun-type design is inherently inefficient, and requires a larger mass of 
fissile material than for implosion designs ([P2], 736).107 The weight and 
bulkiness of device may increase accordingly. However, the performance of 
any nuclear explosive devices may be improved and the critical mass re-
duced by fairly simple measures ([P2], 736). For example, a reflector that 
returns escaping neutrons back into the fissioning assembly could surround 
the nuclear device. This would make more neutrons available to produce fis-
sions, and less fissile material would be needed. The reduction can be con-
siderable. According to Mark (1991) only some 25% of the initial critical 
mass is needed when a beryllium reflector is placed around a mass of ura-
nium containing 93% of uranium-235. This provides corroborating evidence 
for the findings of Cochran and Paine (Section 4.1.2.1). 
Moreover, to assure high neutron flux the instant the system goes critical, 
a strong neutron source that becomes active as soon as the pieces come intro 
position can be introduced. The burst of neutrons will then boost the fission-
ing of uranium atoms, and, hence, increase the yield. For gun-type uranium 
weapons, this can be done for instance by placing one radium source at one 
uranium piece and a beryllium source on the other, so neutrons are produced 
only when the pieces are close to the proper relative position (Serber 1992, 
51). 
4.1.2.4.2 Terrorist Nuclear Explosive Standards 
For states, the technical barriers to weaponization of fissile material come 
down to designing and proving the explosive sets needed to assemble the 
supercritical mass, producing a reliable initiator, coping with the physical 
and chemical properties of the material, and performing the necessary proof 
testing of the designs (Zimmerman 1993, 348). Terrorists, however, would 
not have to meet many of the extremely tight military specifications and 
                                                     
107  Situations were nuclear perpetrators do not possess enough material for a gun-type design, 
and they hence are left with no other option than trying to construct the less mass-
demanding implosion device, could be envisioned. 
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weapon tolerance standards ([P1], 112; [P2], 731–732; Mark et al. 1987, 63; 
Falkenrath et al. 1998, 100). A crudely assembled nuclear device, while less 
efficient than a state military weapon, could very well serve the needs of a 
terrorist group. 
The highly differing requirements for performance and delivery could 
make weapons designed to meet the “Terrorist Nuclear Explosive Standards” 
less technically challenging to produce than traditional state nuclear weapons 
([P1], 112; [P2], 731). The manufacturing of a single crude terrorist uranium 
bomb might, moreover, not produce many of the “signatures” that intelli-
gence agencies look for, or a noisy testing programme (Milhollin 2002, 8w). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Terrorist and state military nuclear explosives compared  
 
(From [P1], 112) 
 
As schematically illustrated in Figure 4.3, a state would be at least as con-
cerned with the nuclear device not going off during storage and transporta-
tion, as with optimizing the yield and detonation of the device. To states, 
nuclear-weapons safety is essential.108 While safety is a must for states, such 
concerns might well be less important to terrorists, especially groups with 
strong leanings to martyrdom (Maerli 2001a, 216).  
Secondly, the reliability concerns may be correspondingly low amongst 
terrorists. While an ignition failure or a fizzle yield would be unfortunate 
from the viewpoint of terrorists, it could have profound impact on the secu-
                                                     
108  One example is the so-called “one-point safety” requirements of the USA to prevent 
accidental detonations of nuclear weapons. This set of strict requirements is designed to 
ensure that a nuclear explosion will not result if the conventional explosive that surrounds 
the fissile material were accidentally detonated. 
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rity of a state, e.g. in a nuclear offensive mode ([P1], 732).109 Moreover, to 
be able to forecast damages, perform nuclear planning, and estimate the 
number of warheads needed, states are looking for fairly predicable and ac-
curate yields.110 The result is, again, more technically advanced designs for 
state nuclear weapons. For terrorists, however, devices that explode with 
only a fraction of the design yield could be more than enough to serve their 
purposes (Arbman et al. 2002, 13).  
Thirdly, weapons for military uses are normally required in fairly large 
numbers, and they must be delivered by conventional military means like 
missiles or mortars ([P2],112).111 Terrorists, on the other hand, will aim at a 
limited arsenal and unconventional delivery. The major constraining factors 
for state nuclear weapons are often the weight capacity of the delivery vehi-
cle and the space available to carry the explosive (e.g., the diameter and 
length of a nosecone or the length and width of a bomb bay). Developing 
reliable delivery systems and slender nuclear explosives is technically chal-
lenging and expensive, even for states ([P1], 732).  
Crude terrorist nuclear devices, however, will easily fit into a van, or 
even an automobile, for possible detonation in a densely populated area 
([P2], 112). Other non-military means of delivery could involve trucks, hot-
air balloons, ships, or simply a complete assembling of the nuclear device 
inside a garage or an out-of-the-way residence (Botuwell et al. 2002, 3).  
4.1.2.4.3 Availability of Relevant Bomb-Making Information  
The design and production of nuclear weapons today is a far simpler process 
than it was during the Manhattan Project (Military Critical Technologies 
1997, II-5-1). The rapid spread of technological knowledge could advance 
terrorists’ weaponization attempts ([P2], 111). Indeed, in a 1960s experiment 
conducted by the US government, three recently graduated students were 
instructed to develop a nuclear explosive design using only publicly avail-
able information. The students reformed their task successfully. In the ensu-
ing years, much more information has entered the public domain, probably 
making similar efforts today even simpler (Maerli 2002c, 5w). As one US 
veteran weapon designer has noted, “the scientific knowledge and computa-
tional expertise required for nuclear weapon design is now widely dispersed” 
(quoted by Hoenig 2001, 32). Nearly 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
this should hardly come as a surprise. Knowledge of nuclear-weapon design 
is so prevalent that trying to maintain a shroud of secrecy around it no longer 
offers adequate protection (Deutch 2001, 68).  
Relevant information on the production of nuclear explosives can be 
found in the technical literature.112 The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lec-
tures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb was declassified and published in 
1992 (Serber 1992). The book originated as a series of five lectures, given to 
the physicists of the Manhattan Project at its commencement, outlining the 
                                                     
109  I.e. in a nuclear exchange, where it would be essential to destroy enemy warheads before 
they are launched.  
110  Technically advanced states have even introduced nuclear weapons with variable yields, 
or “dial-a-yield” measures, where each bomb's explosive power can be custom adjusted 
right before it is launched.  
111  Nuclear mines are a notable exception.  112 See for instance Lovins 1980 and Mark et al. 1993. 
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theoretical foundations of the bomb-making. Also within the information 
swamp on the Internet, potential producers of nuclear explosives can find 
useful sites. While these are not likely to be “step-by-step” descriptions, 
parts of the openly available information are likely to assist and even guide 
potential bomb-makers in the process ([P1], 111).113 
4.1.2.5 Smuggling a Nuclear Explosive Device Into a Target Country  
After a workable nuclear device has been constructed, it will have to be 
transferred to the location of planned detonation (step S7). This process 
could involve border crossings, and hence new challenges for the perpetra-
tors as well as new opportunities for interceptors. The sheer size and weight 
of the explosive device could render clandestine transport and smuggling 
difficult, making detection more probable than in the case of transfers of fis-
sile material.  
However, (sleeping) cells in shipment and receiver countries could be ac-
tivated, to ease and ensure the transfer. As Schmid points out (Section 
4.1.1.1) contemporary terrorism is becoming more trans-national and more 
linked to organized crime. Professionalized nuclear smuggling networks may 
evolve. Moreover, for assembled nuclear explosives, radiation signatures 
from the fissile material are likely to be better masked due to the metal cas-
ing of the explosive device, making radiological detection harder (Cordes-
man 2001, 35).  
As a test, a 6.8 kg cylinder of depleted uranium metal was smuggled, on 
two occations, into the United States without being detected (Natural Re-
sources Defense Council 2003, 2w). Depleted uranium has a lower specific 
activity than HEU,114 but it seems clear that also weapons-grade uranium 
quite easily could have passed through US Customs without being detected, 
despite recent security upgrades at the borders and elsewhere. 
Blocking nuclear smuggling has been a major part of the US Homeland 
Security measures. In the wake of rumours about al-Qaeda's alleged progress 
toward obtaining a nuclear or radiological explosive device in Afghanistan, 
hundreds of new and sophisticated radiation detection sensors were deployed 
to US borders, overseas facilities and points around Washington DC. The 
ability of these sensors to detect nuclear material, however, may be limited 
(Glanz, 2002).  
Generally, technologies designed and used to detect nuclear material op-
erate over fairly short ranges. For a hidden or smuggled crude nuclear explo-
sive device, the shape, material composition, and shielding will be unknown. 
This could further challenge detection.115  
                                                     
113  Such sites are deliberately not presented here.   
114  The specific activity (the radioactivity per unit mass) of the uranium isotopes in depleted 
uranium is about 15 million becquerel per kg (15 x 106 Bq/kg). This is approximately 
40% lower than that of naturally occurring uranium (25 x 106 Bq/kg) and about 150 times 
less than that of enriched uranium (approximately 2.3 x 109 Bq/kg). 
115  However, as seen in Section 4.1.2.1, crudely assembled nuclear explosives may require 
extra quantities of fissile material. This could increase radiation levels, and thus ease the 
delectability. If possible nuclear perpetrators only get hold of material with intermediate 
enrichment levels, say 50 to 60% enriched in U-235, this could also raise the neutron 
background and thus the probability of detection, compared to material with higher en-
richment levels. If close enough, a crude nuclear device could probably be detected within 
a few minutes of measuring time with a hand-held monitoring device (Arbman et al. 
2002, 9).  Generally, it is easier to detect plutonium devices than uranium devices, due to 
higher radiation levels (Arbman et al. 2002, 7).  
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4.1.2.6 Transporting the Nuclear Explosive Device to Location  
The first nuclear weapons produced were robust and sizeable and not easily 
transportable.116 However, a crude nuclear explosive HEU device capable of 
delivering a kiloton yield could weight no more than 300 kg, with a length of 
one meter (Barnaby 1996, 7). Others maintain that the most primitive gun-
type devices would be at least 2 to 2.5 m. long and weigh roughly half a ton 
(Cordesman 2001, 34). Yet even a device of the latter size could fit in the 
back of a truck or inside a cargo container. Hence, the number of terrorist 
means of delivery into or against a country is potentially quite large ([P1], 
112).  
This level of relative mobility, coupled with weak gamma-ray radiation 
from the device, could make it very difficult to detect a nuclear explosive in 
a busy urban environment (Harris 1999, 83).  
4.1.2.7 Detonating the Nuclear Explosive Device   
The final step for terrorists would be to detonate the nuclear device, releas-
ing its devastating blast, heat and radiation. The ease of detonation depends 
upon the technical sophistication of the device, hereunder for instance the 
use of neutron triggers (Serber 1992, 51). The device may fail or fizzle, pro-
ducing a limited yield (see Section 4.1.2.4.1). Once potential terrorists have 
the necessary material, however, the actual construction of the ignition for 
the nuclear explosive device may be comparatively easier (Schaper 2002, 
19). As far as is known, no nation that has attempted to detonate a nuclear 
explosive device has failed on its first attempt (Zimmerman 1993, 354). 
Compared to having stolen an intact nuclear warhead, terrorists who con-
struct their own crude devices could have an easier task detonating the de-
vice. No safeguards to prevent unauthorized uses of the device (PALs) 
would have to be bypassed, and the perpetrators would know the device in-
side and out.  
Even at this stage, governments may put in place measures to prevent ter-
rorists from successfully performing their planned acts. In terms of detec-
tion, however, law-enforcement officers and others will encounter the same 
challenges as their customs-officer colleagues are facing at borders. And 
now time has really become a critical element. 
4.1.3 Summary Answer to Principal Research Question [Q1] 
 
[Q1]: “Can terrorists possibly perform acts of terror by means of crude nuclear 
explosive devices based on highly enriched uranium? What are the main barriers 
to the production of crude nuclear explosives?” 
 
Strategic, practical and perhaps even moral considerations make conven-
tional weaponry the means of choice for the vast majority of terrorist groups. 
However, if given the opportunity, some groups may stand ready to escalate 
to the level of nuclear violence. To would-be nuclear terrorists, access to 
                                                     
116  The “Little Boy” bomb, dropped on Hiroshima, weighed 4,400 kg. It was more than 3 m. 
long and 70 cm. across. 
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fissile material of sufficient qualities and quantities is the most formidable 
obstacle to their nuclear ambitions.  
If terrorists have access to sufficient quantities of unirradiated, or “fresh”, 
highly enriched uranium, crude nuclear explosives could be within their 
reach. Terrorists will have much less stringent requirements to their nuclear 
explosives in terms of reliability, safety, security and delivery than states. 
Technical barriers to the construction of nuclear explosives should thus not 
be regarded as sufficient to prevent nuclear terrorist havoc.  
Once the needed quantities of fissile material have been obtained, it is 
easier to construct a nuclear explosive device using HEU than using pluto-
nium. Acquisition of unirradiated HEU is by far the most direct shortcut for 
any actors seeking nuclear explosive capabilities, because:117  
 
 HEU is the only material that allows for the easy and reliable manu-
facture of crude nuclear explosives;   
 
 perpetrators with access to sufficient quantities of HEU of high 
enough quality will have a good chance to achieve an explosion in 
the lower kiloton range, i.e. with a yield comparable to that of the 
Hiroshima bomb; 
 
 HEU exists in large quantities, in part under unsatisfactory levels of 
protection, control and accounting; 
 
 HEU detection, e.g. at border-crossings and checkpoints, is demand-
ing. due to the low levels of radiation emitted; 
 
 the radiation levels from unirradiated uranium are low and the han-
dling of HEU involves limited health hazards. 
 
If an assembled nuclear explosive reaches its country of destination, it may 
be too late for detection. Unless sting operations and national intelligence 
agencies are able to penetrate the terrorist group, it seems likely that any as-
sembling of crude nuclear explosive devices would go undetected (Narath 
2002, 14). Denying terrorists access to highly enriched uranium through op-
timum nuclear husbandry at its sources of origin could therefore be the be-all 
and end-all of nuclear terrorism countermeasures. 
4.2 Conceptual Nuclear Husbandry  
 
The second principal research question, [Q2],118 is taken as a point of depar-
ture for studying how best to prevent terrorist access to fissile material.  
In the following, this question will be investigated by means of concep-
tual analyses of contemporary approaches to the husbandry of nuclear mate-
                                                     
117  The summary is based on Arbman et al. 2004, a text to which the author of this thesis 
contributed. 
118  [Q2]:“Is there an optimum way of protecting fissile material from falling into terrorist 
hands? What role – if any – do transparency and non-intrusive verification play in this 
regard?” 
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rial. Here, the meanings and implications of common nuclear security con-
cepts like safeguards, material protection, accounting and control (MPC&A), 
verification and transparency are assessed. Particular consideration is given 
to the two latter concepts and their relevance for preventing nuclear terror-
ism: Verification is a veteran, yet persistently contested and highly politi-
cized, issue in international nuclear security. The potential of the more recent 
feature of nuclear material transparency may not yet have been fully utilized. 
The findings of research papers [P4] and [P5] are of primary importance for 
the analysis. 
A central part of the analysis will also involve looking at possible obsta-
cles to optimum nuclear husbandry. Are there, for instance, any differences 
between domestic and international nuclear husbandry? If so, what are the 
implications for practical arms control measures? What are differences be-
tween transparency and verification? How could these best be used to opti-
mize nuclear husbandry, and consequently limit the risk of nuclear terror-
ism? What about their relationship to secrecy? Could for instance nuclear 
secrecy and transparency possibly co-exist?   
4.2.1 Foundations for Optimum Nuclear Husbandry  
 
Deliberate inaccuracy and fuzzy concepts may be embraced purposefully by 
political actors seeking to achieve policy goals. Such ambiguity, while pos-
sibly beneficial in the political or diplomatic sphere, could easily confuse 
and lead to misunderstanding on the technical arms control arena. Clarity is 
thus essential, though surprisingly often an alien feature in discussions on 
practical measures for nuclear arms control ([P4], 54).119 Practical arms con-
trol measures may be introduced without a proper or shared understanding of 
its meanings, intentions or ramifications. Often an overly simplified “one-
size-fits-all” approach to nuclear security measures seems to prevail ([P4], 
56; [P5], 3). This is hardly the best starting point for optimum nuclear hus-
bandry. 
Fuzzy concepts have not only contributed to errors in planning and im-
plementation of arms control measures. As an important input to the political 
arms control discussions, technical inaccuracy may obscure opportunities for 
sound political action, thereby limiting the fulfilment of the true potential of 
specific practical nuclear arms control measures ([P4], 54).120 Too often nu-
clear security equipment is fielded without a serious assessment of its inten-
ded purpose, overall context, expected performance, or vulnerabilities. This 
may cause unrealistic or flawed expectations to monitoring hardware and 
security systems, and failure to appreciate critical security vulnerabilities 
([P4], 55–56). Many of these problems can be avoided with an understand-
ing of the different characters and nature of the various arms control func-
                                                     
119  The lack of careful thinking may not be as obvious in the literature as in real-world arms 
control efforts.   
120  One example is ongoing discussions on a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, where 
technical considerations go hand in hand with political discussions on the level of intru-
siveness and the confidence in verification and control. So far, the international commu-
nity has failed to commence negotiations on such a treaty. For more on the FMCT, see 
Bremer Maerli 2003e. 
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tions. Yet, these issues often seem to be overlooked, with potentially detri-
mental consequences for nuclear security.  
Even something as fundamental as the disparate goals of “P”, “C”, and 
“A” in nuclear Material Protection Control and Accounting (“MPC&A”) are 
not always well recognized.121 Much of this confusion rests within US arms 
control communities, even amongst actors working in the field of nuclear 
security ([P4], 55). As such, it may have far-reaching consequences for inter-
national arm control because the USA is extensively engaged in nuclear se-
curity consulting and technical assistance abroad, and the country is a recog-
nized leader in MPC&A technology. Confusion is particularly common over 
the practical differences between international and domestic “safeguards” – 
concepts with distinctly different meanings and implications ([P5], 9). 
4.2.1.1 Key Concepts in Nuclear Arms Control 
In research papers [P4] and [P5], existing concepts of nuclear arms control 
and terminology are pragmatically examined to clarify inherent differences 
and identify how the current confusion may influence practical control 
measures. One important result of this exercise is the identification of Seven 
Nuclear Husbandry Functions – related yet sovereign activities for the re-
sponsible management of fissile material. These will be presented in the fol-
lowing.  
First, however, three widely applied nuclear arms control concepts are 
scrutinized: “Safeguards”, Verification” and “Transparency”.  
4.2.1.1.1 Safeguards  
The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system constitutes the 
most important example of multinational nuclear treaty monitoring.122 IAEA 
safeguards comprise an extensive set of technical measures by which the 
IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the complete-
ness of the declarations made by states about their nuclear material and ac-
tivities ([P5], 3).  
The US government, however, uses the word “safeguards”, sometimes 
together with “security”, to cover a wide range of domestic nuclear non-
proliferation activities, from physical protection and containment to account-
ing of nuclear material, conveniently grouped under the heading of Material 
Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A).  
As a result, there may be a risk not only of mixing the meaning of the dif-
ferent safeguards terms, but also of confusing the distinct goals of each nu-
clear security measure installed ([P4], 57; [P5], 3). For some time now, the 
IAEA has been using domestic (usually US) safeguards technology and ap-
proaches with little or no modification for use in its safeguards ([P5], 3). 
Technical assistance provided by the United States and other countries to the 
IAEA, moreover, typically involves personnel who are primarily experts on 
domestic safeguards. 
                                                     
121  To explain the differences of different nuclear security functions, [P4] offers some simple 
everyday analogies for nuclear husbandry ([P4], 62). 
122  According to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) each non-nuclear-weapon 
state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be 
negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accor-
dance with its statute and safeguards system.  
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In the IAEA context, the purpose of such safeguards is to verify the fulfil-
ment of the state party’s obligations under the NPT, to prevent diversion of 
nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices. Traditional IAEA safeguards involve a set of techniques and 
technologies depending less on sophisticated hardware than on an elaborate 
set of record-keeping and administrative techniques (Krass 1985, 89).  
Treaty monitoring, like international safeguards, works on the internatio-
nal arena and in a multinational setting. The potential “foe” for international 
safeguards is the very state being monitored and inspected. International 
safeguards, moreover, do not involve any physical protection requirements. 
They do not, even where they are fully in force, offer assurance against theft, 
seizure or unauthorized acquisition of nuclear material within the state (Cur-
tis 2001, 4). 
Under the heading of Material Protection, Control and Accounting 
(MPC&A), domestic US safeguards, in contrast, consist of a set of preven-
tive, protective, or deterrent measures to be put in place for the primary pur-
pose of avoiding non-state diversion of nuclear material ([P5], 4). A state 
operates domestic safeguards inside its own borders and facilities, and does 
so largely for its own benefit and purposes.  
Hence, the two types of international and domestic safeguards do not 
only serve different purposes: They also operate in quite different contexts 
([P5], 5–9). A state attempting to cheat would possess vastly more resources 
than non-state actors planning to divert fissile material from an installation 
under domestic MPC&A.  
For the case of IAEA safeguards, the facility and items monitored will be 
owned by the potential perpetrator, and personnel working at the installation 
could, perhaps, work at cross-purposes to the safeguard control. This would 
influence the operational environment, and the atmosphere and implementa-
tion of the security measures. It could, moreover, raise concerns about espio-
nage and tampering of the monitoring equipment ([P4], 5–9). Besides, re-
sponse patterns and possible sanctions would differ quite significantly be-
tween the two types of safeguards.  
Another important distinction should be made between international 
(IAEA) safeguards and cooperative MPC&A. To meet nuclear proliferation 
challenges, the United States has for the past decade engaged in a defensive 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with Russia and other Newly Inde-
pendent States.123 A significant part of this cooperation is carried out under 
the “US/FSU Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material Protection, Con-
trol and Accounting”, of which Naval MPC&A security upgrades are an in-
tegral part (see Section 4.1.2.2.2). This programme includes providing tech-
nical assistance, consulting, training, and hardware to Russia. However, de-
spite its international focus, it is not a system of international safeguards – 
and not even international MPC&A, which (as yet) does not exist.  
                                                     
123  The programme is designed to help the countries of the former Soviet Union destroy and 
protect nuclear, chemical and biological material and weapons, and associated infrastruc-
ture. The programme emanates from the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 
championed through Congress by Senators Nunn and Lugar. For more on the CTR pro-
gram, see www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_index.html or www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ctr/  (last ac-
cessed 16 January 2004). 
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Under these programs, the USA does not perform any MPC&A functions 
for the Russians. While the USA may act on a consultative and supportive 
basis, Russian MPC&A is a Russian responsibility and an activity under-
taken by Russia on its own soil, using Russian personnel and increasingly 
more equipment bought in Russia ([P4], 57). It is, in other words, still a do-
mestic, and not an international, nuclear security provision.  
4.2.1.1.2 Verification  
The term “verification” may give a positive sense of security and control. As 
an absolutist assurance connotation, however, it poses several problems. 
Firstly, the very nature of arms control makes absolute verification difficult, 
if not impossible ([P4], 59). It will be in the interest of a sovereign state to 
limit any kind of intrusive revelations on its defensive or offensive nuclear 
capabilities. Moreover, if sanctions are likely, those states engaged in unde-
sirable behaviour will have few incentives to supply accurate information 
themselves (Mitchell 2000, 189).  
Consequently, states will want the level of intrusiveness to be kept as low 
as possible. This conflicts with the initial verification goals and expectations 
([P7], 20). Verification activities are further complicated by the fact that new 
monitoring technologies tend to be quite intrusive and may therefore actually 
work against acceptable verification solutions, as they might reveal details 
about nuclear secrets (Rinne 1999).124  
Secondly, the verification process itself involves a series of steps, each 
one with costs and vulnerabilities as well as the potential for failure and 
cheating (Krass 1985, 7–8).  
The interpretation of the data output would involve another element of 
uncertainty and, consequently, a potential for political wrangling: Does an 
observed event or collection of results signify a violation or not, and with 
what probability? While “verification” may raise confidence that a promise 
is violated or kept, it therefore cannot provide 100% assurance of either non-
compliance or compliance ([P4], 59).  
In international negotiations, one fundamental question has therefore 
been whether verification regimes must control capabilities by making non-
compliance impossible, or whether they should have the realistic (but less 
tangible) objective of making defection less attractive than cooperation. This 
distinction is particularly important as the inherent limitations of verification 
are often embraced by political opponents seeking to kill undesired inspec-
tion regimes (Gallagher 1999, 56; Butler 2003, 138). 
Accordingly, verification should not be considered a binary function 
where there is either absolute proof of compliance or absolute proof of 
cheating. Verification should be viewed as a probabilistic, interpretive activ-
ity that involves both evaluating the evidence and attempting to understand 
its meaning (Cheon and Fraser 1988, 39; Thompson 1990). To achieve a 
common understanding of such verification norms, it is crucial to have a 
                                                     
124  Even radiation measurements outside sealed canisters containing the plutonium “pit” of a 
nuclear fission trigger could reveal classified information (von Hippel 1997, 6). Accord-
ingly, if sensitive nuclear components are to be put under international surveillance, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency would have to compromise the intrusiveness of its 
monitoring. These aspects are further explored in Section 4.3.3.2.  
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clear and common understanding of the concept and the implications for 
practical nuclear arms control.   
4.2.1.1.3 Transparency  
No universal understanding of the meaning of transparency exists within the 
arms control communities (Center for Strategic and International Studies 
2000, 54). Transparency has come to be a “grab bag” concept that encom-
passes all kinds of unrelated nuclear monitoring and disarmament activities. 
Nevertheless, the concept has merit – as long as the meaning and implica-
tions are unambiguous and understood ([P4], 60).   
The general aims of transparency to contribute to confidence- and secu-
rity-building, and to foster public and political support by explaining the ra-
tionale of a specific nuclear policy and posture (NATO 2000, 25). In the nu-
clear realm, transparency can corroborate that no clandestine activities are 
taking place, bolster the validity of material accounting, confirm that nuclear 
material is adequately protected, and verify that non-proliferation obligations 
are being met.125 As a result, lifting secrecy serves to reduce tensions and 
nuclear dangers (Zarimpas 2003, 10). As seen in Figure 4.4, predictability is 
a key element in this process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Transparency as a stability and security-building tool, through 
predictability  
 
Transparency is a process in which information about governmental actions, 
preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available – or more prop-
erly, allowed to flow – to citizens and the international community (Finel 
and Lord 2000, 3). A more predictable, and hence more stable, environment 
may evolve.  
While the transparency process can involve elements of cooperation and 
mutual negotiability, transparency is decided and performed by a sovereign 
state on its own territory ([P4], 60). A nation does not need the assistance, 
cooperation, or permission of another states to engage in transparency, nor to 
decide the timing or degree of openness that will be allowed.  
Ideally, transparency surpasses required activities, such as reporting or 
verification obligations mandated by treaty. Transparency is more than a 
mere description or detailed specification of a nuclear programme, specific 
site, or ongoing activity, and more than merely providing data mandated by 
treaty or law. Voluntary release is the true meaning of transparency: Taking 
extra steps of openness beyond expectations or promises is the true test 
(Senazaki et al. 1997, 2–3). Such extra steps are likely to promote higher 
levels of trust. Transparency is “permitted knowledge” (Center for Strategic 
and International Studies 2000, 54). On the other hand, providing false in-
                                                     
125  Here it is assumed that states with an attitude of openness are prone to have benign and 
defensive nuclear intentions. In the absence of crisis, this seems to be a fair assumption. 
Any offensive nuclear intentions are likely to raise tensions significantly, possibly to the 
extent that the state may face a (preventive) (nuclear) attack. From a security point of 
view, this is not likely to be a desired development for any state. 
Transparency Predictability Stability/ Security 
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formation is not transparency, but plain disinformation. Hence, “faking” 
transparency is not an option. 
Note that despite being unilateral in nature, transparency can still be ne-
gotiable. States or the international community can request or demand more 
openness in return for other considerations. They can encourage, cajole, 
threaten, or even horse-trade for increased transparency from the other side. 
Transparency may also evolve as a more or less inadvertent “spin-off” of 
certain state activities.126 But in essence, transparency remains the decision 
of a single state ([P4], 60). Because there usually will be no specific formal 
agreements concerning unilateral acts of transparency, breaking-out is not 
generally relevant. 
Even if transparency is formalized in a treaty, “verification” and a set of 
monitoring equipment should not automatically be expected as part of the 
deal. Typically, transparency does not involve monitoring equipment or ne-
gotiated schemes for monitoring. The more established transparency be-
comes, however, the more it is self-corroborating because there of the in-
creasing number of channels of information that cross-check each other 
(Mitchell 2000, 189). As such, the insight and information acquired in dur-
ing any appurtenant and formalized verification activities will also feed into, 
and expand, the existing pool of (international) knowledge about the nuclear 
intentions and activities of the state monitored.  
With this feedback, initial levels of transparency may be effectively en-
hanced (stippled lines), as schematically presented in Figure 4.5.127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: The interdependent and potentially self-reinforcing relationship 
between transparency and verification 
 
Transparency may be viewed as small “peephole” made available to the in-
ternational community into the priorities of states, revealing some of their 
practices and preferences. Through these vantage points, external actors may 
increase their general understanding of a nuclear programme. They may also 
become better equipped to negotiate later specified verification deals and 
goals (e.g. reductions in strategic nuclear arms). As such, the transparency–
verification relationship is mutually interdependent, as well as potentially 
self-reinforcing.  
                                                     
126  Examples include increased international trade (e.g. adherence to the WTO), large inter-
national events (like the 2008 Olympic Games in China), or simply the development of 
information technology (in particular the Internet). 
127  A prominent example of the interwoven relationship between transparency and verifica-
tion is in the process denoted “International Audits” in Section 4.2.1.2. As part of the Ad-
ditional Safeguards Protocol (International Atomic Energy Agency 1997), states are 
obliged to present comprehensive initial declarations of past and present nuclear activities, 
as well as of any nuclear facilities (Goldschmidt 1999, S–5).  
  Transparency Verification  
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Referring back to Figure 4.4, both transparency and verification could in-
crease predictability and hence increase and contribute positively to stability. 
One factor working in its favour is that transparency, once well established, 
is difficult to reverse ([P4], 60). Fully established and total transparency is 
and will remain an ideal, however. After all, every nation has secrets that 
legitimately should not be released to the world. This is probably why lead-
ing nuclear-weapon states do not feel obligated to pursue transparency, de-
spite strong international calls and treaty commitments.  
The importance the international community attaches to nuclear transpar-
ency was highlighted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. By consensus, the NPT states then agreed upon “In-
creased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear 
weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Arti-
cle VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further 
progress on nuclear disarmament” (2000 Review Conference). This estab-
lished the concept of transparency as a permanent element of nuclear diplo-
macy (Grand 2003, 35). Yet, the current political commitment to nuclear 
transparency is precariously low (Walker 2003, 15). If, in the longer term, 
greater nuclear disarmament is to become a common objective, these posi-
tions will need to change (Höhl et al. 2003, 47). 
Transparency may be viewed as the opposite of secrecy ([P4], 60). Se-
crecy means deliberately hiding intents, capabilities, and actions; transpar-
ency means deliberately revealing them (Florini 2000, 13). Secrecy may well 
be justified from the perspective of national security and international non-
proliferation obligations.128 Releasing classified information will be unlaw-
ful and could potentially harm national and international security. Thus, in-
creased transparency could be seen as making it easier for criminals and sub-
national groups to divert fissile material unlawfully, if for instance details of 
the physical protection systems and quantities and qualities of fissile mate-
rial at facilities were to be made available. 
Openness could hence add to the nuclear terrorist threat, enabling non-
state actors groups to acquire information relevant to their (planned) acts.129 
Proponents of particular transparency measures must therefore demonstrate 
that it will not (inadvertently) lead to the disclosure of useful information to 
would-be proliferators (Grand 2003, 37).   
Transparency and secrecy, however, are not either/or conditions. As ide-
als, they represent two ends of a continuum, and two societal conditions that 
never may be fully accomplished. In practice, transparency and secrecy will 
have to operate in parallel. Especially weaker nuclear states, like China, have 
embraced nuclear ambiguity for its perceived security benefits. To these sta-
                                                     
128  Nuclear weapon states have an obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not 
to disseminate proliferation-attractive or proliferation-encouraging information. For in-
stance, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon 
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”. The treaty text is available at 
http:// disarmament. un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html (last accessed 30 October 2003).   
129  Particularly sensitive information could for instance encompass quantities, and qualities 
of fissile material stored at specific installations, as well as the level and procedures for 
security and control. 
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tes, unintended openness may become particularly costly if opponents man-
age to identify weaknesses in their (limited) nuclear arsenals, war-plans, or 
(future) capabilities. Still, due to the perceived security benefits, even China 
has been pursuing a range of nuclear transparency options, hereunder clarifi-
cation of its nuclear activities and acceptance of site visits (Bin 2003, 50). 
In sum, transparency is based on voluntary measures. It permits outsiders 
to accumulate released data from a wide range of sources, over an extensive 
period of time, to build confidence that the behaviour of a country or a col-
lection of countries is consistent with agreements and norms (Senazaki et al. 
1997, 2–3). Ideally, such voluntary measures will generate increased confi-
dence, hence reducing tensions and the perceived need for secrecy. Accord-
ingly, there exist several interrelated incentives for increased transparency 
on all stocks of fissile material (based on Maerli 2002a, 8): 
 
 to gain confidence in non-diversion; 
 
 to maintain constructive security dialogues; 
 
 to create the foundation for deeper cuts in nuclear arms; 
 
 to raise awareness of international non-proliferation challenges; 
 
 to identify the best and most sustainable options for nuclear security. 
 
Greater transparency in the management of nuclear material and warheads 
would genuinely contribute to strengthening international security and re-
ducing nuclear-related threats (Zarimpas 2003, 253). Hence, transparency 
has been, and will continue to be, an indispensable device for limiting the 
dangers posed by nuclear explosives (Walker 2003, 29). 
4.2.1.2 The Seven Nuclear Husbandry Functions 
It is common to consider “safeguards”, “verification”, and “transparency” as 
comprising the key nuclear security and arms control measures. As pointed 
out, however, these concepts may be vague, too general, and potentially mis-
leading. They could encompass a variety of unrelated activities. Clarification 
of the concepts and specification of the tools applied (if any) for each of 
them is therefore both necessary and desirable to be able to meet contempo-
rary fissile material security challenges. A set of specified and better defined 
functions in the spectrum of nuclear husbandry activities will therefore be 
identified in the following. These are ([P4], 61):  
 
 domestic nuclear physical protection; 
 
 domestic nuclear control/containment; 
 
 domestic nuclear accounting; 
 
 domestic nuclear auditing; 
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 international nuclear auditing; 
 
 monitoring of international treaties and agreements;  
 
 nuclear transparency. 
 
These seven functions fit into the two broader categories of domestic and 
international husbandry, respectively, as illustrated in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: The Seven Nuclear Husbandry Functions 
 
Domestic International 
Physical 
Protection 
Control Accounting Auditing Auditing Treaty 
Monitoring 
Transparency 
 
(From [P4], p.61) 
 
US “domestic safeguards” is split into its three respective functions of 
“physical protection”, “containment and control” and “accounting”. Physical 
protection measures may have the greatest immediate impact in reducing the 
immediate risk of theft. By contrast, material accounting can at best detect 
thefts after they have occurred. It does little to actually prevent thefts. Physi-
cal protection security upgrades are often less sensitive as they require less 
understanding of a facility’s operations and are less technically complicated 
(Bukharin et al. 2000, 23).  
Accounting, on the other hand, could be the only way to confirm that no 
thefts have occurred, and that the system of physical protection and control 
has performed as intended. Accounting could prove crucial in detecting and 
deterring thefts by insiders with knowledge of the weaknesses of a facility’s 
security systems (Bukharin et al. 2000, 23).   
“Domestic auditing” means monitoring adherence to domestic laws and 
regulations, not to international treaties, by internal revision. “International 
auditing”, basically a more flexible and focused way of doing treaty 
monitoring, is still a novel feature in international arms control. Its evolving 
incarnation can be seen in the strengthened international safeguards system, 
as expressed in the “Model Protocol” (International Atomic Energy Agency 
1997). The category of “Treaty monitoring” here simply encompasses NPT 
safeguards, i.e. what has been denoted “international” or “IAEA” safeguards 
above. As it is normally directed to an international audience, nuclear trans-
parency is included amongst international nuclear husbandry functions. 
By assessing the means applied, the adversaries to defeat (i.e. the type of 
hostility of the operational environment), and the potential obstacles that 
each of the nuclear security activities may encounter, it soon becomes clear 
that these Seven Nuclear Husbandry Functions are quite disparate ([P4], 64–
70). Research paper [P4] offers an attempt to quantify of the differences. 
Each attribute (“Means”, “Adversaries”, and “Obstacles”) is then given a 
(numerical) contribution score, according to its relevance for the function in 
question. For instance, locks and barriers are important means for physical 
protection and are given a high contribution score (+2). These means, how-
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ever, play no role in nuclear transparency, so their appurtenant contribution 
score is consequently low (–2) ([P4], 65 and 69–70).  
Likewise, a domestic system for nuclear accounting aims at deterring in-
siders from diverting fissile material. The system is, however, of much less 
importance for international treaty monitoring. Hence, in the first case the 
contribution score is set high (+2), and in the latter, low (–1). Similar argu-
mentation may be introduced for the obstacles to the husbandry functions. 
The various activities may encounter different types of resistance, especially 
when they are initially implemented or when they are expanded ([P4], 67). 
Negative perceptions to change could, for instance, be a more constraining 
obstacle for nuclear transparency than for the instalment of domestic security 
measures in a domestic setting. Hence, a high contribution score in the first 
case and a low one for the latter. 
 
Table 4.4: Overall linear correlation coefficients (r) for each of the Seven 
Nuclear Husbandry Functions versus the others, based on the relative con-
tribution scores 
 
 Domestic 
physical 
protection 
Domestic 
containment 
and control 
Domestic 
account-
ing 
Domestic 
auditing 
Internat. 
auditing 
Treaty 
moni-
toring 
Transpar-
ency 
Domestic 
physical  
protection  
 
 
1 
 
 
0.66 
 
0.30 
 
0.51 
 
–0.29 
 
–0.37 
 
–0.33 
Domestic 
contain-
ment and 
control  
 
  
1 
 
0.84 
 
0.50 
 
–0.06 
 
–0.11 
 
–0.36 
Domestic  
account-
ing  
 
   
1 
 
0.47 
 
0.07 
 
0.04 
 
–0.23 
Domestic  
auditing  
 
    
1 
 
–0.05 
 
–0.27 
 
–0.17 
Interna-
tional 
auditing  
  
     
1 
 
0.73 
 
–0.09 
Treaty  
monitor-
ing  
 
      
1 
 
0.17 
Transpar-
ency 
       
1 
 
(From Table 5 in [P4], p. 71) 
 
By combining all attributes, there are a total of 44 different relative contribu-
tion scores for each of the Seven Nuclear Husbandry Functions ([P4], 71). In 
this exercise, all contribution scores are weighted equally, regardless of 
whether they fall within the “Means”, Adversaries” or “Obstacles” catego-
ries. The differences between the respective functions may then be explored 
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by calculating Pearson linear coefficients for each nuclear husbandry func-
tion (see [P4], 69–73).130 The findings are summarized in Table 4.4. 
The correlation coefficient provides a measure of how interconnected one 
husbandry function is to another. The correlation coefficient, r, assumes a 
value from – 1 to + 1, where a value of r = + 1 signifies perfect correlation. 
The two nuclear husbandry functions in question are then in other words 
identical. A correlation coefficient of r = 0 indicates that the two functions 
are orthogonal, and completely uncorrelated and dissimilar.131 The resulting 
coefficients accentuate the dissimilarities of the respective functions. 
The correlation analysis reveals that international treaty monitoring is in-
deed quite different from any of the domestic functions (P, C, A, or domestic 
auditing). These results should warn against the tendency for instance to in-
sist that US domestic nuclear security means and procedures make the most 
sense for IAEA safeguards or treaty monitoring ([P4], 76; [P5], 9); a com-
parison of domestic and international nuclear auditing reveals more dissimi-
larities than similarities. 
However, Table 4.4 also indicates several related features amongst the re-
spective nuclear husbandry activities ([P4], 69). As may be expected, domes-
tic physical protection, for instance, appears to be somewhat related to do-
mestic containment and control, and both these functions seem again to be 
related to domestic accounting. Though the means applied differ, the imple-
mental obstacles to overcome and the adversaries to defeat are probably 
quite similar for the three domestic MPC&A activities.  
On the international arena, there is some correlation between internatio-
nal nuclear audits and traditional treaty monitoring. International auditing is 
strongly related to treaty monitoring, another type of international husbandry 
function. This makes sense, as the former could be viewed as basically a 
more comprehensive and aggressive form of the latter ([P4], 74). The poten-
tial adversary, the inspected state, is, moreover, the same. Hence, the streng-
thened safeguards system (future nuclear audits) should be based more on 
the traditional safeguards system – i.e. treaty monitoring – than on domestic 
auditing or domestic MPC&A. The shared attributes of treaty monitoring 
and (future) international nuclear auditing should be examined in detail, so 
that the international community can utilize what is already known about 
treaty monitoring for developing effective international nuclear auditing. 
There is, however, a lack of correlation between transparency and any of 
the other six nuclear husbandry functions (Figure 4.6). Transparency is thus 
quite unique. Its features (in terms of what, when and where to reveal) will 
be up to the state itself, depending on the intentions behind the act of 
transparency ([P4], 75).  
 
                                                     
130  Admittedly, the contribution scores and numerical figures chosen will be subjective. In-
puts in the correlation matrixes are based on (and coloured by) the experiences of the aut-
hors of the research paper [P4]. As such, the assessments will carry with it inherent and 
unfortunate biases. Accordingly, others are encouraged to perform similar exercises, with 
their preferred inputs. Given that the inputs are fairly reasonable, this, however, should 
not alter the results significantly: Minor changes to the scores show to have little effect on 
the overall findings ([P4], 72).   
131 A value of r = – 1 indicate that the functions are completely anti-correlated, e.g. like the 
two series (–2, –1, 0, 1, 2) and (2, 1, 0, –1, –2). One series has a large number when the 
other has a low, and vice versa.  
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Figure 4.6: Weak correlation coefficients for transparency versus the other 
six Nuclear Husbandry Functions  
 
However, once the political decision to proceed has been made, transparency 
is likely to be fairly easily implemented. It requires minimal cost and no or 
limited technology, in stark contrast to verification, and to domestic and in-
ternational safeguards. For transparency, readily available information distri-
bution channels can be used. Possible positive trade-offs include internatio-
nal recognition, an informed citizenry and neighbours, and potentially a 
more stable nuclear international security environment. Accordingly, trans-
parency may be an important supporting element to practical nuclear arms 
control.132 
4.2.2 Optimizing Nuclear Husbandry   
 
These findings have several implications for nuclear security and practical 
measures for nuclear arms control. One is that it is particularly important not 
to confuse and mix international and domestic nuclear husbandry functions. 
While this may be tempting from an economic, and perhaps even a habitual, 
point of view, it should be avoided. International and domestic nuclear hus-
bandry are distinctly dissimilar. The means to be applied, the adversaries to 
meet, and the obstacles to overcome all differ considerably ([P4], 76, [P5], 
9).  
There may, moreover, be a range of practical constraints. As indicated, 
nuclear husbandry functions can encounter various types of resistance. The 
extent of the political, military, technical, diplomatic, or bureaucratic opposi-
                                                     
132  Transparency may become a particularly powerful and imperative in the context of unilat-
eral and non-verified nuclear arms control ([P4], 75), as well as for bilateral nuclear secu-
rity cooperation. 
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tion will usually depend on the amount of change, resources, and inherent 
risks involved ([P4], 69). The resistance can be strategic in nature, where 
changes are opposed due to security concerns, or of a more subtle organiza-
tional (structural), or a psychological/cultural (individual) nature.  
As a result, even if and when (attributable) differences are fully appreci-
ated, there can be substantial problems in transferring domestic MPC&A 
hardware, methods, and know-how between different (international) settings. 
Different countries have very different cultures of physical protection and 
safeguards (Bunn 1999, 3). Despite their expertise, US nuclear security con-
sultants could face profound challenges when assisting in the upgrading of 
Russian domestic MPC&A systems.133 The US Department of Energy alone 
now administers in Russia more than a dozen distinct non-proliferation pro-
grammes designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material or expertise falling 
into the hands of terrorist organizations and states ([P6], 39).134 
In its MPC&A assistance to Russia, the USA has been very slow to ap-
preciate the variety of different nuclear custodians in Russia (Potter and 
Wehling 2001, 187).135 There is, moreover, little understanding of Russian 
organizational structure, peculiarities, and decision-making processes. As-
sisting the Russians in strengthening their MPC&A can neither be effective, 
nor sustainable, without a thorough understanding of these problems (Potter 
and Wehling 2001, 183; Bunn 2000b, 84). 
Cultural differences in attitudes about security may hence create serious 
impediments (Bunn 2000b, 150). Transparency in particular is likely to be 
deeply affected by cultural beliefs and attitudes towards openness. In situa-
tions where the nature and advantages of increased openness are not properly 
understood, the anticipated benefits will be underestimated ([P5], 69). This is 
likely to result in less interest and thus less emphasis on implementing or 
expanding certain nuclear husbandry functions. National pride, legal restric-
tions or bureaucratic inertia can also be serious obstacles to nuclear security 
activities (Smith 2003, 16).  
The latter is often seen as an insistence on over-classifying documents, 
data, and perceived secrets (Albright 2000, 60; Hafemeister 2003,110). Tra-
ditions of secrecy may be another challenge. As Liddell Hart wryly observes, 
“the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get 
an old idea out” (quoted by Smith 2003, 23). Secrecy can hence be detrimen-
tal to scientific and technical progress. It can also undermine public confi-
dence in government by limiting citizens’ ability to scrutinize their govern-
ment’s action or be fully informed on public issues (Albright 2000, 60). A 
more general consideration is that democracy requires an informed citizenry, 
and secrecy undermines this goal (see Section 3.1).  
                                                     
133  New settings often present unexpected technical problems; workforce conflicts; novel 
kinds of adversaries; unique issues of licensing, environmental surroundings, exports con-
trol, tariffs, and liability; and other obstacles to the practical implementation of MPC&A 
systems (Potter and Bukharin 2001; Baker and Cutler 2001, 25; Bunn 2000, 81–82). 
134  For an overview and discussion of the programmes, see e.g. (Hoehn and Fieck 2001; 
Spector 2001; and Roston and Smigielski 2003). 
135  After nearly a decade of cooperation (in 2000), both the Department of Defense and De-
partment of Energy had for instance very incomplete information on the number and loca-
tion of non-MINATOM sites possessing direct-use material. 
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4.2.3 Summary Answer to Principal Research Question [Q2] 
 
[Q2]: “Is there an optimum way of protecting fissile material from falling into 
terrorist hands? What role – if any – do transparency and non-intrusive verifica-
tion play in this regard?”   
 
The past decade has shown some remarkable and unprecedented successes in 
the field of practical, cooperative nuclear arms control. Scientists whom very 
few believed would ever cooperate have worked jointly to secure stocks of 
fissile material to reduce Cold War nuclear threats. But a range of difficul-
ties, some of which seem to emanate from a lack of conceptual understand-
ing, hamper ongoing efforts to optimize nuclear security.  
For any corroborative nuclear security activities (e.g. the United States’ 
MPC&A assistance to Russia), a range of practical and political impedi-
ments will arise. A fundamental prerequisite for avoiding these pitfalls is to 
have a clear understanding of the goals, implications and limitations of the 
instigated activities. Domestic and international nuclear security activities 
should not for instance be uncritically mixed. 
Seven Nuclear Husbandry Functions that span the spectrum of current 
and future nuclear security activities have been identified. These are: Do-
mestic nuclear physical protection, domestic nuclear control/containment, 
domestic nuclear accounting, domestic nuclear auditing, international nu-
clear auditing, monitoring of international treaties and agreements, and, fi-
nally, nuclear transparency. Some of these are related, however, as they are 
distinct, discriminatory, and operate with little overlap, less confusion should 
arise, both on the conceptual as well as on the practical level.  
Nuclear transparency is a novel and under-utilized husbandry function. 
Its potential may not have been fully exploited. Transparency may not only 
lessen any offensive nuclear tensions amongst states. Ideally, it could lay the 
foundation for and advance international nuclear security cooperation, and 
possibly develop the (global) norms needed for responsible nuclear hus-
bandry and non-intrusive verification of fissile material. Hence, it is a pre-
condition for reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
Transparency normally precedes verification. Without nuclear transpar-
ency, verification can hardly be achieved (Arbman 2003, 116). The means 
and mechanisms at work, however, are quite different, as are their objec-
tives. Mixing transparency and verification in practical nuclear arms control 
could mean that their respective features will not be effectively recognized, 
implemented, or nurtured. Transparency, using existing channels of informa-
tion, may be easily instigated, and quite hard to reverse, once the political 
openings have been established. Verification, on its part, normally requires 
carefully negotiated procedures, agreements, and equipment that monitor 
(only) data acceptable to all parties involved. Once implemented, however, 
verification will feed into, and expand, existing levels of transparency.  
At first glance, transparency and security may seem to be incompatible 
and conflicting interests. Openness may be at odds with the to need to main-
tain ambiguity in military strength. Each nation has, moreover, both a right 
and an obligation to protect classified and sensitive information. Some of the 
objections to transparency are hence well founded and justified. Others, 
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however, may be outdated and exaggerated. Transparency and secrecy may 
very well work in tandem, as none of them are either/or conditions. As a 
general rule, transparency measures should not release information that 
could be damaging to the very non-proliferation interests it seeks to promote.  
Keeping a massive shroud of secrecy on stocks of fissile material can 
only maintain and exacerbate current uncertainties in fissile material hold-
ings and protection. This could increase the risk of diversion and, accord-
ingly, elevate the nuclear terrorism threat. It is not beneficial to the security 
of any state.  
4.3 Nuclear Husbandry in Practice 
 
Having explored the underlying concepts for improving security on stocks of 
fissile material, the time has come to look at practical ways to implement 
optimum nuclear husbandry, in particular nuclear transparency and non-
intrusive verification. This section will thus address the third principal re-
search question, [Q3],136 based on research papers [P6], [P7], and [P8]. 
This section presents the results of a case-study assessment of nuclear 
transparency and non-intrusive verification on unirradiated Russian naval 
fuel. For this material, transparency has remained a particularly alien feature. 
The material is still kept completely outside international control, despite its 
proliferation attractiveness and possible applicability in crude nuclear explo-
sive devices.  
Possible schemes for enhanced openness while protecting sensitive infor-
mation are presented and discussed. Related issue that will have to be ad-
dressed concern the foundation for such practical measures for nuclear arms 
control, and their limitations. What kinds of practical measurements are fea-
sible, and who are the key actors involved? What kind of information on 
fresh naval fuel is justifiably withheld, from a security perspective? If it is 
successfully implemented, could lessons be drawn from naval fuel transpar-
ency and non-intrusive verification to other practical activities in nuclear 
arms control, and vice versa? 
Latour’s model on the rendering of science from Chapter 3 is used as a 
facilitating tool for introducing the novel discipline of non-intrusive verifica-
tion on sensitive stocks of fissile material. Technical background informa-
tion on Russian naval fuel is given in Appendix IV. 
First, however, the rationale for choosing naval fuel as a case study is fur-
ther explained. As will be seen, many of the challenges associated with fresh 
naval fuel go to the crux of contemporary fissile material protection and con-
trol issues.  
                                                     
136  [Q3]: “Within legitimate security constraints, what kinds of measures could be put in 
place to enhance the transparency and non-intrusive verification of stocks of sensitive fis-
sile material?” 
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4.3.1 Unirradiated Russian Naval Uranium Fuel as a Case Study 
 
There are several reasons for using unirradiated, or fresh, Russian naval fuel 
as a case study. Firstly, the enrichment levels of naval fuel make it highly 
proliferation-attractive. Secondly, the fuel cycle, still shrouded in secrecy, 
involves a large portion of global HEU stockpiles. Thirdly, existing and pos-
sibly future arms control agreements do not fully meet the proliferation chal-
lenges posed by these fuel cycles.137 Fourthly, R&D for non-intrusive nu-
clear verification may in general benefit from looking at new schemes and 
material, outside the traditional nuclear weapon stockpiles. And finally, na-
val fuel consumption is likely to decrease in the coming decades (Maerli 
2002a, 26).138 This, and the close working relation forged between different 
actors under the naval MPC&A security upgrades, could affect states’ will-
ingness to engage in naval fuel transparency and non-intrusive verification.  
Directly or indirectly all of these factors will determine the future fissile 
material holdings by states, norms of fissile material transparency, and the 
level of (international) control and security of these stocks. As such, these 
aspects are of direct relevance for the prospects of nuclear terrorism, and will 
be briefly elaborated upon in the following. 
4.3.1.1 Naval Fuel Security Challenges  
Specific attributes make the naval fuel cycle potentially less proliferation-
resistant than other uranium fuel cycles. To achieve increased efficiency and 
higher energy output while keeping naval cores compact, higher enrichment 
rates of HEU are used in the reactors ([P8], 14). The high enrichment and the 
low radioactivity levels of fresh naval fuel make the material highly prolife-
ration-attractive. 
As explained (Section 4.1.2.1.4), highly enriched uranium is the only ma-
terial that allows the easy manufacture of a crude and reliable nuclear explo-
sive device ([P1], 117; [P2], 733). In consequence, due to their high enrich-
ment levels, the naval fuel cycles could constitute a back door to clandestine 
nuclear explosive capabilities, by states or by non-state actors.139 Russian 
                                                     
137  In non-nuclear weapon states, institutionalized international control, i.e. international 
safeguards, is in place to limit possible diversion of any (potentially) weapons-useable 
material. However, these arrangements do not properly cover the naval fuel cycles ([P8], 
16). International safeguards do not prohibit the non-explosive use of nuclear material, 
equipment or technology for a military purpose such as the propulsion of naval ship. The 
material can simply be withdrawn from international safeguards, evoking this formal ex-
ception. New guidelines and a new regime have been proposed to limit the potential im-
pact of the current HEU loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so far without signifi-
cant political support (see e.g. Moltz 1998). 
138  Overall US naval fuel requirements will be reduced mainly due to the introduction of life-
time reactor cores and a limited decline in the number of operating reactors. By 2020, 
with the successful launching of all the planned new SSNs with lifetime cores, the annual 
lifetime integrated naval HEU fuel consumption of U-235 for US attack submarines will 
be some 60% of the levels for the year 2000 (Bremer Maerli 2002b, 32). Russian naval 
HEU consumption will continue to decrease, due to the reduced operational status of and 
severe fleet reductions in the Northern Fleet. Throughout the 1990s, the Russian Navy has 
experienced significant cutbacks in personnel and material. From 1991 to 1998, the total 
number of ships in the Northern Fleet was more than halved (Hoenneland and Joergensen 
1999, 41 and 181). Drastically reduced operational schemes and significant HEU savings 
resulted (Bremer Maerli 2002b, 34).    
139  Clearly, there could be production challenges, e.g. associated with the shaping the mate-
rial into best geometries for nuclear explosives, removal of impurities and the possible 
need to covert uranium oxide to metal. These obstacles, however, could be manageable 
even for non-state actors (see Section 4.1.2.4.1).  
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naval fuel has been particularly exposed to thefts (see Appendix V). The en-
richment levels of the fuel involved make such activities particularly worri-
some.140 Rough estimates indicate that with highly enriched uranium as few 
as 10 naval fuel assemblies could suffice to supply enough highly enriched 
uranium for a nuclear explosive (Bukharin and Potter 1995, 47).141  
Sensitivity concerns and the strategic importance of nuclear submarines 
cause the nuclear-weapon states to maintain a high degree of secrecy around 
their nuclear naval operations. Very little is officially known about subma-
rine nuclear-fuel stocks, nor current and future consumption needs of naval 
HEU (Maerli 2001d, 24).142 Hence, large quantities of HEU are managed 
without the transparency needed to build confidence that they are safe and 
secure or to provide the foundation for deep, transparent, and irreversible 
nuclear arms reductions ([P8], 14).  
The problem could be exaggerated by new naval HEU markets outside 
international control. The former Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 
(MINATOM) has actively promoted extending the uses of the naval reactors 
for the purposes of providing electricity and heat to remote coastal 
communities (see e.g. Belyayev and Leontyev 2004, 18).143 The reactors 
with HEU fuel will then be placed on floating barges and transported to 
coastal areas or possibly underground, e.g. in mines, to make energy 
available locally. For MINATOM the naval reactors could represent a new 
opportunity for Russian nuclear exports, and hence new revenues. For the 
international community, it could represent a new danger of nuclear 
proliferation (Maerli 2001b, 9).  
Nor is control of material for naval propulsion likely to be included in a 
future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) (Maerli 2001c, 124, Miller 
2003, 1). It is the firm expectation of Washington, for example, that an 
FMCT would prohibit the production of HEU, plutonium, and uranium-233 
for nuclear explosives, but not prevent the use of HEU for non-explosive 
military uses such as naval reactors ([P8], 16). In consequence, yet another 
verification loophole may be created in a future FMCT. Mere concerns that 
opponents may continue to produce HEU for bombs under the cover of a 
naval fuel programme could limit the strength of and, consequently, political 
interest in the treaty.  
Furthermore, there might be important and positive synergistic effects by 
looking at non-intrusive verification of naval fuel and on-going warhead dis-
                                                     
140  Because the difficulty of gaining access to this material is the major barrier to the spread 
of nuclear explosives, it has been proposed that material with high enrichment levels 
should be subjected to the same stringent security standards as nuclear weapons (Bunn 
2000; Fetter 2003).   
141  Here it is assumed that about 12 kg of weapons-grade uranium would be needed to pro-
duce an implosion-type nuclear device and that as much as 300 kg of U-235 is available 
in the reactor cores. Other sources indicate only half of this amount of U-235 in the cores 
(see Bremer Maerli et al. 1998, 18). 
142  Open-source technical characteristics of fresh Russian naval fuel are presented in Appen-
dix IV 
143  As part of a massive government reorganization, Russian President Putin 9 March 2004 
broke up the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry and reassigned its activities to other cabi-
net-level ministries (Nartker 2004, 1w). Under the new governmental structure, civilian 
nuclear activities will be handled by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, a part of the 
newly created Industry and Energy Ministry. Military aspects of the former Atomic En-
ergy Ministry have been transferred to the Defence Ministry. 
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mantlement verification in parallel.144 The United States and Russia are en-
gaged in a range of cooperative programmes to reduce the dangers of the 
excessive stocks of fissile material and to meet their disarmament obliga-
tions. Several of these activities call for measurement on material with com-
positions that are either considered classified or sensitive by at least one 
party.145 An overarching problem for many of these activities revolves 
around identifying the material in a closed container such as either a war-
head, a weapon component, or fissile material from a dismantled nuclear 
weapon (Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering 2001, 2). 
Both the USA and Russia view the information that could be revealed by 
measurements as extremely sensitive, and are committed to preventing its 
release to the other and to other parties (Pura 2000b, 4). 
Hence, technical communities are now examining a variety of non-
intrusive measurements on items with sensitive or classified properties, some 
of which may be applicable on unirradiated naval fuel. The underlying phys-
ics is well understood, but there are technical challenges involved in the need 
to protect and limit the data output while providing enough information to 
foster sufficient confidence in the results of the measurements ([P7], 21). 
Such cooperation is essential for improved nuclear husbandry, but it is pro-
gressing at a limited pace.  
Finally, of the programmes the US Department of Energy administers in 
Russia, the joint physical security upgrades at Russian naval facilities have 
by far been the most successful. This is largely because of the flexible and 
stepwise working approach chosen and the cooperative working spirit and 
trust developed ([P6], 49). The progress made suggests that valuable lessons 
can be learnt from the US–Russian naval security upgrade programme, les-
sons that could improve and contribute to other nuclear husbandry activities 
([P6], 48–49). The naval MP&A Program has, moreover, created a sound 
basis for an overall Russian HEU accounting exercise. The naval MPC&A 
may therefore act as a springboard to increased transparency and possibly 
future non-intrusive verification ([P6], 48). 
4.3.2 Naval Fuel Transparency and Non-Intrusive  
Verification Foundations  
 
The situation of trust and cooperation built through the MPC & A Program 
has played a crucial role in opening up the Russian nuclear complex (Buk-
harin et al. 2000, 68). It has allowed relationships to be built, laying the 
                                                     
144  The positive effects of looking at different non-intrusive verification schemes in parallel 
have been stressed by Pura 2000a, among others. Experience from naval fuel transparency 
and non-intrusive verification may provide important feedback for improved HEU weap-
ons-dismantling activities and third-party control of weapons-useable fissile material as 
well. The attribute approach, one of the methods for proposed for non-intrusive verifica-
tion of naval fuel (Section 4.3.3.2.1), is an important part of the trilateral initiative be-
tween the USA, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for control of fissile 
material declared excess to national security needs. 
145  Bilateral (US–Russian) initiatives include the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase 
Agreement, the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA), and verification acti-
vities at the plutonium storage at Mayak. Fissile materials declared in excess to US and 
Russian security needs are controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), under the so-called “Trilateral Initiative”.  
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foundations for a wide range of other cooperative activities to promote nu-
clear security. With the Latour model from Chapter 3 and the cooperative 
naval MPC&A activities on fresh Russian naval fuel as starting points, this 
section explores the practical foundation needed for increased transparency 
and non-intrusive verification on stocks of naval fuel.146 
4.3.2.1 Establishing Common Ground 
Whereas a culture crash between American and Russian actors has slowed 
down other cooperative projects on nuclear safety in Northwest Russia 
(Hoenneland 2003, 91), the MPC&A Program for the Russian Navy has 
made remarkable progress in reducing the vulnerability of large amounts of 
highly enriched uranium to theft and diversion, at relatively modest cost 
(Bukharin et al. 2000, 60). For the fresh naval fuel security upgrades the 
Russian and US sides shared interests and incentives from the very begin-
ning.147 This facilitated cooperation even into new and highly sensitive ar-
eas. As reflected by the naval MPC&A upgrades, where there is a desire for 
cooperation, and a wish to make it habitual and strong, transparency then 
follows. 
Moreover, the MPC&A activities on fresh naval fuel, and later on nuclear 
warheads, of the Russian Navy offered a flexible approach to work inspec-
tions in a cooperative atmosphere with mutual exchange of information. In-
stead of a strict on-site inspection regime, a cooperative and less adversarial 
approach was chosen ([P6], 42). US and Russian MPC&A experts would sit 
down together and jointly assess the situation before and after the security 
upgrades. What the US team might lose in terms of insight through formal 
inspections it was likely to gain through a voluntary and informal flow of 
information ([P6], 43). 
Initially, a flat, pragmatic, and highly efficient organizational structure 
was chosen for the naval upgrades. Work was conducted in stages, with a 
step-by-step approach and one facility at the time ([P6], 42). Communication 
was free among all parties involved. US team members could personally 
contact high-level counterparts in the Russian Navy. This drastically in-
creased interaction and allowed for quick problem-solving when needed 
([P6], 42). Both sides, moreover, maintained stable teams with limited per-
sonnel changes (Bukharin et al. 2000, 59 and 61).  
4.3.2.2 Forming Alliances 
The stepwise, flexible working approach chosen for the naval upgrades and 
the continuity in the working teams soon ensured close working ties between 
the actors. In the words of Latour (Section 3.4.3), alliances were built. These 
alliances, which included high-ranking officers of the Northern Fleet, proved 
instrumental for the success of the programme ([P6], 46). This partnership 
eased interactions with bureaucrats and military opponents of the collabora-
tion. Russian evaluations tend to be time consuming, and a large number of 
agencies are involved in decision-making (Maerli 2003f, 155). The alliances 
                                                     
146  A related set of criteria may be found in Shields and Potter 1997, 386–405. 
147  Several thefts of naval HEU fuel concerned the Northern Fleet (see Appendix V). Ameri-
cans, on their behalf, were eager to limit the diversion of any proliferation-attractive mate-
rial ([P6], 42). 
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also created an important vehicle for communication with different “Power 
Ministries” of the Russian Federation ([P6], 46).148 These ministries had the 
potential for severe interference in cooperative nuclear security activities. 
The impact of their policies and priorities in this regard should not be under-
estimated (Bukharin 2003, 139).  
The direct contact established between foreigners and Russian officers 
was also important in other ways. The group of Russian officers now stands 
forth more clearly in society as a separate political interest group (Hoenne-
land and Joergensen 1999, 20). They have to a larger extent become invol-
ved in politics in order to ensure the autonomy and decision-making author-
ity of the defence sector. This is new, and could change ways of military be-
haviour and attitudes, also when it comes to practical nuclear arms control 
measures.  
For instance, it was the officers of the Northern Fleet who in the mid-
1990s acknowledged that they had a security problem and no or very limited 
means to fix it. The then commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral 
Gromov requested assistance and cooperation between the Navy, the Mos-
cow-based Kurchatov Institute, and possibly the United States, on upgrades 
for naval fuel storage and handling (Shmelev et al. 1998). This created the 
foundation for successful nuclear security cooperation. And it was initiated 
amongst a set of actors whom very few would have thought would ever co-
operate, just a few years earlier.  
This forming of alliances required a profoundly new level of openness, 
with access to and insight into more or less secret military objects. Other 
factors working in parallel to erode Russian military norms of secrecy in-
clude the increased (local) civilian influence on the Northern Fleet due to 
economic hardship (Hoenneland and Joergensen 1999, 163),149 as well as 
international nuclear clean-up efforts.150   
4.3.2.3 Mobilizing the Means  
Cultural differences between actors on the Russian side also played a role for 
the success of the naval MPC&A Program ([P6], 46). The Northern Fleet 
quite early acknowledged an internal security problem and evinced a genu-
ine interest in fixing it. For the naval security upgrades, this was probably 
paramount for avoiding many of the practical, structural and political im-
pediments that hampered other parts of the cooperative security assistance.  
                                                     
148  “Power Ministries” is a widely used expression referring to Russian defence and security 
agencies. Apart from the Ministry of Defence, the following agencies are normally in-
cluded in this categorization: the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), the Federal Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Government Commu-
nication and Information Agency (FAPSI), the Federal Protection Services (FSO), the 
Ministry of Internal Situations (MChS), the Federal Border Service (Hoenneland and Jo-
ergensen 1999, 45). 
149  When the impoverished Northern Fleet became heavily indebted both to its supporting 
industry and to other regional enterprises on whose services it is dependent, efforts were 
made to convert parts of the nuclear (submarine) industry to embark on the production of 
civilian consumer goods. However, while it may have created new incentives for open-
ness, the success of such endeavours has been very limited (Hoenneland and Joergensen 
1999, 125–132).  
150  The magnitude of the environmental crisis in the wash of the nuclear activities of the 
Northern Fleet makes it unlikely that Russia will ever able to deal with the problems 
alone.  This could forge new openness as deemed necessary by international contributors 
and donors when they stand ready to render support (see Section A.7.2 in Appendix VII).   
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MINATOM, in contrast, tended to put less emphasis on the insider threat 
and regarded MPC&A deficiencies as primarily an economic problem.151 
Accordingly, international expertise and cooperation easily became secon-
dary to obtaining domestic funding for upgrades ([P6], 46). To use Latour, 
MINATOM’s willingness, or ability, to explore opportunities and thus po-
tentials for mobilization by assessing new means, methods, and non-traditio-
nal cooperative partners, was low compared with that of the Northern Fleet.  
When dealing with the Russian Navy, the working approach of the naval 
MPC&A upgrades has indicated a highly efficient way of solving access 
problems and achieving important and concrete results at sensitive facilities 
([P6], 48). Russian Naval MPC&A can therefore provide a useful source of 
working methods and approaches that might be fruitful at other sensitive 
facilities in the Russian nuclear weapon complex.  
An integrated approach to international nuclear security cooperation is 
needed (Hafemeister 2003, 111). Currently, however, such unusual program-
me approaches are not held up to broad scrutiny, except on a piecemeal or 
even accidental basis, since there is no regular discussion of policy imple-
mentation standards (Gottemoeller 2001, 32).  
4.3.2.4 Implementing Change  
To achieve long-term nuclear security, ingrained habits, ways of thinking, 
and priorities need to change – all the way from the presidential level, down 
to the individual actors handling nuclear material (Bukharin et al. 2000, 27). 
Changes will have to come from the individuals who conclude that such 
changes are in their interests and in the interest of their organizations – as 
well as their countries.  
To implement change, each of the loops of mobilization, alliance-build-
ing, autonomization and public representations need to be connected, to 
work together in what Latour denotes the “bloodstreams” of science. Techni-
cal, structural and political forces need to pull in the same direction, at the 
same period of time. Coordination may be challenging. However, once the 
relevant linkages have been established, the process may be hard to stop and 
difficult to reverse.  
In fact, the diverse elements may be mutually reinforcing, as evidenced 
by the willingness on both the US and the Russian side to move forward to 
secure naval nuclear weapons once the unirradiated fresh fuel was protected 
(see Section 4.1.2.2.1). This advancement required political will, technical 
solutions, as well as organizational structures on both sides, ready to meet 
new requirements and implement factual changes.  
Equivalent processes may be envisioned for HEU transparency and non-
intrusive verification on the sensitive naval fuel cycle.  
                                                     
151  MINATOM used to be the main agency representing the Russian Federation in bilateral 
and multilateral discussions on nuclear installations and nuclear waste (Hoenneland 2003, 
86), prior to President Putins massive government reorganization March 2004 (see Foot-
note 143). Streamlining Russian bureaucracy could be a positive move, but concerns have 
been voiced that the resulting government structure could complicate practical U.S.-Rus-
sian nuclear non-proliferation activities (Nartker 2004, 1w). To ease bilateral nuclear 
safety and security cooperation in the Northern areas, Russia has also established a new 
organization, SevRao (the Northern Enterprise for Treatment of Nuclear Waste), a locally 
based agency under the former MINATOM (Bremer Maerli 2003f, 155). SevRao will op-
erate in parallel to Nuklid, another entity with close ties to the former MINATOM. 
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4.3.3 Naval Fuel Transparency and Non-Intrusive Verification  
Alternatives  
 
Experience indicates that an incremental approach is the best way to move 
forward throughout the implementation processes towards bilateral or trilat-
eral verification (Section 4.3.2.1). One approach could be to use small ges-
tures such as creating bilateral declarations as stepping-stones to more elabo-
rate agreements.  
Here, the prospects of increased naval transparency through declarations 
will be explored first. This presentation will be followed by a discussion of 
various possible schemes for non-intrusive fresh naval fuel verification. 
4.3.3.1 Transparency Through Declarations 
As seen in Section 4.2.1.1.3, transparency basically takes place as a unilat-
eral act by the state itself, normally after careful considerations of the pros 
and cons to national security. As such, it may be orchestrated and even pin-
pointed to cover certain domestic aspects of nuclear activities, addressed to 
certain international recipient(s), for confidence-building purposes.  
Transparency does not involve any technical means per se. Rather, it uses 
existing channels of information (like interviews, public statements, on-site 
visits) to present the desired message. The more substantial transparency, the 
better, as this may have a self-enforcing effect on the credibility of the infor-
mation provided. At present there are no treaties that oblige nuclear weapon 
states to declare, directly limit or accept controls on their fissile material. 
Consequently, if properly introduced and nurtured, transparency in fissile 
material may create a strong foundation for nuclear security.  
Declarations, one form of transparency, can have an important confi-
dence-building aspect, as an indication of a state’s good will. Stockpile dec-
larations may be particularly important, as the size of the holdings of fissile 
material provides a ceiling for the number of nuclear explosives that could 
be produced, as well as a marker for future reductions. Declarations could 
make less probable any (state) diversion of fissile material for clandestine 
production of nuclear explosives ([P7], 21; [P8], 17).  
Such declarations could be part of bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
data exchanges on the aggregate stockpiles of fissile material, based on ex-
isting commitments of transparency, or they could be arranged under special 
agreements on naval information exchange ([P8], 17).152 One option is a 
phased approach, where there is a movement towards more comprehensive 
exchange of information as mutual confidence increases (Fetter 2003, 136). 
As a minimum, voluntary state transparency on fresh naval fuel could in-
clude regular declarations of the following:153  
 
                                                     
152  Formalized agreements already exist for some fissile material stockpile declarations. One 
example is the guidelines agreed to by the five declared nuclear-weapon states under the 
NPT, together with Belgium, Germany, Japan and Switzerland, to increase transparency 
in the management of civilian plutonium by publishing annual statements of each coun-
try’s holdings of civilian plutonium. In 1998, the IAEA published its Guidelines for the 
Management of Plutonium (INFCIR/549). 
153  For a somewhat related set of recommendations for nuclear warhead declarations, see 
Fetter 1999, 4–7.  
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 current domestic quantities of fresh HEU dedicated to naval propul-
sion;. 
 
 national estimates of future naval HEU needs; 
 
 fresh naval fuel, if any, withdrawn from military stockpiles and put 
under international control. ([P7], 21). 
 
This approach would allow for the provision of information on the total 
quantities of HEU dedicated to naval propulsion, while protecting any de-
tailed and possibly sensitive information regarding the fuel and reactor ope-
rations.  
Due to the large uncertainties in the current quantities of stocks of fissile 
material, comprehensive initial declarations are particularly important. States 
may also be willing to declare quantities of spent naval fuel generated 
through naval propulsion, or possibly their naval HEU production history. If 
so, this could allow for comparisons of stocks of fresh and spent fuel, to sub-
stantiate declarations.  
Early declarations, even those of a very general nature, could build confi-
dence as well as encouraging governments to improve internal accounting 
systems (Fetter 2003, 150). Confidence in the declarations given could be 
further strengthened through non-intrusive verification throughout the naval 
fuel cycle ([P7], 20).154 This aspect is further explored in the following. 
4.3.3.2 Non-Intrusive Naval Fuel Verification 
From the state perspective, acceptability, in the sense of what is tolerable to 
relevant domestic security environments, becomes the key issue. To the ex-
tent that any activities at all are to be performed on sensitive fissile material, 
this is therefore likely to be done in a non-adversarial, non-intrusive manner, 
using appropriate equipment and measurement procedures. As seen in Sec-
tion 4.3.2, all interested parties also need to have a certain level of “owner-
ship” in the (new) practical arms control process and activities.155  
Once verification is deemed acceptable, the level of monitoring may rise 
with increased experiences and trust (Hafemeister 2003, 110). Experience 
has shown that the likelihood that an arms control technology will be accep-
ted increases if the following criteria are taken into consideration (Gosnell 
2000, 1–2): 
 
 measurements cannot reveal classified information; 
 
 simple technology is preferable to complex technology; 
 
 familiar technology is preferable to unknown technology; 
 
                                                     
154  If states wish to establish agreed limits on stocks of fissile material, it would also be 
highly desirable to verify the accuracy and completeness of declarations (Fetter 2003, 
146). 
155  Reciprocity and increased openness with regard to the fuel practices of the US Navy may 
not only be desirable but also a prerequisite for genuine Russian openness on their naval 
fuel cycles. 
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 passive measurements are generally preferable to active interroga-
tion measurements.  
 
All measures should be as transparent as possible, hence the call for simplic-
ity and familiarity ([P7], 22). In the simplest cases, radiation emitted from 
the object of interest can be measured directly, through passive measures. 
Active measurements collect and analyse the resultant radiation after, for ex-
ample, neutron bombardment. However, such measures may be overly intru-
sive, and that would violate the chief principle of arms control verification: 
Not to reveal any classified information. Current efforts to protect classified 
information include carrying out the radiation measurements behind infor-
mation barriers, normally in combination with a set of acceptable attributes; 
and describing, to the extent possible and desirable, the objects in question. 
4.3.3.2.1 Naval Attributes, Templates, Tagging, Seals and Tags 
Limited gamma emissions, a low neutron background and ubiquitous ura-
nium presence in all background radiation, masking weak signals, and the 
preference for passive measurement techniques – all these challenge the 
identification of appropriate HEU verification techniques ([P7], 21).156 Self-
shielding of fuel assemblies could further complicate the detection and 
measurements of gamma rays.157  
However, operational schemes for international non-intrusive HEU veri-
fication have already been put in place (see e.g. Bieniawski et al. 2000; Ucan 
2000).158 A set of similar non-intrusive verification measures may be intro-
duced on the sensitive naval fuel. Possible measures include naval fuel at-
tributes, naval fuel templates, naval fuel tagging, and tags and seals on con-
tainers for fresh naval fuel transports.  
To protect classified information and to meet the criteria for acceptability 
for practical arms control measures, all measurements should be performed 
externally, on the fresh-fuel transportation containers, not directly on the 
fuel. For gamma detection, the signature radiation must therefore be suffi-
ciently penetrating to escape through both the fuel cladding and the container 
wall. Table 4.7 summarizes the pros and cons of the possible measures. 
Various naval attributes (like isotopic ratio, threshold mass, possibly ura-
nium metal, and contaminants) may be identified with a set of passive 
gamma-spectroscopy techniques. This, however, will depend on stringent 
uses of information barriers, as the measurements may be overly intrusive 
([P7], 23).159 Moreover, if the attribute approach is chosen for non-intrusive 
                                                     
156  Generally, HEU measurements are likely to be more challenging than measurements on 
weapons-grade plutonium. Naval fuel with lower enrichment levels is, however, likely to 
be more detectable than HEU emanating from weapons, due to the higher presence of the 
isotope U-238, with more penetrating gamma rays. 
157  Similarly, calculations of organ doses from external gamma radiation must take into ac-
count the shielding effect of the body (Stranden 1979, 926). 
158  Of particular interest is the US–Russian HEU deal. According to the 1995 HEU “Mega-
tons to Megawatt” deal, 500 tons of Russian highly enriched uranium will be down-
blended and used in commercial US power-reactors. Transparency and non-intrusive veri-
fication are a prerequisite for successful implementation.  
159  To protect sensitive information, an automated system could here be used to measure the 
attributes and produce a simple “yes” or “no” to the question “Does the object display the 
agreed set of attributes?” (Fetter 2003, 147). An attribute measurement system with the 
successful use of information barriers was used on classified nuclear material and shown 
to a Russian audience by US scientists in August 2000. See Avens 2001, 15. 
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verification, all parties involved should devise the naval fuel attributes 
jointly, together with proper measurement and inspection procedures, which 
will have to be negotiated and formalized. 
 
Table 4.7: Different non-intrusive verification techniques for naval fuel 
 
 Pros Cons Possibly in 
combination 
with 
Remarks 
Attributes  Passive meas-
urements; fairly 
well-known con-
cept  
 
 
May be too intru-
sive. A set of meas-
urable attributes is 
needed to gain con-
fidence. Hard to 
measure HEU di-
rectly 
Tagging: pres-
ence of high-
energy isotopes a 
distinct attribute 
Relies on infor-
mation barriers 
and high-
resolution 
gamma-ray spec-
troscopy 
Templates Passive meas-
urements 
 
No agreed values 
for measured 
characteristics  
 
Fairly robust and 
easily operated 
system, once 
installed 
  
A wide variation of 
fuel enrichment 
levels and fuel 
shapes may require 
multiple sets of 
templates  
 
The need for au-
thentication re-
quires additional 
schemes for protec-
tion of equipment 
during storage  
Tagging: pres-
ence of high-
energy isotopes 
eases the identi-
fication and 
comparisons  
Relies on infor-
mation barriers 
and high-
resolution 
gamma-ray spec-
troscopy 
U-232  
Tagging  
 
Unique U-235 
identifier  
 
 
Needs to be intro-
duced in HEU sam-
ple  
 
Resulting and 
highly penetrating 
gamma ray not 
unique to U-232  
Templates and 
attributes  
Isotope does not 
occur naturally.  
Traces will be 
found in all re-
processed ura-
nium fuel.  
Tags and  
Seals  
Fairly easy to 
implement, no 
need for informa-
tion barriers  
May provide a false 
sense of security; 
heavily dependent 
on procedural solu-
tions and sur-
rounding hostility 
  
All the above More a supple-
ment than a 
stand-alone ele-
ment.  
 
(From [P7], 24)  
 
Another approach could be to perform and compare measurements on naval 
fuel with known data for reference items. Here output data from the gamma 
spectroscopy is measured up to that of a set of naval fuel templates. The 
wide range of enrichment levels and different fuel designs may, however, 
require a disproportionately huge number of fuel templates. This is likely to 
complicate measurements, and, as with the attribute approach, a trusted in-
formation barrier is required for the comparisons ([P7], 24).   
Tracking the fresh fuel by means of chemical tags – e.g. fuel contami-
nants with strong radiation signatures – is another option, either by adding 
isotopes or by using contaminants already present. A prime candidate in this 
regard is the isotope U-232. The 2614-keV gamma rays associated with de-
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cay of this isotope are very penetrating because its attenuation is near mini-
mum at this energy (Lemley et al. 1999, 2). The isotope is a reliable U-235 
indicator.160 However, the fact that the most penetrating gamma radiation is 
not unique to the isotope U-232 complicates measurement set-ups. Its pres-
ence alone may not mean that the uranium is highly enriched. More elabo-
rate, yet practically feasible, measurement schemes with parallel detection of 
different isotopes with different gamma ray energies are hence needed for 
confirmatory verification of shielded HEU (Gosnell 2000, 5). 
Tamper-indicating devices like seals and tags on naval fuel transport con-
tainers may also support verification and control of fresh naval fuel. These 
may ensure a literally closed fresh naval fuel cycle, from the point when the 
transport container leaves the naval fuel production facilities, and to its des-
tination in a naval reactor.161 The effectiveness of a tags-and-seal regime, 
however, will depend upon the appurtenant inspectoral procedures and the 
degree of surrounding hostility (Johnston 2001).162  
To optimize non-intrusive verification of naval fuel, more R&D and in-
creased information-sharing are needed in several areas ([P7], 25).163 Prob-
lems in the practical implementation of the proposed non-intrusive verifica-
tion schemes should also be anticipated ([P7], 25). There are several “real-
world constraints” to overcome. These include, apart from the obvious issues 
of classification and sensitivity, the possible impact on operational activities 
at the naval bases and the need for new working procedures.  
4.3.4 Summary Answer to Principal Research Question [Q3] 
 
[Q3]: “Within legitimate security constraints, what kinds of measures could be 
put in place to enhance the transparency and non-intrusive verification of stocks 
of sensitive fissile material?” 
 
For practical arms control measures, a cooperative approach, where all par-
ties involved share common goals and intentions, in a non-adversarial set-
                                                     
160  During the enrichment process, the U-232 is preferentially swept into the light isotope 
fraction that becomes HEU, and minuscule amounts get into the depleted uranium. There-
fore, the presence of U-232 in a uranium sample is consistent with that uranium being U-
235. But unfortunately, the most distinctive gamma emission associated with its decay se-
ries is not unique. U-232 and Th-232 have a common daughter (Th-228), and their decay 
schemes are identical from that point on. Consequently, thorium could be placed in the 
container in sufficient quantities to spoof verification measurements.  
161  This would require validation of the integrity of the tags and seals at designated check-
points throughout the fuel transport cycle. Once the fuel is introduced into the naval reac-
tors, tracking could end as the radiation levels will make the fuel self-protective after the 
first chain reactions have been initiated in the submarine or icebreaker reactor cores. Any 
attempt then to divert the material for nuclear explosive purposes would then not only be 
very difficult, but highly dangerous as well. 
162 A tamper-indicating system on fresh naval fuel transportation containers is fairly easy to 
piece together, at least in theory. In practice, however, the limitations and fallibility of 
tamper detection tags and seals should be taken into account when designing the systems. 
See Johnston 2001. 
163  To avoid spoofing, or suspicion of spoofing, measurement procedures and techniques 
should be developed carefully and jointly by all interested parties. This is likely to require 
more information on fresh Russian naval fuel is required in order to determine the best at-
tributes and tags for fuel identification and control. More information is, moreover, 
needed on the transportation containers used for fresh naval fuel, to permit best possible 
external gamma-ray attenuation estimates and optimum uses of passive detectors in com-
bination with information barriers. 
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ting, has given the best results by far. What different actors might lose in 
terms of insight through formal inspections they are likely to gain through a 
voluntary and informal flow of information. This, however, would require an 
appreciation of the benefits associated with transparency, and an understand-
ing of the disadvantages associated with continued secrecy.  
After a decade of cooperation, less than half of the proliferation-attractive 
material in Russia has been secured with international assistance. This lack 
of progress maintains the risk of diversion and, accordingly, raises the threat 
of nuclear terrorism. The HEU stocks are managed with very little of the 
transparency needed to build confidence that they are safe and secure, or to 
provide the foundation for deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in 
nuclear arms. To improve nuclear security, options for increased transpar-
ency and non-intrusive verification of proliferation-attractive material should 
be further explored. 
Declarations of quantities of HEU destined for naval propulsion could be 
a starting point for increased transparency and hence more credible and ac-
curate estimates of naval HEU stocks, consumption, and future needs. Confi-
dence in such declarations could later be substantiated through non-intrusive 
verification. A set of fairly simple and technically available non-intrusive 
verification measures for naval fuel cycles is available without compromis-
ing national security needs and legislation. Most promising appears to be the 
attribute approach, possibly coupled with naval fuel tagging (U-232).  
If implemented, such measures could raise confidence that naval fuel is 
not being diverted for the purpose of producing nuclear explosives. It could, 
moreover, help establish an international transparency norm for naval fuel 
cycles and other stocks of sensitive fissile material, and hence to reduce the 
threat of nuclear terrorism. 

Chapter 5: Conclusion and  
Implications 
In three sections, this concluding chapter discusses implications of the re-
search findings for nuclear terrorism prevention, nuclear husbandry, and nu-
clear terrorism risk assessments. The direct repercussions for countermea-
sures against nuclear terrorism are presented, and a set of consequential rec-
ommendations for practical nuclear arms control are offered. The chapter 
ends with some considerations on nuclear terrorism risk analysis and model 
development.  
5.1 Nuclear Terrorism Prevention 
 
If, as Falkenrath argues (Section 3.1), nuclear terrorism is to be put in the 
category of first-order national security challenges, this raises serious ques-
tions about what can and should be done about the threat of nuclear terror-
ism. Reducing vulnerability by protecting particular or possible targets is 
neither prudent nor desirable.  
Yet, as Dhanapala stresses (Section 3.1) a purely reactive posture is 
equally unsatisfactory. In the fight against nuclear terrorism, governments 
could hence chose measures to make the threat less prominent; they could 
create operational capabilities that might give them a better chance of detect-
ing and defeating plots in the making; or they could put in place structures to 
minimize the consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack.   
Terrorism countermeasures have traditionally included political govern-
ance, socio-economic measures, communications and educational efforts, 
military interventions, judicial and legal measures, and law-enforcement and 
intelligence activity (Schmid 2003a, 22–27).164 
In the USA, measures against terrorism have been put together under the 
rubric of “Homeland Security”, whose strategic objectives (in order of prior-
ity) are to: Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce US vul-
nerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur (United States Office of Homeland Security 2002, vii). Such 
measures are all likely to play a role, small or large, in fighting future acts of 
terrorism. However, their use, efficiency and costs will differ significantly. 
The respective countermeasures must be scrutinized and prioritised accord-
ingly.  
Different countermeasures against nuclear terrorism can be viewed as dif-
ferent lines of defence. The first line of defence will then be security meas-
                                                     
164  To identify and classify preventive and counter-terrorist measures, the Terrorism Preven-
tion Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has developed a set of eight 
categories from a “Toolbox of Measures to Prevent and Suppress Terrorism”. A detailed 
summary description of these may be found in Schmid 2003a, 22–27. 
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ures installed at facilities containing fissile material, in order to prevent 
unlawful diversion. In March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors endorsed 
an action plan designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of ter-
rorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material. In approving the 
plan, the Board recognized that the first line of defence against nuclear ter-
rorism was the strong physical protection of nuclear facilities and material 
(the International Atomic Energy Agency 2002a).165  
The second line of defence could be border controls, detection systems at 
busy traffic junctures, and intelligence and public surveillance. Nuclear ter-
rorism emergency preparedness measures and response (see Appendix VII, 
Section A.7.7) to mitigate effects of any attacks may be viewed as the third 
line of defence.  
Now, the risk of nuclear terrorism would be drastically reduced if the 
perpetrators were unable to smuggle the nuclear explosive into the target 
country due to a rigorous second line of defence. The probability of a suc-
cessful interception would depend on the level and sophistication of the 
(technical) border control and terrorists’ own skills.166 However, once the 
fissile material leaves the facility of origin, all subsequent control and coun-
termeasures become secondary.  
Not only will the number of locations, means of transportation and per-
sons to control increase dramatically: Finding the infamous needle in the 
haystack, in this case unirradiated fissile material, may be extremely hard, as 
the radiation signatures of such material are weak and the quantities needed 
for a workable nuclear device are limited. In reality, efforts to detect and in-
terdict nuclear smugglers are extremely unlikely to reduce the likelihood 
anywhere close to zero (Allison 1995, 69). The probability of an undetected 
transfer could be high. 
Even heightened vigilance and high-tech forensics are not enough to de-
ter all would-be nuclear smugglers (Vogel 2002, 952). Current domestic cap-
abilities to quickly determine who exploded a nuclear device and where the 
fissile material originated from are modest (Board 2004, 1w). Due to its po-
tentially dissuading effects, as perpetrators may face swift identification and 
retaliation, calls have been made for launching new US programs of so-
called nuclear attribution or post-event forensics (Committee on Science and 
Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2002, 60). Officials hope that if ter-
rorists know that a bomb can be traced, they will be less likely to use one. 
However, as seen in Section 2.1, terrorists are not easily deterred. 
                                                     
165  The plan covers eight areas: physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; 
detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other ra-
dioactive material; strengthening of state systems for nuclear material accountancy and 
control; security of radioactive sources; the assessment of safety- and security-related vul-
nerabilities at nuclear facilities; response to malicious acts or threats thereof; the adher-
ence to international agreements and guidelines; and enhancement of programme coordi-
nation and information management for matters relating to nuclear security (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 2002a).  
166  Potential terrorists may try to conceal their explosive devices. In October 2003, recipes 
for an “invincible” bomb, i.e. a bomb that could pass through airport security and x-raying 
undetected, were revealed (NTB 2003, 6). The use of conducting fluids instead of electri-
cal cords for electric transfers was one of the features of such a device. 
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Furthermore, public surveillance, intelligence, and sting operations have 
other inherent limitations and uncertainties, making detection less likely.167 
With an emphasis on the second layer of defence, tighter societal control 
may result, and fundamental civil liberties could be at risk. US citizens can 
now be locked up for merely asserting that they are part of a terrorist plot.168 
The term “enemy combatants” has been introduced into the civilian sphere to 
detain perceived suspects without charges, keep them in secret and hold 
them incommunicado, denying them counsel (New York Times 2003). In the 
aftermath of a nuclear terrorist attack, basic human rights may be further 
compromised to manage the chaos and to track down the perpetrators. 
From a medical point of view, interventions after a nuclear terrorist blast 
could provide of very limited remedy. The remedial effects of even a sturdy 
third layer of nuclear terrorism preparedness and emergency response is 
likely to be correspondingly low. While chemical and biological agents at 
least offer some opportunities for protection and medical remedy, there is 
very little defence against the pressure, heat and radiation from a nuclear 
detonation (Maerli 2003a).  
Still, some analysts, most notably from the USA, maintain that civilian 
defences against nuclear terrorist attacks are feasible, and that the population 
should prepare on a daily basis (see e.g. Couch 2003). Structural chaos and 
breakdown in logistics and medical capacities will further limit the effects of 
any post-event prophylaxis. The possibilities for meaningful mitigation 
would be very minor. Accordingly, efforts to thwart nuclear terrorism should 
be aimed entirely at prevention (Levi 2003, 4). 
Furthermore, a key factor for decisions about nuclear terrorism risk re-
duction is that the nature of the terrorist threat and the targets, weapons, and 
means of delivery will change over time, often in response to successful 
countermeasures. This dynamic relationship makes countermeasures focus-
ing on the later steps in the nuclear terrorist chain, i.e. the second and third 
defensive lines, a particularly daring endeavour. Terrorists will adapt to the 
defences in place and seek the weakest spots known (Committee on Science 
and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 36).  
The closer that nuclear terrorists are to succeeding, the more arbitrary and 
uncertain any countermeasures put in place seem to become. Law-enforce-
ment officers and others may therefore fight in vain, and against the clock, 
the further up potential terrorists are on the ladder of nuclear terrorism 
havoc. 
From the assessment of the various steps on the nuclear terrorism path-
way (see Section 4.1.2), it is clear that that the most effective countermea-
sures are those that focus on the early steps. Denying terrorists access to fis-
sile material would disrupt any further nuclear terrorism plans. It would ef-
                                                     
167  In the words of Stephen Lander, former director of M15, the British Secret Service, “In-
telligence is about secret information others want to keep secret. 100% success is never 
achieved” (quoted in Hutchinson 2003, 196). 
168  The case of Jose Padilla is indicative. Padilla is a US citizen who was taken into custody 
in Chicago in May 2002, after returning from Pakistan. He is suspected of being part of a 
“dirty bomb” plot by al-Qaeda, but as of early 2004, the US government had not pressed 
any charges against him (Koch 2004, 59). The US government insists that military-style 
rules like the enemy combatant doctrine now apply to US citizens, even on US soil, be-
cause al-Qaeda has “made the battlefield the United States” (New York Times 2003). A 
principal decision on the issue by the US Supreme Court is expected spring 2004. 
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fectively reduce to zero the probability of nuclear terrorism, independently 
of other technical capabilities and competence (associated with subsequent 
steps) that the terrorists might have. As such, preventing diversion of nuclear 
weapons material (step 3) represents the nuclear terrorism chokepoint: This 
is the step in the pathway to nuclear terrorist capabilities that can most di-
rectly and reliably be stopped (Bunn et al. 2003a, 32; Nunn 2003, 2).  
Consequently, the prevention of nuclear terrorism must start abroad, 
through optimum nuclear husbandry.  
5.2 Nuclear Husbandry  
 
For a long time, there were two impediments to would-be nuclear prolifera-
tors; the acquisition of fissile material, and the technical know-how for 
building a nuclear device. Today, none of these should be regarded suffi-
cient. Nuclear explosive technology is no longer a secret shared by a few and 
the construction of a crude nuclear explosive does not represent insurmount-
able difficulties for non-state actors.  
The by far the most efficient way of reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism 
is to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear material by controlling the material at 
its sources. This can best be done by establishing stringent domestic and in-
ternational norms of protection, control and accounting.  
Within the legitimate security constraints of states, the following counter-
measures could be considered against the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
 
 Accelerate, unblock, and upgrade fissile material security program-
mes. A decade after the instigation of international security up-
grades, most proliferation attractive and sensitive fissile material in 
Russia has not been dealt with. While unprecedented work has been 
carried out, much remains to be done to accelerate, unblock, and up-
grade the fissile material security programmes to reduce the nuclear 
threat legacy of the Cold War.169 
 
 Expand funding for fissile material security. As the nuclear security 
activities are accelerated and expanded, the burden should be shared 
by more than one donor (i.e. the USA). Specifically, Europe should 
engage more vigorously in the work, possibly using as a platform the 
                                                     
169  In January 2001, a bipartisan panel mandated by the US Secretary of Energy to assess the 
security of Russia’s nuclear material concluded that “the most urgent unmet national secu-
rity threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or 
weapons useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation 
states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home” (Baker and Cutler 
2000, 25). Among the key recommendations of the panel were a tripling of current fund-
ing and establishing of a strategic plan to secure and /or neutralize in the next eight to ten 
years all nuclear-weapons-useable material located in Russia. Top-level agreements, 
moreover, should be reached with the Russian Federation on acceptable measures for 
transparency and access. For the 2002 fiscal year, however, the US Congress approved 
only a small fraction of the funds the panel deemed necessary to secure the material. The 
Bush Administration initially rebuffed attempts to provide more funding (International 
Herald Tribune 2001, 8). 
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G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materi-
als of Mass Destruction.170 
 
 Improve nuclear transparency and accountability. Nuclear program-
mes and stockpiles remain shrouded in secrecy. This is hardly the 
best way to ensure responsible nuclear husbandry and international 
recognition of the security challenges. Nuclear weapon-state declar-
ations and data exchanges on national nuclear material stockpiles 
should be stimulated, as should non-intrusive verification of fissile 
material. 
 
 Establish nuclear stockpile inventories. Proper accountability is cru-
cial to for nuclear security. Current uncertainties in fissile material 
holdings can only exacerbate the nuclear terrorist threat. An overall 
Russian stockpile inventory exercise should be launched, sponsored 
if necessary by international donors.171  
 
 Improve and implement non-intrusive HEU verification. To meet in-
ternational and domestic non-proliferation and disarmament de-
mands, technical communities are now examining a variety of non-
intrusive verification measurements on nuclear items with sensitive 
or classified properties. Important progress has been made on joint 
plutonium verification. Similar efforts should be made for verifica-
tion schemes for highly enriched uranium.  
 
 Assess ongoing nuclear security programmes and approaches. More 
than a decade of cooperation in international nuclear security offers 
a cornucopia of experiences. These should be assessed and best 
practices identified. Particularly successful programmes, like the 
joint naval security upgrades, could provide important inputs for 
fruitful working approaches and strategies in other ongoing and fu-
ture cooperative nuclear security programmes.  
 
 Clarify nuclear security concepts. Optimum cooperation in interna-
tional nuclear security will rest upon a clear, concise, and joint un-
derstanding of the means applied, the obstacles to overcome and the 
adversaries to defeat. Today, confusion prevails when it comes to the 
applicability of the range of practical nuclear husbandry activities. 
Consequently, commonly applied concepts in nuclear security 
should be regularly reviewed and clarified, possibly through joint in-
ternational exercises and workshops.  
 
                                                     
170  In June 2002, the G–8 countries committed themselves to raising up to $20 billion over 
the next ten years for specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address issues of 
non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety. Among the priority 
concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned 
nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former 
weapons scientists. For more on this, consult www. sgpproject.org (last accessed Dec. 14, 
2003). 
171  Again, the G–8 Global Partnership may serve as a platform.  
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 Establish and implement mandatory standards of physical protection 
of fissile material and nuclear installations. While safeguards aims 
at deterring state nuclear proliferation, physical protection is the pri-
mary barrier against potential nuclear terrorists. Yet, despite recent 
updating, the international standards for physical protection are non-
mandatory and probably too weak to meet contemporary nuclear ter-
rorist threats.172   
 
 Expand physical protection information-sharing and international 
peer-reviews. Domestic standards and practices for physical protec-
tion differ widely. While sensitive information is protected, physical 
security experiences and best practices should be shared in interna-
tional fora, to raise the general level and norms of nuclear secu-
rity.173 
 
 Expedite international efforts to put material declared excess to na-
tional needs under international (IAEA) control. Both the USA and 
Russia participate in the Trilateral Initiative, whereby stocks of fis-
sile material in excess to national needs are put under international 
control. So far, however, only very small quantities have been put 
under IAEA control. Nuclear-weapon states should review current 
stockpile inventories, with a view to increasing excess declarations.  
 
 Make all nuclear arms reductions truly irreversible. The principle of 
irreversibility, i.e. that material and weapons taken out from the ar-
senals of nuclear-weapon states should be irrevocably rendered un-
useable for the purposes of nuclear explosives, is essential for reduc-
ing the threat of nuclear terrorism. If destruction of the fissile mate-
rial is not an option, deals should be struck for international control 
and/or irrevocable disposal of fissile material.174  
 
 Commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. End-
ing the production of weapons-useable material would create an up-
per boundary to the number of nuclear explosives possibly produced 
by states or terrorists. A fissile material cut-off treaty – covering all 
fissile material, including naval HEU – is a prerequisite for genuine 
stockpile reductions and, hence, reduced threat of nuclear terrorism.  
 
The challenges posed by nuclear terrorism are substantial and require both 
immediate and sustained efforts by national governments and international 
organizations (Potter 2003, 5). Each of the suggested measures may not 
alone prevent future acts of nuclear terrorism. However, they are likely to be 
mutually self-reinforcing and eventually sufficient to establish the norms and 
                                                     
172  See Section A.7.5, Appendix VII, for more on this.  
173  For instance, the IAEA initiative to organize country-wise physical protection peer re-
views, International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), should be expanded. 
174  The latest strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty, the Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (SORT), does not include provisions for destruction or protection of nuclear war-
heads or fissile material. As such, it offers very little toward reducing the nuclear terrorist 
threat.  
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standards needed to avoid further proliferation of fissile material, to states 
and to non-state actors, and thus to prevent nuclear terrorism.  
5.3 Nuclear Terrorism Risk Analysis 
 
Bunn et al. present a useful model for the steps towards nuclear terrorist vio-
lence. It allows for a stepwise assessment of terrorist intentions and terrorist 
capabilities, and covers both the ideological and operational aspects of ter-
rorism. Accordingly, the model has merits as a useful means for understand-
ing the dynamics and the different elements of the terrorist threat. Moreover, 
it represents a valuable tool for evaluating and prioritizing various counter-
measures for the steps throughout the nuclear terrorist chain. There may, 
however, be room for improvements.  
The model is strictly linear and one-dimensional. Each of the steps relies 
(solely) on the preceding one. It does not take into consideration that terror-
ists’ possible nuclear ambitions could develop as a combination of intentions 
and technical opportunities. For instance, it seems likely that the quest of the 
Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo for nuclear explosives was driven by opportu-
nities rather than a carefully crafted plan (see Section 4.1.1.2). Ability may 
govern, and perhaps enhance, motivations. For some groups, possession of 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear means will likely lead to the 
attempted use of these (Center for Counterproliferation Research 2002, 6). 
This dynamic is not reflected in the current linearity of the model.175 
Nor can one rule out situations where (sudden) technical capabilities to 
perform acts of nuclear terrorism may in fact reduce the motivational aspects 
of a group. Members of a terrorist group could have second thoughts after 
realizing the real ramifications of their planned act(s); group psychology 
rather than individual psychology appears to be the primary determinant of 
terrorist behaviour (Post 2000, 273). Terrorists may follow their own ration-
alities based on extremist ideologies or particular terrorist logics, but they 
are not irrational (Bjørgo 2003, 234).176 The group majority may hence over-
ride any individual nuclear ambitions. 
Distinguishing sharply between motivational and technical aspects may 
be a useful analytical move, as it would separate and clarify the various fac-
ets of nuclear terrorism. However, such a strict intentional/capability-based 
dichotomy may also provide a too narrow scope for evaluation. Motivations, 
as well as technical nuclear terrorist capabilities, may change along the way. 
An admittedly more complex but more accurate model would be two-dimen-
sional, as presented in Figure 5.1.177  
                                                     
175  This dynamic relationship, moreover, provides an extra incentive for limiting technical 
nuclear capabilities of terrorists.  
176  There is no common personality profile that characterizes most terrorists, who appear to 
be relatively normal individuals otherwise (Bjørgo 2003, 234). 
177  The author of this thesis owes this point to Dr. Jon B. Reitan and Dr. Steinar Høibraaten.  
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Figure 5.1: Nuclear terrorist threat as a continuous function of motivations 
and capability  
 
Here, rather than a linear model, the nuclear terrorist threat is (continuously) 
viewed as a product of both intentions and capability, to provide the best and 
most comprehensive threat picture possible at all times. Again, however, it 
should be observed that, in the absence of motivations or perpetrators with 
nil technical capability, the risk threat of nuclear terrorism would be zero. 
The Bunn model has other potentials for improvements as well. For in-
stance, the second step of the model (“Decide to escalate to the nuclear level 
of violence”), seems to assume with some certainty that the group intends to 
use the nuclear explosive device(s) they are pursuing. Thus, possible nuclear 
blackmailing is effectively excluded from the considerations of the model. 
This is unfortunate and inaccurate, as even credible nuclear threats should be 
regarded as nuclear terrorism (see Section 1.4.1). Plausible hoaxes may war-
rant proper governmental responses, and the psychological and societal reac-
tions may be strong.  
Furthermore, possible perpetrators may circumvent some of the technical 
steps in the nuclear terrorist path. For instance, terrorists may acquire the 
fissile material directly themselves, without any middlemen or sellers. Or 
they could construct the nuclear explosive inside the target country, or even 
at location, to limit transportation and the number of border-crossings. In 
either case, one or more steps may be bypassed. Countermeasures focusing 
(solely) on the(se) step(s) could be in vain. 
In sum, the developments and dynamics possibly leading up to nuclear 
terrorism could be more complex and interrelated than described by the ini-
tial linear model. Accordingly, the model should be expanded to reflect this 
complexity and allow for more holistic and comprehensive studies of a (ge-
neric) threat. 
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Chapter 6: Some Reflections on  
Research Findings 
To further the overall scientific and political discourse on reducing the risk 
of nuclear terrorism, this chapter aims at putting the research findings and 
the implications of these findings into the current political context. As such, 
a critique of the ongoing “War on Terrorism” forms an integral part of the 
chapter. No effort will, however, be made at systematically and methodically 
assessing current political indifferences and preferences in the international 
fight against terrorism.  
6.1 Strong Perceptions and Responses 
 
Terrorism is like sand in the machinery of states (Lodgaard 2003b), prompt-
ing them to respond, sometimes jointly and irrespectively of their political or 
religious inclinations.178 In the eyes of an institutional authority, conventio-
nal terrorism primarily poses a threat to societal order, but the general public 
may perceive any terror as a real and (life) threatening danger. In the face of 
nuclear terrorism, however, the state and citizens are in a sense suddenly put 
on a par: Catastrophic events may unfold, threatening both the state and its 
population. This is a subtler aspect of nuclear explosive devices as the great 
“equalizer”.179  
Synergetic, and thus strong, societal responses are likely. By this, an ex-
tended terrorist threat may also be used to justify acts in support of political 
agendas, such as the consolidation of political power (UN General Assembly 
Security Council 2002, 6). Effectively, through rhetoric and heavy politiciza-
tion of security issues, the control institutions and instruments of civilian 
society and the powerful states become mobilized and strengthened, thereby 
giving governments new and unprecedented room for manoeuvre (Beck 
2003).180 Large-scale terrorism, or a potential thereof, may generate new 
political leverage, domestically as well as internationally. 
Following the terrorist attacks, the UN Secretary General singled out ter-
rorists’ use of nuclear, biological and chemical as the gravest threat facing 
the world (Hoyos 2001). Former US Senator Sam Nunn echoed this asser-
tion, claiming that “the most significant, clear and present danger we face is 
the threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The question 
                                                     
178  The attacks of 9/11created a wave of sympathy and a broad international coalition against 
terrorism. States like China, Russia and Iran, among many others, expressed their support 
to the United States.  
179  Traditionally, this notion has been used to explain how conventionally inferior states may 
compensate any military weaknesses with nuclear weapons. 
180  Actors standing ready to wipe out the heart of New York City with crude nuclear weapons 
is a scary, and hence mobilizing, scenario. However, without causing significant distress 
in the public, both the USA and Russia keep some 2000 nuclear warheads on high alert, 
ready to be launched within minutes at each other (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation 2002).  
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is not whether we must prepare for terrorism or for attacks with weapons of 
mass destruction. These two threats are not separate but interrelated and re-
inforcing, and if joined together, become our worst nightmare” (Nunn 2001, 
2).  
The political response to possible acts of super-terrorism has been pro-
found, particularly in the USA. This is reflected in multi-billion dollar bud-
gets to prepare for and respond to threats or incidents of terrorism, the estab-
lishment of entities like the US Department of Homeland Security,181 the US 
“Patriot Act”, and a strong push for missile defences.182 Around the globe, 
states are scrambling to counter the terrorist threat, through a range of means 
including increased public surveillance and intelligence cooperation, efforts 
to boost transparency in financial transactions, as well as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, to enhance interception of international shipments.183 
NATO has established its own response force. In academic circles, articles 
on terrorism are proliferating and terrorism journals are flourishing (Silke 
2003, 20). Most conferences and talks on international security relations now 
seem duty-bound to include some reference to terrorism.  
This situation opens extraordinary opportunities for shaping international 
politics and order. Ideally, the global terror threat and a globalized risk soci-
ety could pave the way for a new era of supranational and multinational co-
operation to counter a trans-national threat (Beck 2003, 145). However, 
these opportunities could also be ruined by domestic misapprehensions of in-
terests. In the name of the “War on Terrorism”, unilateralism could take pre-
cedence over multilateralism. The consensus-based multilateral diplomacy, 
as reflected in international treaties, may be perceived to be too puny to deal 
with contemporary threats. According to some US analysts, such “least-
common-denominator solutions” would “not only undermine effective diplo-
macy, but also and jeopardize the security of America” (Spring 2004, 4).  
Hence, the US takes responsibility and acts where others, most notably 
Europeans, are too weak (Kagan 2003). Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, head 
of the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), explains the 
foundations of the US perspective (2003, 2w):  
 
The events of that day [September 11, 2001] were galvaniz-
ing for the American people and the world. I think the sig-
nificance of that day is that it brought a collective recogni-
tion that a long-emerging threat had come to fruition, and 
was now starkly visible and at the forefront of our national 
collective consciousness”. 
                                                     
181 The US federal spending on homeland security programmes for 2003 was 28.2 billion US 
dollars. From www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/ homeland.html (last accessed 21 
March 2004).  
182  Opponents of the system maintain that it will have no effect against future acts of terror-
ism. Terrorists will not deploy intercontinental missiles (with a distinct return address), 
but rather non-conventional delivery systems like trucks or cargo containers (see e.g. Alli-
son 1995, 69). Both the USA and NATO are now gearing up to put in place operational 
systems – the USA in time for the 2004 presidential elections, and NATO through the 
launch of a feasibility study (NATO 2003).  
183  The Proliferation Security Initiative is a (US-led) coalition of states that are preparing, 
inter alia, to search planes and ships, trains and trucks carrying suspect cargo, and to seize 
weapons or missile shipments that raise proliferation concerns (Weiner 2003, 1w). 
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The terrorist attacks legitimized a redefining of the strategic culture of the 
United States (Vedby Rasmussen 2003, 15) and resulted, first, in a respon-
sive war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In March 2003, a preven-
tive184 war against Iraq was initiated, primarily to ensure that nuclear, bio-
logical, or chemical Iraqi weapons could never be deployed and used against 
the USA or its allies, by the Iraqi regime or terrorists.185 The US President 
sidestepped the UN Security Council after it became clear that international 
consensus for military intervention could not be achieved.186 The war was 
deemed necessary by the USA, but it also ignored European preferences for 
strengthening international order through effective multilateralism (Solana 
2003, 6 and 9). The effects on international security relations, international 
law and international (nuclear) non-proliferation activities may be profound 
(Cirincione 2003). 
6.2 Dramatic Proclamations 
 
The United States has, by all means available, assumed a global burden of 
fighting terrorism. The efforts are accompanied by a forceful, warlike rheto-
ric. The phrase “War on Terrorism” is more than coincidental colloquial 
speech. Nearly a slogan, it has become a strong political mobilizer, despite 
the limitations of the term. It is questionable whether we really are engaged 
in a “war” in the traditional sense.  
The trans-national character of contemporary terrorism renders doubtful 
any effective reprisal of non-state actors, as traditional military responses 
require geographically defined and confined targets (ElBaradei 2003, 1w). 
Modern terrorism is not easily deterred (Cordesman 2001, 35; Carter 2004, 
6w), and perhaps is even stimulated by absolute military superiority and ac-
tions (Urquhart 2003, 12). Hence, optimal solutions for dealing with the non-
traditional, non-state threat of nuclear terrorism are probably not to be found 
in the traditional military “tool-boxes” of states. 
 If, however, we are to believe President Bush, we are at war, as terrorists 
could “threaten civilization itself with their mad, global ambi-
tions“(Knowlton 2003, 2w). For this reason, we “should fight back” and not 
“wait for the authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruc-
tion” (Bush 2001, 1w). Moreover, we all have to act now “because we must 
lift this dark threat from our age and save generations to come.” Such heated 
                                                     
184  The Bush Administration, and others, prefers to talk about “preemptive” rather than “pre-
ventive”. There is indeed a difference between the two concepts. “Preemptive” war refers 
to a direct, immediate, specific threat that must be eliminated at once; in the words of the 
US Department of Defense manual, “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible 
evidence that an enemy attack is imminent”. By contrast, “preventive” war refers to loom-
ing, potential, future, and therefore speculative, threats (Schlesinger Jr. 2003, 24). 
185  On 16 March 2003, US Vice-President Dick Cheney appeared on the TV programme 
Meet the Press, claiming that Saddam Hussein “has been absolutely devoted to trying to 
acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons”; 
then he added “I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong” (NBC News 2003, 3w). ElBaradei 
is the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, an agency that (right-
fully and authoritatively) has stated that the Iraqi nuclear weapon programme has been 
neutralized (Bremer Maerli, 2003b). Three days after Cheney’s TV appearance, the latest 
Iraq war was initiated. 
186  In the USA, only Congress can make the final legal decision to engage in war. However, 
Congress has never blocked military action if the president so desired (Nyhamar 2003).  
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rhetoric by may stand a risk of effectively gagging open discourse, and ethi-
cally founded and justified counterarguments (Njålsson 2003, 7). 
It is, moreover, striking to observe how much Bush in his speeches em-
phasizes own victimization. The acts of terrorists are performed by “the 
shock troops of a hateful ideology” (Bush 2003, 2w). In other words, the 
“civilized” world (i.e. the world of Bush) has, involuntarily and unwittingly, 
become the subject of catastrophic dangers posed by irrational and mad ac-
tors. Such outcries could be heartfelt and genuine, showing a US president 
who is concerned about possible emerging threats. Moreover, people expect 
their president to take action and show the way. On the other hand, such dra-
matic proclamations may be detrimental.  
Firstly, they seem to indicate an inexorable certainty of catastrophic 
events that we all will be facing. Referring again to Beck (2003, 31), this 
phenomenon could be a “fabricated insecurity”, upon which a state may legi-
timize its powers and actions. In this process, it is essential to develop 
stereotypical images of the enemy that can be used to integrate and further 
enhance culturally founded prejudices. Deliberately used to further state 
military and power structures, they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. As 
such, they are meta-weapons that states may use to legitimize their actions in 
a circular manner (Beck 2003, 69). 
Secondly, endlessly referring to the collective jargon of “weapons of 
mass destruction” can only blur the respective, and highly differing, threats 
posed by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons (Maerli 2003a, 11; Mor-
rison and Tsipis 2003, 77). Mixing the disparate weapons in an “appropriate” 
cocktail of political rhetoric may prevent us from identifying the best meas-
ures to meet these different threats. 
Thirdly, publicity and a strong focus on terrorism work both ways. For 
instance, the debate on bioterrorism has been characterized by too much 
hyping of the problem, possibly resulting in misperceptions and an increase 
in biological weapon hoaxes (Chyba 2001). With the strong focus Bush has 
chosen to give the issue, he may stand a risk of inspiring opponents. Terror-
ists monitor developments in society closely, and they learn from each other. 
In part due to the natural conservatism of terrorists (Section 4.1.1), once a 
successful approach is developed, it is likely to be replicated in some kind of 
form (Center for Counterproliferation Research 2002, 7).  
Copycat effects hence prevail. A vivid illustration: Prior to the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult releasing the nerve-gas sarin in the Tokyo metro in 1995, the 
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would encounter about a dozen 
cases a year involving threats or actual attempts to acquire or use chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear material. After the Tokyo terror attack, 
this figure increased sharply. In 1997, the FBI opened 71 investigations of 
this type; in 1998, it launched a full 146 (Tucker 2000, 2).  
Fourthly, in this setting of coarse-grained vocal moral dichotomy of “us” 
and “them” and religion-charged enemy images, there is no room for consid-
erations on the causes of terrorism. The fact that the nuclear terrorist threats 
may well be a product of past (nuclear weapon) policies by “civilized” 
states, could, moreover, be suppressed. The result might be misguided fixes 
to multifaceted security challenges. 
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6.3 Flawed Postures 
 
To stem further nuclear proliferation, President G. W. Bush in a speech at 
the US National Defense University on 11 February 2004 called for streng-
thening multilateral arms control (Bush 2004). Firstly, he proposed steps for 
augmenting the existing treaty-based regime in some areas where it faces 
systemic shortcomings, most notably on export controls. Secondly, he de-
clared that efforts should be pursued for strengthening the regime where it 
faces problems that can be addressed by internal reforms. 
In addition to urging other states to expand their internal control of nu-
clear proliferation activities, Bush specifically proposed broadening the 
scope of the Proliferation Security Initiative; expanding the Nunn–Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; curtailing the sale of enrichment 
and reprocessing equipment; refusing to sell equipment for civilian nuclear 
programmes to countries that fail to observe the IAEA’s Additional Protocol 
on safeguards; establishing a new special committee under the IAEA Board 
of Governors for safeguards and verification; and finally, denying positions 
on the IAEA Board of Governors to states that are under investigation for 
illicit nuclear activities (Spring 2004, 3).  
These proposals are encouraging, not least as they recognize the impor-
tance of international cooperation and multinational mechanisms to stem 
nuclear proliferation. However, the steps may provide too limited remedies 
in the long-term fight against nuclear terrorism; by failing to deal with the 
underlying nuclear postures of leading nuclear weapon states, they do not 
address the inherent dangers of nuclear proliferation to states and non-state 
actors.  
A more comprehensive and consistent approach to prevent nuclear prolif-
eration is needed (Arms Control Association 2004; Carter 2004). As some 
countries possess nuclear explosives (or are protected by them in alliances) 
and others do not, this asymmetry breeds chronic global insecurity and fur-
ther incentives to proliferation (ElBaradei 2003, 1).  
According to the US National Security Strategy, issued in September 
2002, the United States now must “deter and defend against the threat before 
it is unleashed” (United States of America 2002a, 14). US military and civil-
ian agencies must therefore “possess the full range of operational capabilities 
to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists” (United States 
of America 2002b, 2). Building upon the December 2001, Nuclear Posture 
Review,187 some of the weapon capabilities advocated herein are nuclear 
(Butcher 2003, 66).188 
By expanding the nuclear target list, the new posture explicitly increases 
the nuclear threat to possible US adversaries (May 2003, 2w).189 Rather than 
                                                     
187  The Nuclear Posture Review is classified. Excerpts made available reveal the establishing 
of a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), de-
fences (both active and passive), and a revitalized defence infrastructure (hereunder a 
strengthening of US nuclear testing capabilities) that will provide new capabilities in a 
timely fashion to meet emerging threats. From GlobalSecurity.org 2001. 
188  May 2003, the US Senate lifted the ban on “mini-nuke” research and development. The 
time required to resume nuclear testing has been shortened to 18 months or less. On the 
possible US development of new nuclear weapons, see Ferguson and Zimmerman 2003.  
189  Pentagon has apparently produced contingency plans for preemptive use of nuclear weap-
ons against several new states (Barnaby 2003b, 3). In March 2002, the British Minister of 
Defence announced, for the first time, that also British nuclear weapons could be used 
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reflecting an updated strategy for minimizing the demand for nuclear explo-
sives and material, the current US nuclear posture adds an unknown amount 
to inducements for nuclear proliferation (du Preez 2002, 67).190 
Moreover, very limited consideration is given by the US to following up 
the practical steps on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation from the 
2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (2000 Re-
view Conference). Nothing less than the viability of the NPT could rest upon 
the successful implementation of these steps (Maerli 2004a, 6).  
Rather than fulfilling its own commitments under the NPT, the US focus 
has shifted from eliminating nuclear explosives and material, to eliminating 
certain regimes that may have them, today or in the future. In this selective 
and coercive counter-proliferation strategy some nuclear weapons are toler-
ated, even encouraged, and others are not. Universal norms and treaties then 
become a hindrance to US freedom of action, instead of serving as strategic 
levers in the battle against non-proliferation (Cirincione 2003, 2w).  
A sound and forward-looking nuclear posture should lay the groundwork 
for multilateral actions to minimize the problem of nuclear terrorism, includ-
ing adequate measures to safeguard and, as needed, dispose of the hundreds 
of tons of excess nuclear weapon material (May 2003, 4w). But President 
Bush’ 2005 budget request includes a cut in the Nunn-Lugar Program and 
the administration has not acted quickly in the past to remove bureaucratic 
barriers to this critical program (Baynard 2004, 2w; Boston Globe 2004, 
1w).  
So far, the core of the US national strategy to nuclear issues has seemed 
destined to reduce international cooperation in enforcing non-proliferation 
commitments, rather than enhance it (Perkovich 2003). The implications for 
the threat of nuclear terrorism could be harsh: Without the international non-
proliferation regime, terrorists are likely to have an easier time gaining ac-
cess to nuclear explosives (Holdum 2002).  
6.4 A Non-Victorious “War” on Nuclear Terrorism  
 
As citizens, state leaders, and analysts struggle to grasp the magnitude, range 
and implications of the threat of nuclear terrorism, the path of prevention 
that we, this far, have embarked upon seems less than optimal. In the “War 
on Terrorism” there has been a conspicuous unwillingness – or possibly an 
inability – to deal with the post-Cold War nuclear challenges.  
The vast stocks of fissile material not properly secured create a tangible 
nuclear terrorist threat. But rather than focusing on the persistent prolifera-
tion problems associated with the possible supply of existing nuclear mate-
rial, the international community, driven forward by the USA, tends empha-
                                                     
first during a military crisis, to respond to or deter biological or chemical attacks (Bremer 
Maerli 2003b, 24). 
190  The US unilateralist emphasis on flexibility has, moreover, brought the strategic arms 
control process to a halt, Bremer Maerli 2004a, 5). The Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (SORT) has no milestones or intermediate goals, no provisions for destroying fis-
sile material or delivery systems, and verification has no role in assuring compliance. 
Apart from the obligation not to have more than 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by 31 
December 2012, it is actually hard to see how SORT can be violated. 
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size the nuclear demand side of the proliferation problem, often with an 
appurtenant preference for (military) coercion.  
One can hope that terrorist groups having both nuclear intentions and ca-
pabilities would see reasons not to resort to nuclear mass destruction to 
achieve their objectives. But only an effective worldwide system of controls 
over fissile material can give assurance that such scenarios will not turn into 
reality (Narath 2002, 15).  
To non-state actors, the technical barriers to the production of crude nu-
clear explosives are not likely to be insurmountable. In the “war” on nuclear 
terrorism the security of all stocks of fissile material should, without delay, 
be considerably improved as a crucial anti-nuclear terrorist measure. Com-
prehensive fissile material inventories and stringent norms should be devel-
oped to ensure that all stocks of fissile material are completely secure and 
rendered unuseable as nuclear explosives. 
Approaches to security and accounting for nuclear material must adapt to 
changing conditions (Bunn 1999, 2). As opposed to other security threats, 
like the plethora of small arms, controlling stocks of fissile material repre-
sents a definite and thus manageable problem, once the political will is 
established. Many of the measures in need for implementation, however, call 
for reconsiderations of current postures, practices and priorities of the nu-
clear weapon states. 
The attacks of 9/11 have given a new urgency to discussions on nuclear 
transparency (Walker 2003, 15). When the US “War on Terrorism”, with all 
its ramifications, was instigated on that dreadful day, the era of the nuclear 
stockpile opacity and nuclear Alleingang of the nuclear-weapon states should 
also have ended.191 It did not. The prospects of winning a “war” on nuclear 
terrorism are correspondingly low. 
                                                     
191  Alleingang is German. It means going solo or alone, here in the context of pursuing (nar-
row) domestic goals and ideals regardless of the interests and preferences of the interna-
tional community.   

Appendixes 
Appendix I: Radiological Terrorism vs. Nuclear Terrorism192   
 
Too often, nuclear terrorism is confused with radiological terrorism, and 
vice versa. Despite some shared features, the means, mechanisms, and not 
least the consequences of the two types of terrorism are quite different.  
A.1.1 Radiological terrorism 
 
The primary means of radiological terrorism is to cause contamination and 
health risks (and thus fear) by deliberately dispersing radioactive substances. 
For this, so-called “radiological dispersal devices” (RDDs) may be applied. 
As opposed to nuclear weapons, RDDs do not involve any nuclear chain re-
action, but rather rely on the innate radioactivity released. The most specta-
cular form of RDDs could be the use of so-called “dirty bombs”. Radioactive 
material would then be wrapped around conventional explosives and deto-
nated, contaminating the surroundings. In 1995, Chechnyan rebels threat-
ened to blow up several assembled dirty bombs in Moscow,193 but the 
threats were never carried out. 
In the most rudimentary way, the spreading of the radioactive sources 
could be done by simply pouring out or dispersing the material, e.g. in 
highly trafficked (and (confined) areas. Decontamination would be difficult, 
time-consuming and expensive. Food and drinking sources could also be 
contaminated, again with huge societal and economic losses – as evidenced 
by experiences from past radiological accidents, as in Goiania in Brazil, 
1987. Other scenarios involve dispersal of radioactive substances into the 
environment or the ventilation system of a building or metro system (Stein-
hausler 2003, 784).  
Radioactive sources are widely available today through their wide range 
of uses in industry, medicine and research. However, substantial contamina-
tion would require large to very large radioactivity levels – levels difficult to 
procure and to handle. Moreover, of the millions of commercial radioactive 
sources used globally, only a small fraction pose inherently high security 
risks because of their portability, dispersibility and high level of radioactivity 
(Ferguson et al. 2003, 62). Most types of radioactive waste potentially avail-
able to terrorists have low specific activity (Committee on Science and 
Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 46) and thus generally represent 
a small risk.194 
                                                     
192  The following text builds on Bremer Maerli 2004b.  
193  In the form of armed containers with caesium.  
194  However, a “dirty bomb” could also be constructed with a nuclear explosive device con-
taining material that becomes activated by the weapon’s radiation (such as cobalt), 
thereby magnifying the radiological impact of the device (Narath 2002, 11). 
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The thousands of containers of radioactive material used in medicine, in-
dustry and research that have been lost or stolen worldwide could be used to 
make crude “dirty bombs” (United States General Accounting Office 
2003b). Such scenarios, however, would not include the immense blast, heat, 
or radiation from the triggering of a nuclear explosion. The effect could be 
more like that of chemical weapons, and contamination could probably be 
dealt with (Cordesman 2001, 20).  
Depending on the amounts of radioactivity used, dispersal effectiveness, 
and exposure time and exposure patterns, the risk of immediate fatalities 
from acts of radiological terrorism would appear generally low (Barnaby 
2003a, 5). Fatalities, if any, would probably emanate from blast effects from 
the chemical explosives rather than from radiation exposure as such (Com-
mittee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, 46). The 
main danger to health and life would lie in the long-term (stochastic) effects 
(like increased cancer risks), although the use of RDDs could create strong 
emotional effects and widespread panic (Ford 1998). 
In sum, radiological terrorism could have strong psychological and socie-
tal impacts. However, it would most probably not be catastrophic, as a suc-
cessful nuclear terrorist attack could be. 
A.1.2 Nuclear Terrorism   
 
Improvised, or crude, nuclear devices are most likely to be either on a gun-
type design or an implosion design. These are the two fundamental designs 
for nuclear fission weapons as first used in 1945 in Hiroshima and in Na-
gasaki, respectively. Vast amounts of energy are released when fissile mate-
rial, either highly enriched uranium or plutonium, fissions. The possible ef-
fects of a crude nuclear explosive are discussed in Appendix II.  
Later generations of nuclear weapons have more complicated designs, us-
ing a combination of nuclear fissions and fusions to boost the nuclear explo-
sive yield. While both the implosion type and the gun-type design may pro-
duce yields in the kiloton-range, modern high-yield nuclear weapons can 
create explosions equivalent to megatons TNT explosions (i.e. 1,000 times 
greater than the earlier devices).  
Essential for the design of any fissile explosive is swift compression of 
the nuclear material: This is necessary to create a super-critical mass and to 
avoid pre-ignitions that would cause the device to fizzle (see Appendix III). 
A super-critical mass is a mass capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reac-
tion. The fissioning of either uranium or plutonium atoms then results in 
subsequent fissions of new uranium or plutonium atoms. The critical mass 
depends upon the type of fissile material used, its density and purity, and the 
sophistication of the nuclear explosive device.195  
                                                     
195  To create a critical mass for implosion-design weapons, a sub-critical spherical mass is 
symmetrically compressed by an array of triggers packed around conventional explosives 
with fissile material in the centre. In a gun-type design, one sub-critical mass is fired onto 
another sub-critical mass of fissile material with the use of conventional explosives. The 
higher probability of spontaneous fissions and hence a higher neutron background renders 
it impossible to use plutonium in the relatively slow gun-type design. Generally, it is eas-
ier to produce improvized nuclear devices by highly enriched uranium and the gun-type 
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Terrorists with nuclear ambitions would probably go for a first-genera-
tion nuclear explosive of the types described above. The general designs are 
well known from open sources and declassified information. Terrorists may 
have lower requirements with regard to safety, security and reliability of 
their possible nuclear devices than states (see Section 4.1.2.4.2). They may, 
moreover, not be overly concerned with optimizing the yield or with making 
their nuclear devices slender enough to fit into missile warheads. Terrorist 
might deliver the weapons in densely populated areas by the use of other 
means, like trucks.  
The most formidable obstacle facing terrorists and states in trying to ac-
quire nuclear weapons is to gain access to large enough quantities of high-
quality fissile material. Stringent protection and control of highly enriched 
uranium and plutonium are thus essential. 
                                                     
design than using implosion-based plutonium weapons, but the critical mass is higher. For 
more on crude HEU devices, see Appendix III. 
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Appendix II: Possible Effects of a Crude Nuclear Explosive 
Device  
 
Nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively different from conven-
tional weapons. In addition to extensive mechanical blasts and heat from the 
fireball, nuclear explosives offer a third killer – radiation. A nuclear detona-
tion is followed by several physical processes. Direct effects in conjunction 
with the nuclear explosion will be the initial ionizing radiation, an electro-
magnetic pulse (EMP), heat radiation, blast waves, and structural collapses. 
Subsequently, there will be secondary fires and firestorms, as well as resid-
ual radiation and radioactive fallout.  
This appendix gives a basic overview of possible effects of the detonation 
of a crude nuclear explosive in a densely populated area. It is assumed that 
the device would provide a (modest) yield of one kiloton, detonated at 
ground level.196 The assessment is by no means exhaustive. It is challenging 
to determine the consequences of nuclear explosions, as a range of factors 
will govern the effects. Damage and lethality estimates will vary according 
to local conditions and are therefore attended by with fairly large uncertain-
ties. In-depth studies and refined model assessments should be initiated to 
understand the real impacts, dose levels and fallout patterns that would be 
associated with nuclear terrorist explosions in densely populated areas.  
A.2.1 Direct Effects  
 
No other destructive device can cause greater societal disruption or exact a 
larger human toll than nuclear explosives (International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War 1996, vi). The number of casualties from a nu-
clear terrorist attack could be catastrophic, albeit far less severe than in the 
case of an all-out state nuclear exchange. The consequences would depend 
on the size, the sophistication and hence the efficiency of the nuclear explo-
sive device, on the location of the target, the density of the surrounding 
population, the extent of debris dispersal, and any pre-warnings that might 
provide a possibility of escape or evacuation.   
As opposed to a nuclear airburst, the preferred military method, a terrorist 
nuclear explosion on the ground would produce heavy cratering and hence 
significant radioactive dirt and debris. Because their fireballs suck up huge 
amounts of dust and debris, ground bursts create a larger “footprint” of fall-
out downwind of the impact zone (Hutchinson 2003, 113).197 
Radiation levels are likely to be correspondingly high. The resulting base 
surge of radioactive fallout could extend over an area of several square 
                                                     
196  This seems the most likely scenario for nuclear terrorists. An airburst is likely to require 
military means of delivery, e.g. bomber plane or missiles. The yield of such a device 
would, however, be much less devastating than those of high-yield (megaton-class) stra-
tegic nuclear weapons. 
197  This effect may depend on the surrounding building structures. If the fireball is confined 
between the buildings, it will be blown up to a higher altitude than otherwise expected, 
leading to reduced local fallout, but causing broadly distributed long-term fallout (United 
States Office of Technology Assessment 1979, 46). 
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kilometres, possibly with fatal dose levels of radiation.198 Shorter exposure 
could cause significant injury (International Physicians for the Prevention of 
Nuclear War 1996; United States Office of Technology Assessment 1979). 
At the instant a typical nuclear explosive is detonated, the temperature 
shoots up to tens of millions of degrees and pressure to millions of atmos-
pheres. With a nuclear fission device, roughly half the energy goes in the 
blast, about a third in heat and the rest in radiation (Barnaby 2003b, 27). Ta-
ble A.2.1 shows the effects of a 10-kiloton nuclear device (i.e. in the range 
of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), as a function of distance.   
 
Table A.2.1: Direct effects from a 10-kiloton nuclear explosive as a function 
of distance from ground zero. 199 
 
Yield  Metal 
vaporize 
Metals melt Wood 
burns 
3rd 
degree 
burns 
5psi/ 258 
km/h winds 
3 psi/192 
km/h 
winds 
10 kt 0.38 km 0.66 km 1.3 km 1.9 km 1.3 km 1.6 km 
 
(From Cordesman 2001, 53) 
 
In the near vicinity of the detonation, metal would simply vaporize in the 
intense heat. A bit further away (approx. 650 m.), metal could melt. At 1.3 
km. from ground zero, wood could instantly catch fire and create firestorms 
(see Section A.2.2). This would contribute significantly to the physical de-
struction of structures also outside the initial blast zone (International Physi-
cians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 1996, 52). Consequently, with a 
bomb of the size of the Hiroshima bomb, heat would kill people over a larger 
area than the case with either blast or radiation (Barnaby 2003b, 27). At high 
yields, blast and thermal effects reach out to greater distances than does the 
initial radiation. At one kiloton, however, the reverse is true (United States 
Office of Technology Assessment 1979, 45). 
The British Cabinet Office has calculated the lethal effects of a primitive 
one-kiloton nuclear explosive detonated at ground level in a “typical” city. 
According to these estimates, people outdoors or near windows inside would 
be killed by thermal radiation up to 200 meters from the point of detonation 
(Barnaby 2001, 50). The initial radiation could kill people one kilometre 
away; the blast could kill people up to a distance 800 m. from the point of 
detonation. These effects would, however, be reduced by urban structures. 
Because of absorption of the radiation passing through the multiple walls of 
several buildings, the initial lethal dose of 6 Sv would extend only some 250 
m., covering an area only one-tenth that of the case of unimpeded radiation 
(United States Office of Technology Assessment 1979, 45). These estimates 
correspond fairly well with other calculations.  
                                                     
198  From a one-kiloton device and a 24-km/hour wind, radiation levels within an area of 
about 15 square km2 would be high enough to cause radiation sickness in the short term to 
those outdoors (Barnaby 2001, 50). In an area of some 400 km2, countermeasures would 
have to be put in place to avoid long-term radiation effects.  
199  psi = pounds per square inch, a measure of maximum over pressure in the blast wave. 1 
atm. = 101.325 kPa = 14.7 psi. 
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The findings of Cordesman (2001, 53, Table 4.10) indicate that the direct 
nuclear radiation from a one-kiloton device would be lethal some 700 m. 
from ground zero (see Table A.2.2).  
 
Table A.2.2: Direct effects from a one-kiloton nuclear explosive as a func-
tion of distance 
 
Nuclear radiation: Lethal dose in 
open  
0.71 km   
Blast: 50% incidence of translation 
with subsequent impact on a non-
yielding surface 
0.28 km   
Thermal: 50% incidence of 2nd 
degree burns to bare skin 
0.77 km   
Probability of serious injury from 
flying debris 
1%:0.28 km 50%: 0.22 km 99%: 0.1 km 
Probability of fatal blast injuries  1%: 0.27 km 50%: 0.19 km  
Probability of blunt blast injuries 1%: 0.38 km 50%: 0.27 km 99%:0.19 km 
 
(From Cordesman 2001, 53)  
 
Calculations show that approximately half of the structures within 300 m. of 
ground zero would collapse. Almost everybody (99%) less than 100 m. away 
from the impact can be expected to suffer serious injuries from flying debris. 
Twice that distance, half the population would receive fatal blast injuries. 
About half of those 800 m. from the impact zone would get 2nd degree burns 
to bare skin.  
A.2.2 Secondary Effects  
 
In the case of burns and radiation, it is important to distinguish between im-
mediate and subsequent, secondary injuries (International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War 1996, 51). Initial burn injuries result from the 
direct thermal radiation of the nuclear explosion. Secondary burns result 
when an individual is exposed to the fires that are ignited as a result of the 
explosion. Similarly, initial radiation doses result from direct exposure to the 
gamma rays and neutrons released in the fission process. Subsequent doses 
result from exposure to induced radioactivity, as well as from radioactive 
fallout.  
Diseases may easily break out in the aftermath of an attack. The struc-
tural damage could destroy sanitary installations and sewerage systems, 
thereby contaminating the water supply not only with radiation, but also with 
incitant bacteria and viruses. Corpses and animal cadavers could further add 
to the risk of epidemics (Statens Strålevern 1995, 8). The collapse of local 
health services is likely. In Hiroshima, 90% of all doctors and nurses were 
killed and injured, and only three of the city’s 55 hospitals were useable after 
the attack (Hutchinson 2003, 106). A simulated 12.5-kiloton detonation 
(ground-based) in the port area of New York City indicates that some 1,000 
hospital beds would be destroyed in the nuclear blast, and that 8,700 more 
would be in areas with radiation exposures high enough to cause radiation 
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sickness (Helfand et al. 2002, 357). The remaining medical facilities would 
quickly be overwhelmed, even if there were a high level of preparedness. 
In consequence, secondary effects would significantly add on to the dam-
ages. However, these effects would depend on an even wider variety of fac-
tors than would the direct effects from a nuclear terrorist attack, and uncer-
tainties in assessments would loom higher. Most assessments therefore only 
take prompt (direct) effects into consideration.200 While casualty estimates 
from Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain controversial (International Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear War 1996, 52), the Hiroshima mortality rates 
as a function of distance from the explosion may give an indication of both 
direct and secondary effect and hence the total potential lethality of a crude 
nuclear explosive (see Table A.2.3).201  
 
Table A.2.3: Hiroshima mortality rates as a function of distance from explo-
sion 
 
Distance from explosion (km) < 0.5 0.5– 1.0 1.0– 1.5 1.5– 2.0 2.0– 5.0 
First day mortality rate 90% 59% 20% 11% < 4% 
Final mortality rate 98% 90% 46% 23% < 4% 
 
(From International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 1996, 52) 
 
As seen from Table A.2.3, nine out of ten people closer than 500 m. from 
ground zero were killed immediately or the first day. During the subsequent 
days, the mortality rate increased to 98%. People more than 500 m. but less 
than one kilometre away from the impact zone had a 10% probability of sur-
viving; nearly 60% of the fatalities occurred during the day of the bombing. 
For distances between 1 and 1.5 km., more than 50% of the population survi-
ved. Further distant, 2 to 5 km. away, 5% died, primarily during the first day. 
In other words, the combined effects of a crude nuclear explosive device 
in a densely populated area are likely to be catastrophic and particularly dev-
astating within a radius of one to two kilometres from the immediate impact 
zone.  
                                                     
200  Similarly, during the Cold War, nuclear weapon communities may have failed to predict 
the magnitude of nuclear fire damages when plans for strategic warfare were drawn up 
(Eden 2004). Policy-makers may thus have been misinformed about the ferocious conse-
quences of mass fires on nuclear targets, in effect underrating the totality of the destruc-
tive impacts of nuclear uses.  
201  The Hiroshima bomb was exploded in an airburst, not on the ground. Hence, the compari-
sons are not directly applicable to a ground-based nuclear terrorist explosive. In the case 
of airburst nuclear explosions, as at Hiroshima, radiation is distributed in the upper at-
mosphere and falls out around the globe over many years. In ground-burst explosions, the 
effects would tend to be more localized, though with higher levels of radiation due to the 
cratering effects.  
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Appendix III: Crude Gun-Type Nuclear Explosive Devices  
 
Manufacturing crude nuclear explosive devices poses several technical chal-
lenges to potential perpetrators. Here, the range of obstacles will not be as-
sessed in any detail.202 Rather, this appendix will look briefly into two re-
lated key aspects in connection with constructing a gun-type device; the risk 
of pre-ignition, and system expansion once the assembly goes critical.  
The point of departure is a simple, modified South African nuclear explo-
sive device, as presented by Barnaby (1996, 7; 2003, 111). While under an 
international embargo, the apartheid regime produced six first-generation 
HEU (gun-type) devices from indigenous resources.203 The devices had a 
length of approximately 1.8 m. and a weight of slightly less than one ton 
(Horton 2000, 6; Hutchinson 2003, 129). 
In his simplified version of the South African device, Barnaby uses a gun-
type device with one hollowed-out HEU cylinder at the bottom, and a smal-
ler cylindrical HEU mass at the top that will fit into the underlying cylinder. 
The total HEU mass is 55 (40 + 15) kg., in two pieces located 34 cm. apart. 
The HEU parts are propelled together by means of conventional explosives. 
The length of the complete device is 0.5 m. The South African weapons 
were constructed without any neutron initiators (Stumpf 1995, 3w), Ba-
rnaby’s model device likewise 
A.3.1 Risk of Pre-Ignition 
 
The background neutron radiation can cause fissioning in the fissile material 
of the device and make the chain reaction start prematurely. If this happens 
the very moment the fissile material is sufficiently compressed to sustain a 
chain reaction, a “fizzle” yield, i.e. a yield significantly below the explosive 
power of the design, will result. Due to the lower neutron background, this 
represents less of a problem for HEU devices than for plutonium-based nu-
clear explosives. 
A gun-type design apparently makes it possible to eliminate the neutron 
initiator, however, at the cost at some reduction in yield (Falkenrath et al. 
1998, 163). South Africa is the only state known to have done this. The de-
signers of the South African bomb had to rely on stray neutrons in the at-
mosphere to initiate the chain reaction (Barnaby 1996, 7). The statistical na-
ture of the spontaneous initiation process could result in an initiation delay 
longer than the transit time through the target (Narath 2002, 6). 
Even when the weight and length of the device are kept down, velocities 
of a few hundred meters per second should be achievable for gun-type de-
signs (Narath 2002, 7).204 Assuming a (modest) insertion speed of 200 
m/sec, the insertion time for the Barnaby device will be: 
                                                     
202  The considerations here are of a general character. No attempts have for instance been 
made to simulate or calculate the efficiency and probable yields of the crude gun-type de-
signs discussed. 
203  These devices consisted of two uranium pieces, one shaped like a sphere with a hole in its 
middle with a second piece in the shape of a cylinder designed to fit the hole. At detona-
tion, the cylindrical piece of HEU would be propelled down a high-strength gun barrel 
into the spherical piece of HEU.  
204  Field artillery pieces generate muzzle velocities of about 1000 m/sec. 
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tins = 0.34 m / 200 m/sec = 1.7 x 10-3 sec 
 
The number of background neutrons generated during this interval equals:205 
 
Nneutron = 1.4 (/kg-sec) x 55 kg x tins = 0.13 
 
Hence, the number of spontaneous background neutrons from any of the two 
HEU masses during insertion is quite limited. The risk of pre-ignition, and of 
a “fizzle” yield, will be correspondingly low.206 
Nobel laureate Luis Alvarez (1987, 125) has emphasized the ease with 
which a nuclear explosive device can be constructed with HEU, due to the 
low neutron background: 
  
With modern grade uranium, the background neutron rate 
is so low that terrorists, if they have such material, would 
have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion 
simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other 
half. Most people seem unaware that if separated HEU is 
at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion… 
even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order 
 
Alvarez did not, however, specify what he meant by “high-yield” explosion. 
The yield will depend upon the effectiveness of the device – more specifi-
cally, on the level of system expansion once the chain reaction is initiated. 
A.3.2 System Expansion 
With regard to efficiency, it is important to keep the bomb assembly intact as 
long as possible in order, to allow for as many fission generations as possi-
ble. The second critical parameter for device is thus its inertia. 
Given the very limited neutron background (see above), one can assume 
that the uranium parts of the device have been fully assembled before the 
chain reaction is initiated. Once the chain reaction is running, the time be-
tween fissions will be: 
 
τ = λ/υ ≈ 10 –8 s 
where τ is the neutron generation time, i.e. the mean time it takes for a re-
leased neutron to create a new fission; λ is the mean free neutron path equal 
to 13 cm (Serber 1992, 12); and υ is the average neutron velocity of 1.4 x 
109 cm/s (for neutrons with an energy of 1 MeV).  
The 55-kg. HEU (90% U-235) of the Barnaby device equals a total of 
1.3x1028 uranium atoms (U-235 and U-238). Ninety-four fission genera-
                                                     
205  The neutron background rate is taken from National Academy of Sciences 1995, 45, 
assuming 100% U-235.  
206  However, the presence of even quite limited amounts of (light-element) impurities could 
increase the neutron background and hence increase the risk of a fizzle yield (Serber 
1992, 53–54). 
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tions is more than enough to produce this number of neutrons.207 The time 
needed to fission all the HEU in the Barnaby device is in theory thus: 
 
tfis = τ x 94 ≈ 1 µsec 
 
However, although Barnaby does not say so, neutron reflectors seem to be 
required for his device as outlined. For uranium enriched to 93%, the critical 
mass of a sphere is 56 kg. (Barnaby 1996, 14). The cylindrical geometry of 
the Barnaby device with 90% HEU would thus require an even higher mass 
than the 55 kg. of HEU to go critical, unless the core was surrounded by ma-
terial reflecting escaping neutrons back. This would complicate construction. 
What yield might then be expected? Fissioning of all the HEU in the Ba-
rnaby device would, again theoretically, produce a yield of 935 kilotons. 
This is because one kilogram (the consumption of a typical fission device) 
would give a yield equivalent of that of 17 kiloton of high explosives such as 
dynamite or TNT (Garwin and Charpak 2001, 59). 
But the gun-type design is inherently ineffective. In the gun-type bomb 
that destroyed Hiroshima, only 700 g out of the 60 kg. of HEU enriched to 
80% in U-235 actually fissioned. The efficiency of the device was thus as 
low as about 1.3%. Yet, it produced a yield of 13 kilotons. By comparison, 
the design yield of the South African devices was 10 to 18 kilotons (Horton 
2000, 6). Even a poorly assembled copy of these devices, with an efficiency 
of say 1%, could thus be able to produce one to two kilotons. This would be 
a devastating and unprecedented terrorist yield, representing some thou-
sandth part of the true “potential” of the HEU in Barnaby’s device. 
However, even within the microsecond it would take to fission all the 
uranium, quite significant system expansions could occur. As the energy re-
lease increases exponentially, moreover, much of the energy releases take 
place very late in the explosion. As much as 99% of the energy released 
from a crude HEU device will be released during the last five generations of 
the reaction, mainly as kinetic energy that will expand the fissile material 
and weapon assembly (Swahn 2001, 48).  
A bomb exploding within a period of about 10 nanoseconds could have 
an explosive power corresponding to the few kilograms of material moving 
at a speed of 109 cm/sec (Garwin and Charpak 2001, 48). Accordingly, 
within a microsecond the fragments may have travelled 10 cm outwards, in 
effect drastically reducing the yield, as the assembly will abruptly become 
sub-critical. Expansion of only a few centimetres will stop the reaction (Ser-
ber 1992, 11).  
Consequently, not only reflectors, but also a set of tampers seems needed 
for the Barnaby device to function close to any “design” yield.208 This is not 
an insurmountable problem, but it would further complicate construction of 
the device. 
                                                     
207  294 = 2.0 x 1028. 
208  A tamper is a massive layer of material with inertial properties that slow the expansion of 
the fissile material. Heavy material, often with good neutron-reflecting abilities, is used 
(e.g. natural uranium).  
Crude Nukes on the Loose? 
appendixes 
129 
Appendix IV: Russian Naval Fuel209 
 
Durability, compactness, shock and temperature resistance and power-output 
flexibility are all important features of naval reactors. This set of demands 
places major restrictions on the type and construction of naval nuclear fuel.  
Due to classification and sensitivity concerns, very little information has 
officially been made available on Russian naval fuel composition, holdings 
and handling. However, for any non-intrusive verification, a minimum of 
basic fuel data is needed. This appendix surveys the information available, as 
background for the case study on non-intrusive verification (Section 4.3.3.2). 
A.4.1 Naval Fuel Holdings  
 
Since 1958, the Soviet Union and Russia have constructed 249 nuclear-pow-
ered submarines, representing more than half of the submarines produced 
worldwide.210 Two thirds of these vessels were delivered to the Northern 
Fleet, the rest were destined for the Pacific Fleet. In addition to the combat 
submarines, five research and development submarines and several full-size 
land-based submarine-training facilities have been produced. Moreover, the 
eight ships of the Russian icebreaker fleet are nuclear-propelled, each with 
one or two reactors, accompanied by four (laid-up) battle cruisers and a com-
munication ship with twin reactors. Most Russian submarines are equipped 
with two reactors. The overall number of naval reactors produced by the So-
viet Union/Russia is therefore at least 480 (Maerli 2001b, 8).  
The United States and Russia have the most extensive nuclear propulsion 
programmes, representing by far the largest fleets globally, using highly en-
riched uranium (HEU) in the reactor cores.211 HEU naval requirements for 
the United States and Russia are an estimated one to two tons a year for each 
country (Feiveson 1999, 230). An estimated total of 250 to 300 tons of HEU 
have been used in US and Russian naval programmes since these were initi-
ated, constituting some 10 to 15% of the countries' overall HEU production 
(Maerli 2002a, 25). Estimates of fresh Russian naval fuel holdings range 
from 60 tons (Roston and Smigielski 2003) to 80–85 tons (Hibbs 1995, 12).  
Naval operations therefore consume a considerable quantity of highly en-
riched uranium, and naval fuel represents a significant part of the global 
HEU economy. As enrichment activities have now ceased in both countries, 
both the US and the Russian navies rely on HEU from weapon stockpiles for 
their naval propulsion programmes. This will, eventually, reduce the stocks 
of HEU, but is also likely to limit the quantities of fissile material declared 
excess to national military needs and put under international safeguards.212 
                                                     
209  The Appendix is largely based on an unpublished article (work in progress) entitled  
“Nuclear Naval Fuel in Northwest Russia: Knowns and Unknowns”, by Morten Bremer 
Maerli, Nils Boehmer and Ole Reistad.  
210  92 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 67 cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), 90 attack 
submarines (SSNs). 
211  All US and British nuclear-powered ships and submarines are fuelled with weapon-grade 
uranium, and all Russian nuclear submarines today use highly enriched uranium. France 
and China use LEU in their submarines. 
212  In fact, the US Navy proceeds in an extremely cautious manner, keeping all its fissile 
material usable for naval propulsion in military reserve. With the exception of the first ten 
tons declared excess, all the HEU that the USA has declared as excess and put under in-
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A.4.2 Naval Fuel Enrichment 
 
The need for self-sufficiency, strong power-outputs and limited reactor sizes 
may make it necessary to use highly enriched naval nuclear fuel (Gagarinski 
et al. 1996, 22). Enrichment of the pressurized water reactors (PWRs) on 
Russian submarines varies from about 5% to 21% U-235 for the first- and 
second-generation cores (Bukharin and Handler 1995, 250). Later reactor 
generations have used higher degrees of enrichment, varying from around 
20% to 90%, depending on the specific reactor design (Sukhoruchkin 1997). 
Some 24 reactors are believed to have been designed to use uranium en-
riched to 90% U-235 (Bukharin 1996, 63), hereunder liquid-cooled reactors 
and some of the icebreakers. Current Russian submarines run on fuel en-
riched to intermediate levels. 
Fuel enrichment gradients within each reactor core seem common. Start-
ing with the third-generation submarines, reactor cores may have up to three 
zones of different enrichments, with the lowest inner ring having about 21% 
enrichment and the highest outer ring being enriched to 43–45% (Bukharin 
and Handler 1995, 250). Equivalent enrichment gradients, up to 20% differ-
ence, may be found within the different icebreaker reactor cores.213 
A.4.3 Naval Fuel Composition and Casing 
 
In the early days of nuclear propulsion, as with the construction of the first 
reactor in the icebreaker Lenin, oxide fuel was used. Today, most Russian 
naval reactors probably use dispersion fuel elements (enriched uranium with 
a matrix of high heat-conductivity alloy), with thin-walled steel or zirconium 
(Zr) cladding (Papkovsky undated). According to one source, however, the 
Russian icebreaker fleet could be powered by both dispersion fuel and fuel 
rods filled with uranium-zirconium alloy fuel inside zirconium cladding 
(Handler 1995, 2). 
Zr-casings (and Zr alloys) are widely used in light-water thermal reactors 
because of the small absorption cross-section for thermal neutrons.214 How-
ever, due to the relatively low strength of Zr at temperatures between 360 to 
400 ºC, steel claddings are also used. The heat and corrosion resistance of 
steel is higher and the price lower; however, the material may be exposed to 
corrosion cracking and has a much higher cross-section for neutron absorp-
tion (Kuznetsov 1989, 36). Accordingly, higher enrichment levels of ura-
nium could be needed. Reportedly, the reactor fuel element cladding for the 
first icebreaker was made of stainless steel, whereas in the second and third 
                                                     
ternational safeguards failed to meet the specifications for use in naval fuel. Yet, the US 
Navy maintains the right to withdraw any excess material it may need from international 
safeguards (see Bunn 2000, 54 and Albright et al. 1997, 93). 
213  Personal communication with personnel at the Russian Icebreaker Fleet, February 1996. 
214  The casing of the fuel elements is designed to prevent any direct contact between the heat 
carrier and the fuel, in order to prevent radioactive leakage and corrosion. Low neutron 
absorption, strength, plasticity, creep and vibration resistance, and good thermal conducti-
vity are key casing parameters. The casing must operate under the most severe conditions 
and needs enduring strength. To reduce the neutron absorption, the casings are made as 
thin as possible. Typical thickness for casing is from 0.3 to 0.8 mm (Kuznetsov 1989, 32). 
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it was made of zirconium alloy made by an improved technology (Makharov 
2000). 
A.4.4 Naval Fuel Shape  
 
The Soviet Union and Russia developed four generations of naval pressur-
ized reactors, each generation with improved reliability, compactness and 
silence of operation. However, there are no reports to indicate substantially 
prolonged core lives even in the latest generation of submarines (Maerli 
2002a, 35). As for the U.S., various different fuel geometries and shapes 
have been applied for former Soviet, now Russian, nuclear submarine 
reactors. 
Specifics about the different fuel rod designs remain classified. Gener-
ally, an important fuel parameter is the volume-to-surface ratio; this deter-
mines the thermal stress per unit surface and, hence, the temperature of the 
casing and the fuel. Naval reactors are compact and their cores have a high 
power density.  
Most ship reactor cores have a volume of about 1 m3 and a power density 
of up to 200 MW/m3 (Maerli et al. 1998, 14). High power densities require 
efficient heat removal from the reactor core. This is achieved through the use 
of a large heat transfer surface, or in some cases by using liquid metal in-
stead of water as coolant. 
To increase the surface, plate-type, annular, x-shaped, and perforated fuel 
elements have been developed (Kuznetsov 1989, 32). A portion of more ad-
vanced or modern reactors seemingly makes use of cross-shaped fuel rods, 
either in clad or in unclad versions (Handler 1995, 2). In addition to the 
cross-shaped ones, fuel rod-types with finned casings, annular, plate type 
with longitudinal fins, perforated, and finally, curved plate types have been 
designed (Kuznetsov 1989, 32). 
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Appendix V: Thefts of Russian Highly Enriched Naval  
Uranium215   
 
 
Location Date Theft Enrichment  Perpetrators Remarks 
Andreeva 
Bay 
July 
1993 
Two fuel 
elements 
(each 
weighing 
4.5 kg.) 
36% Two sailors 
from the 
Navy’s radia-
tion protec-
tion depart-
ment 
Two more officers 
charged, but 
charges withdrawn 
due to lack of evi-
dence  
Sevmorput 
storage 
installa-
tion, Mur-
mansk  
Nove
mber 
1993 
Three 
fuel ele-
ments 
with 4.3 
kg. HEU 
approx. 20% Three officers Material recovered; 
perpetrators sen-
tenced  
Sevmash 
shipyard, 
Severod-
vinsk 
July 
1994 
Uranium 
dioxide 
3.5 kg. 
20–40% Four busi-
nessmen from 
the area, to-
gether with 
workers at the 
shipyard 
 
 
Sevmash 
shipyard, 
Severod-
vinsk 
Octo-
ber 
1994 
Fuel 
ele-
ment(s) 
Highly en-
riched 
No informa-
tion 
Arrests in Ark-
hangelsk, no prose-
cution  
Zvezdo-
chka ship-
yard, 
Severod-
vinsk 
July 
1994 
Fuel 
ele-
ment(s) 
No informa-
tion 
Employees 
hired on con-
tracts from the 
Northern Fleet 
Accused seized 
before the uranium 
had been removed 
from the shipyard  
Zvezdo-
chka ship-
yard, 
Severod-
vinsk 
Janu-
ary 
1996 
Fuel 
ele-
ment(s) 
No informa-
tion 
Employees 
hired on con-
tracts from the 
Northern Fleet 
Uranium removed 
from the shipyard; 
arrests in Severod-
vinsk 
Atomflot, 
Murmansk 
Shipping 
Company 
Au-
gust 
2003 
Fuel 
assem-
blies 
from a 
nuclear 
ice-
breaker  
Both U-235 
and U-238 
Allegedly 
Alexander 
Tyulyakov, 
Deputy Direc-
tor at Atom-
flot 
Case under inves-
tigation  
 
Table A.5.1: Registered thefts of highly enriched naval  
uranium in the Northern region  
                                                     
215  From [P6], 41. 
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Appendix VI: Naval MPC&A Upgrades in Northwest Russia216  
 
 
Site Location Type  Activity Timeframe Remarks 
Site 49  Severomorsk  
Consolidated 
Northern Fleet 
fuel storage  
Storagean-
nex217  
May 96–Sept. 
99218  
Main storage 
for Northern 
Fleet; possibly 
at capacity  
PM 63  
Belomorsk 
naval base,  
Severodvinsk  
Auxiliary 
 vessel219 
Shipboard, 
pierside 
upgrades  
1998–May 
2000220  
First ship 
upgraded; PM 
12, PM 74 
same class  
PM 12  
Olenya Bay 
naval base, 
near Mur-
mansk  
Auxiliary 
vessel  
Shipboard, 
pierside 
upgrades  
Aug. 98–Sept. 
2000     
2d 
Northern 
Fleet 
storage 
   Northern Fleet fuel storage        
Planned before 
consolidation 
at Site 49; not 
started  
Sevmash 
shipyard  Severodvinsk  
Fresh fuel 
storage at sub-
marine as-
sembly facility 
New and 
integrated 
up-
grades221  
Started 1998; 
near completion 
June 2003  
Second phase 
upgrades 2001 
Mur-
mansk 
Shipping 
Co.  
Atomflot, 
north of Mur-
mansk  
Auxiliary 
vessel Imandra 
Physical 
barriers, 
port secu-
rity  
July 96–Sept. 
99222  
Icebreaker  
upgraded by  
Norway, Swe-
den  
Mur-
mansk 
Shipping 
Co.  
Atomflot, 
north of Mur-
mansk  
Civilian nu-
clear- pro-
pelled  
 icebreakers  
Security  
upgrades 
onboard 
ships  
Work initiated 
1999223  
Funds pro-
vided by Nor-
way, Sweden 
and UK  
Navy 
bases 42 sites
224  
Nuclear 
weapon stor-
age225  
As for fresh 
fuel  
To be finalized 
by 2005  
Planned; Lo-
cations classi-
fied  
 
Table A.6.1: Status of US-supported Naval MP&A Upgrades in Northwest 
Russia. 
                                                     
216  From Morten Bremer Maerli, “U.S.–Russian Naval Security Upgrades. Lessons learned 
and the way ahead”, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2003, vol. 56, no. 4, 26 and 28. 
217  Capacity expansion, physical upgrades, computerized control and accounting (Bukharin et 
al. 2000, 60; Iourassov et al. 1998).  
218  US General Accounting Office 2001, 34. 
219  Large capacity for fresh and spent fuel, liquid radioactive waste.  
220  Wolfsthal et al. 2001, 134. 
221  Upgrades for detection, intruder delay, response, and material accounting. 
222  US General Accounting Office 2001, 34. 
223  Upgrades completed on three (Sovjetsky Soyuz, Vaigach, Yamal) ships as of summer 
2003. 
224  In Northwestern and Far East Russia, exact locations unknown. The number of warheads 
is approximately 4,000.  
225  US General Accounting Office 2001, 34. 
Morten Bremer Mærli 
appendixes  
134 
Appendix VII: Possible Study Derivatives 
 
In a nutshell, the primary intent of this study has been to assess the risk of 
nuclear terrorism and appurtenant countermeasures. In the process several 
study derivatives have emerged. These are briefly presented in the following. 
A.7.1 Improved Nuclear Non-Proliferation Efforts 
 
Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could be vital 
to peace and stability (Molnár 2003). The regime now finds itself at a critical 
juncture (Feiveson 1999; Graham 2001), and efforts to boost its long-term 
integrity should be considered (Cirincione 2003; Gottemoeller 2003).  
However, today’s sole remaining superpower sees traditional arms con-
trol as “largely the agenda of the past” (Brooks 2003, 2).226 Strong unilateral 
currents may hence run the risk of undermining the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime (Lodgaard 2003a; du Preez 2002; Cirincione 2003; 
Perkovich 2003).  
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime 
relies not only on its substance and means of verification, but also on the 
political attitude expressed by the international community (Butler 2003, 
135). Proper verification schemes may lessen the politicizing of monitoring 
issues and opposition to verification as an institutionalized tool for interna-
tional control.227  
Innovative transparency and verification schemes for fissile material like 
the ones presented in this study could provide important and timely lessons 
for bi- and multilateral efforts and arms control, in effect contributing to a 
strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
A.7.2 Improved Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction 
 
Urgent environmental and proliferation concerns converge on the Kola Pen-
insula. This northerly region has the world’s highest density of nuclear reac-
tors, many of them left inside rusting decommissioned nuclear submarines 
(Toje and Maerli, 2003). The area contains large quantities of liquid and 
solid radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. These items are partly stored 
in run-down and unsecured facilities that leak radioactivity into the sur-
roundings.  
                                                     
226  Lacking any real (global) opponents, the USA feels little need to limit its own power 
through bi- or multilateral arms control (Lodgaard, 2003a). Where for instance the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is founded upon formalized, verifiable and 
mutually committing arms control, the G.W. Bush Administration favours flexibility – as 
reflected in the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the USA 
and Russia.  
227  The political role of verification remains elusive (Krass 1985, 171; Gallagher 1999). 
Monitoring problems associated with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the ever-
pending Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty are obvious examples. Nowhere else, however, 
has the scepticism towards international inspections and verification been as evident as 
during the Iraq crisis of spring 2003. The alleged “cat- and-mouse-game” by the Iraqis 
lead to a US-headed invasion, cutting off further international monitoring. For a discus-
sion of the pre-war Iraqi nuclear programme, see Bremer Maerli 2003b. 
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In areas until recently closed to foreigners, large amounts of radioactive 
material have been left unprotected from theft and exposed to the elements. 
In the past, nuclear waste was routinely dumped into the Barents Sea – home 
to one of the most important fisheries in the world. Recent Russian plans to 
import radioactive waste and the envisioned MOX-trading, possibly along 
the Norwegian coastline, could raise the risk of accidents and mishaps.228  
For nearly a decade, Norway and other countries have been working co-
operatively with Russia to improve the situation. Important progress has 
been made and hard lessons have been learned along the way. The dialogue 
and connections that have been established, the cooperative framework that 
has been institutionalized, and today’s more nuanced understanding of the 
concerns, priorities, and practices of the different actors involved should cre-
ate a sound basis for new rounds of cooperative, concerted efforts to limit 
the persistent nuclear security and safety risks in the region (Maerli 2003f, 
166). 
However, a minimum level of reliable information is essential for the safe 
and secure handling and protection of the excessive stocks of naval fuel. As 
such, it is a prerequisite for long-term nuclear security in Northwest Rus-
sia.229 But the facts surrounding Russian nuclear fuel in many instances re-
main well-kept secrets.  
Russian authorities have been reluctant to discuss details concerning their 
naval fuel handling activities, despite persistent nuclear proliferation and 
pollution dangers and a need for openness in conjunction with concerted in-
ternational nuclear clean-up efforts in Northwest Russia (Toje and Maerli 
2003; Hoenneland and Joergensen 1999).230  
Hence, a balance needs to be struck between keeping classified and sensi-
tive information protected and at the same time providing the necessary, less 
sensitive, information to the parties involved in nuclear fuel handling activi-
ties in Russia.  
Confidence-building measures and cultural exchange provide ideal ave-
nues for improving this situation (Brende 2003, 10). Ideally, studies like this 
one could add on to the impetus of increased openness, thus fostering impro-
ved cooperative activities aimed at nuclear threat reduction.231 
                                                     
228  As part of the 2000 US–Russian plutonium disposition agreement, Russia now foresees 
MOX, based on Russian weapon plutonium, traded or leased to the European nuclear in-
dustry.  
229  As the international community now gears up to assist Russia in clean-up activities, as 
evidenced by the 20-billion pledge by the G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, there is a need for openness. On 20 May 
2003, key states signed the international agreement on Multilateral Nuclear Environmen-
tal Programme in the Russian Federation, opening up for several new projects in the 
northern region. 
230  Two years after the Kursk accident, a nuclear submarine slated for dismantling sank dur-
ing towing on 30 August 2003 outside the Murmansk fjord. Nine crewmembers drowned. 
Despite high-level promises of improved cooperation and notification practices after the 
Kursk accident, Norwegian authorities were not informed about the latest accident. Given 
the state of the nearly 200 decommissioned submarines awaiting dismantling in the re-
gion, new accidents cannot be ruled out. 
231  Problems remain. In August 2003, representatives of a high-level US–Norwegian delega-
tion were, at the last minute, denied access to a shipyard where dismantling of Russian 
nuclear submarines are to take place with foreign funding (Diggens 2003a).  
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A.7.3 Increased Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Awareness and In-
terest  
 
Ideally, nuclear terrorism risk assessments like this one could also set the 
stage for renewed nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament awareness and 
interest. For nuclear disarmament to move forward in any significant way, 
the process has to be stepwise – and a positive learning experience (Lod-
gaard 1998). Education itself, however, remains an under-utilized tool for 
promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation (Potter 2001, 5).  
A UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education con-
cludes:232 
 
There has never been a greater need for education in the 
areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, especially 
with regard to weapons of mass destruction, but also in the 
field of small arms and international terrorism. Since the 
end of the cold war, changing concepts of security and 
threat have demanded new thinking. Such new thinking will 
arise from those who are educated and trained today 
(United Nations 2002a, 1). 
 
Hence, future arms controllers need to start their training today.233 Progress 
in arms control is likely to require skilled personnel with in-depth knowledge 
of political processes as well as technical know-how. Interdisciplinarity may 
be key.  
A.7.4 Improved Transparency on Emerging Weapon Technologies  
 
A somewhat related, yet quite subtle, study aspect concerns the need to con-
trol emerging weapon technologies. For instance, the rapidly developing 
field of nano-technology could prove capable of producing new types of 
weaponry. It is still not known whether these new technologies will increase 
security or potentially add to the arsenal of bio- and techno, or even nano-
terrorism (Mnyusiwalla 2003, R11).  
The emergence of technology in the hands of secretive or irresponsible 
states could pose a major threat associated with nano-technology (Knight 
2003). Proposals have therefore been made to strengthen bioweapons and 
conventional arms control agreements in view of possible nano-technology 
weaponry (The Ecologist 2003, 41). However, such efforts are likely to be 
hampered by the current lack of international control mechanisms for the 
commercial development and use of nano-technology, and, perhaps more 
importantly, by strong state traditions of secrecy in weapons programmes.  
                                                     
232  The study was submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly at its 57th 
session on 9 October 2002. See  
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/ education/study.html (last accessed 31 October  2003). 
233  The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
in California is one important example. Attracting students from around the world, it of-
fers inter alia a Masters degree in non-proliferation studies. 
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While the schemes for increased transparency and non-intrusive verifica-
tion of sensitive fissile material investigated in this study by no means are 
applicable, some of the overarching principles and ideals may be pertinent to 
emerging technologies. 
A.7.5 Improved Legislative Framework for Nuclear Security  
 
The first line of defence against nuclear terrorism is the strong physical pro-
tection of nuclear facilities and material (International Atomic Energy 
Agency 2002a). Most countries do provide some form of physical protection 
for their nuclear material, but because there is no international standard or 
requirement for physical protection (as there is for safeguards) of civilian 
nuclear material, protection varies widely from country to country, and is 
often inadequate (Bunn and Steinhausler 2001, 2-3w).234  
Studies like this could spur the process of improving requirements and 
standards for physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Proper 
nuclear terrorist assessments could make states more inclined to work to-
gether to improve levels of physical protection globally. This seems para-
mount, not least as initiatives to strengthen international physical protection 
requirements are moving forward slowly.  
For instance, amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material to reach more comprehensively into domestic state prac-
tices, law and regulation is underway.235 However, the extension is likely to 
be modest, with no real requirement for international reporting or informa-
tion sharing, and no call for making existing physical protection standards 
mandatory.  
Current IAEA recommendations assume, moreover, that a state’s physi-
cal protection system should be based on the state’s evaluation of the threat, 
and that this should be reflected in the relevant legislation (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1999). The state should continuously review the 
threat, and evaluate the implications of any changes in that threat for the re-
quired levels and the methods of physical protection.236 
                                                     
234  For instance, a National Academy of Sciences committee has recommended that, to the 
extent possible, weapon-useable nuclear material be protected with the same high stan-
dards as intact nuclear weapons (National Academy of Sciences 1994, 31). The US gov-
ernment has later formalized this recommendation, but its implementation is still inade-
quate (Bunn 1998, 138). 
235  The current Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274 
Rev.1) obligates parties to make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of 
physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material; cooperate in the recov-
ery and protection of stolen nuclear material; make as criminal offences specified acts to 
misuse or threats to misuse nuclear material to harm the public; and prosecute or extradite 
those accused of committing such acts. After the extension, the convention will also cover 
more than just nuclear material in transit.  
236  Here, however, Norway lags behind, and no national design basis threat has been estab-
lished (Bremer Maerli et al. 2002).    
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A.7.6 Improved Nuclear Terrorism Information and Intelligence  
Gathering  
 
Existing databases on movements of illicit nuclear and radiological material 
are diverging and need to be improved and coordinated (Schmid 2003a). 
Open-source reporting of illicit trafficking in nuclear material is often of 
poor quality, incidental and random (Zaitseva and Steinhausler 2004, 1w),237 
occasionally thickening the air with unfounded rumours about imminent ter-
rorist attacks. The information presented is diluted and disturbed by a fairly 
high level of both under-reporting and over-reporting (Potter and Sokova 
2002, 116–117). Under-reporting may be due to the sensitive nature of the 
data and reluctance of officials to release data, while the inclination of the 
media to sensationalize nuclear smuggling incidents and limited journalistic 
knowledge may result in over-reporting. 
Both processes lead to incomprehensive flows of information, and a po-
tential for confusing the public at large, policy-makers, analysts, and even 
intelligence communities that extract significant quantities of their data from 
open sources. The result may be skewed analysis and possibly under- or 
over-appreciated threat assessments.238  
If the law-enforcement community is to stand a chance of disrupting nu-
clear deals in the making, it is of paramount importance to have accurate 
intelligence and underlying threat assessments. Proper threat assessment of 
nuclear terrorism and risk understanding could help to reduce the “back-
ground noise” and thus improve international and domestic nuclear terrorism 
intelligence gathering.   
A.7.7 Improved Nuclear Threat Assessment and Emergency  
Preparedness 
 
New and innovative consequence management is probably needed to ensure 
proper response to future acts of catastrophic terrorism (Hills 2003, 245–
246). Many states, among them Norway, have established responsive struc-
tures for nuclear emergencies. There may, however, be significant differ-
ences between a nuclear accident, for instance in a nuclear power reactor 
abroad, and a planned nuclear terrorist attack (Maerli, 1999, 203; Putnam 
2002). These differences should be assessed and understood.  
The scale, intensity and dynamics of large-scale terror will be different 
from traditional acts of terrorism or natural disasters. For nuclear or radio-
logical terrorism, response time, dose rates and dose patterns, as well as the 
                                                     
237  Errors include failure to differentiate nuclear weapons-usable material from other radioac-
tive material, incorrect use of physical units of activity and dose rate, and misquotation of 
isotopic characteristics and enrichment levels (Zaitseva and Steinhausler 2004, 1w). For 
useful overviewes of illicit trafficking incidents, see the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Data-
base produced by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of Interna-
tional Studies www.nti.org/db/nistraff/update.htm (last accessed 30 October 2003), or the 
Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) at the In-
stitute of International Studies, Stanford University. 
238  For instance, do all intelligence officials know the difference between a “dirty radiologi-
cal bomb” and an improvised nuclear device?  How would, and should, they react to re-
ports of seizures of large quantities of caesium at a European border crossing? 
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psychological responses in the public, are some key parameters that could 
differ. Checklists, based on specified scenarios, seem desirable.  
The evaluations presented in this thesis could provide a useful starting 
point for such endeavours. The assessment could, moreover, help establish 
national capability standards for levels of preparedness, as well as creating a 
basis for proper preparedness preparation, requirements and procure-
ments.239 A critical question in civilian nuclear defence is always “how 
much is enough” (Craig and Jungerman 1986, 362). Appropriate responses 
require risk knowledge, as produced in this study.   
Proper assessments of the threat of nuclear terrorism could, moreover, al-
low medical communities to perform their necessary evaluations. What kind 
of preparedness should, if any, be put in place to deal with low-probability/ 
high-consequence events like nuclear terrorist attacks? To what extent 
should specific resources be allocated, in what ways and where? Are there 
possible overlaps between nuclear terrorism preparedness and primary 
health-care improvements? Important synergies between bio-terrorism pre-
paredness and strengthened primary health-care have been identified (Chyba 
2001). 
International studies indicate that first-responders are dangerously unpre-
pared (Rudman et al. 2003). In the event of nuclear or radiological terrorism, 
police and fire-fighters are likely to be among those ordered to the scene of 
the crime. Today, these forces are largely unprepared for such scenarios 
(Flood 2003; Rudman et al. 2003, 24).  
How first-responders would react is an open question, and refusal to enter 
contaminated areas cannot be excluded (Maerli 1999). Hence, there may be a 
need for more exercises and training, as well as suitable equipment. In some 
countries, most notably the USA, specialized forces have been established to 
respond to acts of nuclear terrorism (Richelson 2002). 
Besides, many of the current models and simulations of nuclear terrorism 
impact assume relatively simplistic blast, thermal, immediate radiation, and 
plume/fallout patterns (Cordesman 2001, 44). There has also been very little 
concern about EMP effects, even when modelling impacts in societies filled 
with computers and electric communication systems and control devices. 
Consequently, there could be a risk of providing erroneous estimates, and of 
misleading responders.  
Work should hence be initiated to model the effects of nuclear terrorist 
effects in urban settings more realistically. Improved models should allow 
for better prediction of fallout and dose patterns, as well as primary and sec-
ondary effects, including the likely collapses in heath services, possible fire-
storms, and the risk of epidemics (see Section A.2.2 in Appendix II). 
                                                     
239  While the probability of terrorist attacks with nuclear, biological, or chemical material 
may be low in Norway, it has been recognized that the consequences of such attacks are 
potentially so serious that the emergency preparedness should be strengthened (Justis og 
Politidepartementet 2002, 5). Some measures should “immediately be carried out”, in or-
der to increase “the atomic emergency preparedness against acts of terror” (Justis og 
Politidepartementet 2002, 10). 
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A.7.8 Improved Communication on Nuclear Terrorism Risk 
 
The victims of acts of terrorism are not the primary targets. They are instru-
mental, serving mainly as message generators to impress, coerce or terrorize 
one or several audiences, sometimes simultaneously (Schmid 2003a, 11). 
The psychological impact of acts of nuclear terrorism is likely to be particu-
larly strong (see Section 4.1.1).  
As terrorism should be viewed as a type of violence-induced communica-
tion, both the propaganda dimension of the terror and the public relation of 
countermeasures are essential (Schmid 2003a, 12). At the same time, how-
ever, an attitude that issues related to nuclear explosives are “too compli-
cated” and hence should be left with the experts seems to prevail (Craig and 
Jungerman 1986, 365).  
For proper risk communication, there hence is a need for sensitivity to the 
situations and knowledge of those at risk, or who perceive themselves to be 
at risk (Irwin and Wynne 1996, 214). Generally, lay understandings of risk 
may be quite different from the objective risk assessments of “experts” 
(Reitan et al. 1996, 155; Stern 1999, 33).  
Slovic (1996, 165) has stressed the urgent need to develop plans and ma-
terial for communicating with the public in the event of a radiological disas-
ter. In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the news media are likely to be 
the single most important channel of communication between the govern-
ment and the public.  
As such, the media may prove the real “first-responders” in a catastrophic 
terrorist event (Randstorp 2003b). At the same time, however, there is a 
symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the media (Bjørgo and 
Heradstveit 1993, 42; Wilkinson 1997, 54).240 As news sources tend to focus 
on spectacular and negative aspects (Galtung and Ruge 1965), the media 
may contribute to the social amplification of risks.  
Hence, the level of the threat of nuclear terrorism needs to be communi-
cated in appropriate perspective (Putnam 2002), to journalists and the public 
at large. By making clearer the multifaceted characteristics of nuclear terror-
ism, and possible ways to prevent such catastrophic events from happening, 
assessments like this one could pave the way for a better dialogue between 
different actors in the communication process.  
Again, risk understanding is an essential point of departure. 
                                                     
240  Simplistically put, terrorists need information channels to carry their message and display 
their violent acts, and the media need to sell their commodity, which is (negative) news.  
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Activation products: Non-fissile material that has become radioactive as a result of 
neutron irradiation. 
 
Atom: The basic component of all matter. The atom is the smallest particle of an ele-
ment that has all of the chemical properties of that element. Atoms consist of a nu-
cleus of protons and neutrons surrounded by electrons. 
 
Audit: A documented activity performed to determine the adequacy of, and adher-
ence to, established procedures, instructions, specifications, codes and standards. 
 
Becquerel (Bq): The SI unit for measuring the rate of nuclear transformations, or 
activity. The becquerel is defined as one radioactive disintegration per second. 1 Bq 
is approximately 27 pCi. 
 
Cold War: A conflict over ideological differences between the United States and the 
Soviet Union and their allies lasting from the late 1940s until the early 1990s. 
 
Contamination: The unintended or undesirable presence of radioactive substances 
on surfaces, or within solids, liquids or gases (including the human body). 
 
Cooperative Threat Reduction: A U.S. programme designed to help the countries of 
the former Soviet Union destroy and protect nuclear, chemical and biological mate-
rial and weapons, and associated infrastructure. The programme emanates from the 
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, championed through Congress by 
Senators Nunn and Lugar. 
 
Critical mass: If the neutrons from the fission of a nucleus cause the fission of at 
least one other nucleus, a fission chain reaction is produced. The minimum mass that 
can sustain a nuclear fission chain reaction is called the “critical mass”. The fission 
cross-section and the average number of neutrons per fission are somewhat smaller 
for U-235 than they are for Pu-239, making the critical mass larger. The critical 
mass of enriched uranium increases as the relative amount of U-235 decreases. The 
critical mass of a bare solid sphere of U-235 is approximately 50 kg. However, the 
inevitable presence of impurities will raise this value.  
 
Criticality: The state of a nuclear chain reaction when it is just self-sustaining (or 
critical), i.e. when reactivity is zero. 
 
Crude nuclear explosive devices: Technically unsophisticated nuclear explosive 
devices of the first generation, possibly within the technical reach of non-state ac-
tors. 
 
Curie (Ci): A unit of radioactive decay rate defined as 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations per 
second. It equals the amount of radioactivity in 1 gram of the isotope radium-226.  
 
Decay: The process by which an unstable element is changed to another isotope or 
another element by the spontaneous emission of radiation from its nucleus. This pro-
cess can be measured by using radiation detectors. 
                                                     
241  Input entities for the glossary are taken from the main text, as well as from Section I of 
Central Intelligence Agency 1998; International Atomic Energy Agency 2000; Internatio-
nal Atomic Energy Agency 2002b; US Department of Energy, undated. 
Morten Bremer Mærli 
glossary 
142 
Decontamination: The process of making people, objects, or areas safe by absorb-
ing, destroying, neutralizing, or removing the hazardous (radioactive) material. 
 
Depleted uranium: Uranium that, through the process of enrichment, has been 
stripped of most of the uranium-235 it once contained, so that it has more uranium-
238 than natural uranium. It is used in some parts of nuclear weapons and as a raw 
material for plutonium production. 
 
Direct-use material: Nuclear material that can be used to manufacture nuclear ex-
plosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment. This category includes 
plutonium containing less than 80% of Pu-238, highly enriched uranium and U-233. 
Unirradiated direct-use material (such as fresh highly enriched uranium or separated 
plutonium) requires the least processing time and least effort to produce a nuclear 
explosive device.   
 
Domestic Safeguards: See Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A). 
 
Dose: A general term for the amount of radiation absorbed over a period of time. 
 
Emergency preparedness: The capability to take prompt action that can effectively 
mitigate the impact of an emergency on human health and safety, property or the 
environment.  
 
Emergency response: Actions taken to mitigate the impact of an emergency. 
 
Enrichment: Enriching uranium increases the concentration of uranium-235 atoms 
in a uranium sample. When uranium is mined, it consists of heavy uranium-238 at-
oms (about 99.3% of the mass), together with medium-weight uranium-235 atoms 
(0.7%) and light-weight uranium-234 atoms (< 0.01%). See Highly Enriched Ura-
nium (HEU). 
 
Exposure: The act or condition of being subject to irradiation. 
 
Fallout: Radioactive particles resulting from a nuclear explosion that gradually de-
scend to earth. 
 
Fat Man: The second atomic bomb used by the United States. Fat Man was dropped 
on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945. Its design was of an implosion type.  
 
First-generation nuclear explosives: Fission weapons produced for first time in the 
mid-1940s under the US Manhattan Project. There are two basic designs of this gen-
eration: Implosion type and gun type. See Crude nuclear explosives. 
 
Fissile material: Nuclear material capable of undergoing fission by interaction with 
slow neutrons; uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, or any 
combination of these radionuclides.  
 
Fission: The splitting or breaking apart of the nucleus of a heavy atom usually 
caused by the absorption of a neutron. Large amounts of energy and one or more 
neutrons are released when an atom fissions.  
 
Fission products: Radionuclides produced by nuclear fission.  
 
Fuel assembly: A set of fuel elements and associated components which are loaded 
into and subsequently removed from a reactor core as a single unit. 
 
Fuel element: A rod of nuclear fuel, its cladding and any associated components 
necessary to form a structural entity. 
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Fusion: The process whereby the nuclei of lighter elements, especially the isotopes 
of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium) combine to form the nucleus of a heavier ele-
ment with the release of substantial amounts of energy. 
 
G–8 Global Partnership: In June 2002, the G–8 countries launched the Global Part-
nership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under 
this initiative, G–8 countries will support specific cooperation projects, initially in 
Russia, to address issues of non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and 
nuclear safety. Among the priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weap-
ons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of 
fissile material and the employment of former weapons scientists. The G–8 countries 
committed themselves to raise up to $20 billion to support such projects over the 
next ten years. Some non-G–8 countries, among them Norway, have later joined the 
partnership.   
 
Gamma rays: High-energy, highly penetrating photons emitted from the nucleus of 
atoms, similar to x-rays. They can penetrate deeply into body tissue and many other 
materials. Shielding against gamma radiation requires thick layers of dense materi-
als, such as lead. Gamma rays are potentially lethal to humans.  
 
Gun-type design: One of the two first-generation nuclear explosive designs. In the 
gun-type design, one sub-critical mass is fired onto another sub-critical mass of fis-
sile material with the use of conventional explosives. The higher probability of 
spontaneous fissions and, hence, a higher neutron background renders it impossible 
to use plutonium in the relatively slow gun-type design. Generally, it is easier to pro-
duce improvised nuclear devices by highly enriched uranium and the gun-type de-
sign than by using implosion based plutonium weapons, but the critical mass is 
higher. 
 
Half-life: The amount of time needed for half of the atoms of a radioactive material 
to decay. 
 
Health effects (of radiation): These may be deterministic and/or stochastic. Deter-
ministic effects are radiation effects for which a threshold level of dose generally 
exists, above which the severity of the effect is greater for a higher dose. Stochastic 
effects are radiation-induced health effects whose probability of occurrence is 
greater for a higher radiation dose and whose severity (if it occurs) is independent of 
dose. Stochastic effects may be somatic effects or hereditary effects, and generally 
occur without a threshold level of dose.  
 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-
235. It is generally considered possible to construct nuclear explosives with enrich-
ment levels as low as 20%. When diluted to an isotopic content less than 15–20% in 
uranium-235, the material cannot be used in a nuclear device because sufficiently 
rapid super-critical assembly of the explosive becomes impractical and the critical 
mass too large. Weapons-grade HEU is enriched to above 90% in U-235. 
 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Deal: Under the U.S.–Russian Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement, 500 tons of Russian HEU are to be blended to 
proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium (LEU) by the year 2013. The material 
is to be sold to the United States for re-sale as fuel for commercial nuclear power 
plants. As of end of 2003, 201.5 metric tons of weapons-grade HEU had been recy-
cled into some 5,900 metric tons of LEU power-plant fuel and delivered to the 
United States. The agreement is also known as the HEU “Megatons to Megawatt” 
deal. Transparency and non-intrusive HEU verification are prerequisites for its suc-
cessful implementation.  
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Illicit trafficking: Receipt, possession, transfer or disposal of nuclear or other radio-
active material without proper authorization. 
 
Implosion-type design: One of the two first-generation nuclear explosive designs. 
To create a critical mass for implosion-design weapons, a sub-critical spherical mass 
is symmetrically compressed by an array of triggers packed around conventional 
explosives with fissile material, either weapons-grade plutonium or weapons-grade 
uranium, in the centre. 
 
Improvised nuclear device: A crude nuclear explosive device possibly within the 
technical reach of terrorists. 
 
Information barrier: During non-intrusive verification of fissile material in classi-
fied or sensitive forms, an information barrier must both prevent the release (acci-
dental or intentional) of any classified information, and at the same time provide 
confidence that the measured systems are functioning correctly and that the unclassi-
fied display (output) reflects the true state of the measured item.  
 
Inspection: An examination, observation, measurement or test undertaken to assess 
nuclear activities and compliance with formalized agreements.  
 
International Safeguards: see Safeguards. 
 
Isotopes: One or two atoms with the same atomic number, but with different number 
of neutrons and hence different mass number. There are various isotopes of uranium, 
which all contain 92 protons in the atom’s centre (which makes it uranium). The 
heaviest atoms contain 146 neutrons, the middle-weight atoms contain 143 neutrons, 
and the light-weight have just 142 neutrons. In designating these isotopes, it is 
common to add together the number of protons and neutrons and then attach that 
total on the back of the name: uranium-234, uranium-235, and uranium-238.  
 
Lethal dose: The dose of radiation expected to cause death without medical treat-
ment. 
 
Little Boy: The first atomic bomb used by the United States. Little Boy was dropped 
on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. Its design was of a gun-type. 
 
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU): Uranium enriched to below 20% in U-235. Nuclear 
reactor fuel typically consists of about 3% uranium- 235 and 97% uranium-238.  
 
Manhattan Project: The U.S. Government project, named for the Manhattan Engi-
neer District that produced the first nuclear weapons during World War II. Started in 
1942, the Manhattan Project formally ended in 1946. The Hanford Site, the Oak 
Ridge Reservation, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory were created for this 
effort. 
 
Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A): Systems intended to pro-
tect material against theft or diversion, and to detect such events if they occur. The 
systems consist of a combination of physical protection to delay and detect intru-
sion; control and containment to prevent unauthorized movement of material; and, 
finally, accounting to ensure all material is accounted for, to enable the measurement 
of losses, and to provide information for follow-up investigations in case of irregu-
larities.   
 
Monitoring: The measurement of radiation and the interpretation of the results for 
verification purposes. 
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MOX: Mixed Oxide Fuel. It usually contains natural or depleted uranium and pluto-
nium oxides.  
 
Mutually assured destruction (MAD): A Cold War concept whereby if one side 
first launched a nuclear attack, the other side would retaliate in kind. 
 
Naval reactor: A class of nuclear reactors used for propulsion of surface ships and 
submarines.   
 
Non-intrusive verification: Fissile material verification activities carried out in such 
a manner that sensitive or classified information is protected. The verification tech-
nique normally includes both procedural and technical means, for instance the use of 
information barriers.  
 
Non-state actors: Sub-national terrorist groups.  
 
Nuclear husbandry: Responsible, careful, and judicious handling, protection and 
control of fissile material. Seven Nuclear Husbandry Functions span the spectrum of 
nuclear security activities. 
 
Nuclear installation: A facility that is part of the nuclear fuel cycle or a nuclear 
research institution.  
 
Nuclear Reactor: A device that sustains a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction. 
 
Nuclear security: Prevention of the loss, theft or unauthorized use of nuclear mate-
rial or nuclear explosives. 
 
Nuclear terrorism: Acts of violence and destruction performed by non-state actors 
where the means applied are nuclear explosive devices – or threats of the use of such 
actions – with the purpose of inflicting destruction, creating fear, getting attention, 
blackmailing, installing instability, and affecting a wider audience than only the vic-
tim(s) directly targeted. 
 
Nuclear weapon complex: The chain of foundries, uranium enrichment plants, nu-
clear reactors, chemical separation plants, factories, laboratories, assembly plants, 
and test sites that produces nuclear weapons. 
 
Plutonium-239: A metallic element used for nuclear weapons with a half-life of 
24,110 years. For plutonium, more than 90% Pu-239, denoted “weapons-grade plu-
tonium”, will normally be preferred in weapon designs, although virtually all com-
binations of plutonium isotopes may be used to manufacture nuclear explosives. An 
exception is plutonium containing substantial quantities of Pu-238, which generates 
so much heat and gamma radiation that it is not practical for use in nuclear explo-
sives. Even reactor-grade plutonium is considered by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency as direct-use, i.e. weapons-useable material. 
 
Practical nuclear arms control measures: Measures to protect and control nuclear 
material, i.e. to increase nuclear security, by means of designated tools. 
 
Prophylaxis: The act of preserving from, or of preventing, disease; the observance 
of the rules necessary for the preservation of health; preservative or preventive 
treatment. 
 
Public-Interest Science: Qualified scientists and researchers provide independent 
technical analysis, and present their findings directly to the public, either through the 
media or at public hearings. Practitioners of public-interest science often denote 
themselves “citizen-scientists”. 
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Radiation: Alpha or beta particles or gamma rays that are emitted by an atom as the 
substance undergoes radioactive decay.  
 
Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD): A device other than a nuclear explosive device, 
designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, 
or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material. 
 
Radioactive material: Material exhibiting radioactivity. 
 
Radioactivity: The phenomenon whereby atoms undergo spontaneous random disin-
tegration, usually accompanied by the emission of radiation. 
 
Radiological terrorism: Acts of terror performed by non-state actors where the 
means applied are radioactive substances. 
 
Reliability: The probability that a system will meet its minimum performance re-
quirements when called upon to do so. 
 
Research reactor: A class of nuclear reactors used to do research into nuclear phys-
ics, reactor materials and design, and nuclear medicine. Some research reactors also 
produce isotopes for industrial and medical use. 
 
Risk: A multi-attribute quantity expressing hazard, danger or chance of harmful or 
injurious consequences associated with actual or potential exposures. It relates to 
quantities such as the probability that specific deleterious consequences may arise 
and the magnitude and character of such consequences. 
 
Safeguards: Control activities performed by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, comprising a set of technical measures by which the IAEA independently 
verifies the correctness and completeness of declarations made by states about their 
nuclear material and activities. 
 
Secrecy: Deliberately concealing intents, capabilities, and actions. Secrecy may be 
viewed as the opposite of transparency. It may be justified from the perspective of 
national security and international non-proliferation obligations. 
 
Shielding: Dense materials (lead, concrete, etc.) used to block or attenuate radiation 
for protection of equipment, materials or people.  
 
Significant Quantity (SQ): A measure used in establishing the quantity component 
of the IAEA inspection goal. The Significant Quantities take into consideration un-
avoidable losses due to conversion and manufacturing processes and should not be 
confused with critical masses. SQs are defined as 8 kg of plutonium or uranium-233 
or 25 kg of uranium-235 contained in a uranium product enriched to 20% or more in 
uranium-235. 
 
Special fissionable material: This category contains Pu-239, U-233, and uranium 
enriched in the isotopes U-233 and U-235, or any material containing one or more of 
the foregoing; and other such fissionable material as the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency Board of Governors shall from time to time determine. 
 
Spent fuel: Nuclear fuel removed from a reactor following irradiation, which is no 
longer useable in its present form because of depletion of fissile material, poison 
build-up or radiation damage. 
 
Thermonuclear weapon: A nuclear weapon that uses fission to start a fusion reac-
tion. Commonly called hydrogen bomb or “H-bomb”. Non-state actors are unlikely 
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to have the know-how and competence needed to construct sophisticated nuclear 
weapons like this.  
 
Threat: A (personally) felt or perceived concern about a looming peril, normally 
non-quantifiable.   
 
Transparency: A process in which information about governmental actions, prefer-
ences, intentions, and capabilities is made available, or more properly, allowed to 
flow, to citizens and the international community. Transparency surpasses required 
activities, such as reporting or verification obligations mandated by treaty. Transpar-
ency is “permitted knowledge”, and may be viewed as the opposite to secrecy.  
 
Uranium-235: U-235 is used as a reactor fuel or for weapons. Naturally occurring 
uranium U-235 is found at 0.72% enrichment. For fission explosives, nuclear 
weapon designers prefer a U-235 fraction of more than 90%, normally denoted 
“weapons-grade uranium”. The half-life is 7.04 x 108 years. 
 
Validation: The process of determining whether a product or service is adequate to 
perform its intended function satisfactorily. 
 
Verification: The process of determining whether the quality or performance of a 
nuclear activity is as intended or as required by treaty. 
 
Weapons-grade material: See direct-use material. 
 
Weapons-useable material: See direct-use material. 
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